After several weeks of large mailings, this mailing is relatively
brief. No capital decision reported this week. The Seventh
Circuit database remains outdated and down.
In depth this week analyzes jury selection in capital cases.
Supreme
Court
The Supreme Court has dismissed as
moot the challenge to Florida's electric chair.
Capital
Cases
No capital cases to report this week.
Habeas
Cases
Harris
v. Barkley (2nd Cir) "Petitioner asserts that his 1992 robbery conviction
was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. Specifically, he
claims that he was deprived of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent
and of his Fourteenth Amendment due process right to consult with his attorney,
as both were defined by the Supreme Court in Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S.
605 (1972), when the trial court ordered that if he was to testify he would
have to do so prior to the last defense witness, who was not available
until the next day. We conclude that, in the circumstances presented, the
trial court did not commit Brooks error."
Parks
v. People of California (9th Cir) Although petitioner failed to bring
to the state supreme court by the traditional route, the state supreme
court did review those claims. District Court's holding finding certain
claims procedurally defaulted reversed as the California Supreme Court
did not state its "decision was based on a bona fide, adequate, and independent
ground."
Oliver
v. Gramley (7th Cir) Habeas petition dismissed for fraud as "[w]hen
the state sought to dismiss Oliver's petition for habeas corpus on the
ground that he had failed to petition the Supreme Court of Illinois for
leave to appeal, he came back with an affidavit swearing that he had given
prison officials the petition to file, and he also submitted what appeared
to be a certificate of service. The district judge thought the certificate
a forgery and the affidavit perjurious, and Oliver, while denying that
he intended to commit perjury or deceive the court, does not deny that
the certificate was forged (by Oliver's father) and the affidavit false."
Section
1983 & Related Filings
Scrooger
v. Booker (10th Cir) Bureau of prison erred in denying a sentencing
reduction available to certain inmates who successfully completed
a drug treatment program.
In Depth
This week's installment of "in depth"
examines capital jury selection. (From at the Habeas
Assistance Training gang from AOC).
VI. JURY SELECTION
The Court has considered a series of cases addressing the question
of juror bias in capital cases and the defendant's right to a fair trial
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. These cases have focused
either on jurors' attitudes toward the death penalty -- i.e. whether they
are strongly opposed or in favor of the death penalty -- or racial bias.
In deciding these cases, the Court has tried to give guidance with regard
to the appropriate scope of voir dire.
A. Death-Qualified Jurors
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), the Court held "that
a sentence of death cannot be imposed or recommended if the jury that imposed
or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because
they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious
or religious scruples against its infliction." Id. at 522. The Court observed
that even someone opposed to the death penalty "can make the discretionary
judgment entrusted to him by the State and can thus obey the oath." Id.
at 519. A state, however, may exclude those jurors who would automatically
vote against the death penalty or those jurors whose attitudes about the
death penalty would affect their decision regarding the defendant's guilt.
Id. at 522, n.21.
Later, the Court made clear that Witherspoon did not hold that the state
could exclude only those jurors who would automatically vote against capital
punishment. In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), the Court held
that the standard for excluding a juror because of his views in opposition
to the death penalty is "whether the juror's views would 'prevent or substantially
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his
instructions and his oath.'" Id. at 424 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S.
38, 45 (1980)). The Court treated the question of jurors beliefs with regard
to the death penalty as simply a routine inquiry into juror bias governed
by Sixth Amendment standards applicable to all cases rather than the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 423.
The Court also noted that trial judges have historically been charged
with determining whether a prospective juror harbors any bias. Id. at 428.
If the trial judge, who is best placed to evaluate a juror's credibility,
receives the impression that the juror would be unable to follow the law,
the judge can remove the juror for cause. Id. at 425-26.22
B. Reverse-Witherspoon
Just as the state may excuse for cause those jurors whose beliefs against
the death penalty would substantially impair their performance of their
duties as jurors, a defendant may excuse for cause those jurors whose beliefs
in favor of capital punishment would lead them to ignore the court's instructions,
not to consider mitigating circumstances, and to vote for the death penalty
in every case. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992). This violates
"the requirement of impartiality embodied in the Due Process Clause." Id.
If the defendant has the right to excuse for cause jurors who hold such
views, and because the defendant must demonstrate that the juror lacks
impartiality, voir dire must be adequate to uncover such bias. Id., 504
U.S. at 733-34.23 It is not enough simply
to ask the jurors if they could be fair and follow the law. Id., 504 U.S.
at 734-36. The defendant must be able to ascertain whether the prospective
jurors find mitigating evidence irrelevant or even not worth their consideration.
Id., 504 U.S. at 735.
C. Racial Bias
In Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986), the Court held that a capital
defendant is entitled to voir dire on the question of racial bias. "Because
of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital sentencing
hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate
but remain undetected." Id. at 35. Thus, unless adequate voir dire is conducted,
beliefs that blacks are more violence prone or morally inferior could influence
how a juror views and weighs aggravating factors. Id. Racist beliefs could
also cloud a juror's view of evidence in mitigation. Id. Without adequate
voir dire, there is an unacceptable risk "of improper sentencing in a capital
case." Id. at 37. The Court, however, stressed that its holding was limited
to cases in which the state was seeking the death penalty. In addition,
the Court held only that Turner was entitled to a new sentencing phase,
not a new trial on guilt-or-innocence. Id.
Errata
In errata this
week is an excerpt of legal humor and commentary from Slate
magazine. Archive search
A discussion list for legal professional
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