Two capital opinions dominate this issue, Valdez v. Ward (10th Cir) and Grandison v. Corcoran,  (4th Cir) (unpublished).  Both cases are a general grab bag of claims that cover  ground too often tread before including competency to stand trial, competence of counsel, and prosecutorial perversions of justice. 

This week's installment features the Supreme Court term that just ended with the annual year end review from the National Law Journal (http://law.com).

Finally, although the full article is  not available at the time of publication, Pollingreport.com is reporting the results of a Wall Street Journal and NBC poll on capital punishment.

NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll conducted by the polling organizations of Peter Hart (D) and Robert Teeter (R). July 27-28, 2000. N=500 registered voters nationwide.
						.
"From what you know, do you think that the death penalty is or is not applied fairly?"
		%
	Applied fairly	42
	Not applied fairly	42
	Depends (vol.)	8
	Not sure	8
						.
"As you may have heard, there have been several instances in which criminals sentenced to be executed have been released based on new evidence or new DNA testing. Based on this information, would you favor or oppose a suspension of the death penalty until questions about its fairness can be studied?"
		%
	Favor suspension	63
	Oppose suspension	30
	Depends (vol.)	4
	Not sure	3

 
 

Valdez v. Ward, No. 99-6147 (10th Cir. 07/27/2000) "On appeal, Mr. Valdez makes six claims of constitutional error: (1) his statements made on July 25 and 26 were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights; (2) the July 26 interrogation violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel; (3) the State failed to prove he was sane beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) he was incompetent to stand trial; (5) the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on second degree murder violated his due process rights; and (6) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The district court granted Mr. Valdez a certificate of appealability on all of these issues. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)." Relief denied.

A. Miranda Waiver

Mr. Valdez's claim that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights is based upon his assertion that he did not understand those rights as read to him in English. Although the ultimate question of whether Mr. Valdez's waiver was knowing and intelligent is subject to review under the standards set forth in section 2254(d), see Pickens v. Gibson, 206 F.3d 988, 995 (10th Cir. 2000), any subsidiary factual findings made by the state court are entitled to a presumption of correctness under section 2254(e), see id. at 994. See also Trice, 196 F.3d at 1169 (although ultimate question of whether petitioner's confession was voluntary reviewed under section 2254(d), subsidiary factual findings entitled to section 2254(e)'s presumption of correctness). 

Whether Mr. Valdez understood his Miranda rights is a question of fact, see Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1131 (11th Cir. 2000); Cuppett v. Duckworth, 8 F.3d 1132, 1141 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc); Derrick v. Peterson, 924 F.3d 813, 823-24 (9th Cir. 1990), which underlies the legal question of whether his waiver was knowing and intelligent, see Perri v. Department of Corrections, 817 F.2d 448, 451 (7th Cir. 1987). We therefore must presume the OCCA's factual finding that Mr. Valdez "fully comprehended what was being said to and asked of him," Valdez, 900 P.2d at 371, is correct unless Mr. Valdez convinces us otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. See § 2254(e)(1). 

Mr. Valdez did not offer any additional evidence and merely argues from the trial record that he did not fully comprehend English and thus did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights. After a close reading of the entire record, we agree with the state court that it establishes Mr. Valdez's understanding of English. In particular, Mr. Valdez's responses to questions during his July 25 interrogations, see Rec., Supp. Ex. 2, and during his lengthy trial testimony, see Rec., vol. V at 10-103, convince us that while he had some limitations in his ability to speak English and therefore occasionally referred to an interpreter to express himself at trial, he fully comprehended what was being asked of him and explained to him. See, e.g., United States v. Todisco, 667 F.2d 255, 260 (2d Cir. 1981) (defendant's in-court behavior supported trial court's finding that defendant understood Miranda rights read to him in non-native language). 

In sum, we agree with the OCCA's exhaustive review of the record, see Valdez, 900 P.2d at 371-72, and its conclusion based thereon that "Valdez's assurances over the course of the evening that he understood his Miranda rights, coupled with his objectively verifiable ability to understand and answer the questions posed to him during the final interrogation, provide sufficient proof that he knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights prior to confessing on July 25th, 1989." Id. at 372. Because Mr. Valdez has not provided any further evidence, clear and convincing or otherwise, to rebut this finding, we reject his assertion that he did not understand English. Consequently, we agree with the OCCA that he knowingly and intelligently waived his rights on July 25. 

B. Invocation of Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel

Mr. Valdez's next Fifth Amendment claim is based upon his assertion that he requested counsel during the interrogation at his home on July 25. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the Court held that after an accused clearly invokes his right to have counsel present during a custodial interrogation, officers must cease all questioning and may not reinitiate questioning on any matter until counsel is provided. See id. at 484-85 (the "Edwards rule"). Relying on Edwards, Mr. Valdez contends his July 26 interrogation by Agent Irwin without counsel present violated his Fifth Amendment rights because it occurred after he invoked his right to counsel the previous day. Therefore, he argues, Agent Irwin's testimony was inadmissible at trial. 

On the evening of July 25, after Deputy Cunningham convinced Mr. Valdez to show him where he disposed of Mr. Barron's body, he presented Mr. Valdez with a Miranda waiver form which Mr. Valdez signed. The officers then taped Mr. Valdez's subsequent confession. Investigator Benson concluded the interrogation by asking Mr. Valdez whether his confession was voluntarily made and whether he willingly signed the Miranda waiver form. Mr. Valdez replied: "Yes, I understand it a little bit and I sign it because I understand it something about a lawyer and he want to ask me questions and that's what I'm looking for a lawyer." Rec., Supp. Ex. 1 at 5. Investigator Benson replied, "But you are willingly talking to us? We didn't beat you or anything like that to get you to talk did we?" Id. After a barrage of questions along this line, and without a response from Mr. Valdez, Investigator Benson asked once more, "you talked to us because you wanted to didn't you?" Id. Mr. Valdez responded, "Yea." The officers then ended the taped statement. Mr. Valdez argues that his first response was an unequivocal invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during the custodial interrogation. 

In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), the Court described the Edwards rule as requiring courts to "determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel." Id. at 458. The Court stated that reviewing courts must make this objective inquiry with the understanding that "a statement either is such an assertion of the right to counsel or it is not." Id. at 459. The Court held that "if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel," the Edwards rule requiring a cessation of questioning does not apply. Id. at 459. 

Mr. Valdez unsuccessfully raised this challenge in his direct appeal. See Valdez, 900 P.2d at 374. Reviewing the issue, the OCCA described the circumstances as they existed on July 25, prior to Mr. Valdez's purported invocation. Applying Davis to those circumstances, the court determined that Mr. Valdez's statement was "[a]t most . . . an ambiguous request for counsel." Id. The OCCA therefore held that Mr. Valdez's subsequent uncounseled interrogation on July 26 did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights. 

Whether a statement constitutes an unequivocal request for counsel under Davis is a question of law, see United States v. Oba, 978 F.2d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 1992), which we review under AEDPA § 2254(d) if the state has addressed the issue on the merits, see LaFevers v. Gibson, 182 F.3d 705, 711 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1290 (2000). Mr. Valdez asserts the OCCA's determination is both contrary to, and an unreasonable application of, Davis. See § 2254(d)(1). The OCCA correctly cited Davis and applied its holding when reviewing this claim, and Mr. Valdez does not argue otherwise. For this reason, its determination is not contrary to Davis. See Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1519-20. Hence, for Mr. Valdez to obtain habeas relief on this claim, he must convince us the OCCA's determination "unreasonably applies [Davis] to the facts of [his] case." Id. at 1520. We agree with the district court that it did not. 

The OCCA's conclusion that Mr. Valdez's reference to an attorney was insufficient to invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Davis was not unreasonable. At the outset, we agree with the OCCA that a plain reading of Mr. Valdez's statement is ambiguous, particularly because it was made after he had given a taped confession and showed police where he had burned the body, undermining his need for the aid of counsel during the interrogation. See, e.g., United States v. Scurlock, 52 F.3d 531, 537 (5th Cir. 1995) (where accused confessed, agreed to give a recorded statement, was read Miranda rights and asked if she was willing to answer questions, accused's subsequent comment that she needed a lawyer was insufficient under Davis to invoke her Fifth Amendment right to counsel); Lord v. Duckworth, 29 F.3d 1216, 1221 (7th Cir. 1994) (accused's statement "I can't afford a lawyer but is there anyway I can get one?," was ambiguous because accused had twice been informed of Miranda rights and had already confessed in lengthy, tape-recorded statement). 

In Davis, the Supreme Court "recognize[d] that requiring a clear assertion of the right to counsel might disadvantage some suspects who--because of . . . [a] lack of linguistic skills . . . --will not clearly articulate their right to counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer present." Davis, 512 U.S. at 460. Despite this, the Supreme Court rejected any further prophylactic protections for an accused's Fifth Amendment right to counsel, holding instead that the primary protection is the accused's comprehension of the Miranda warnings themselves. Id. As discussed above, Mr. Valdez had been read his rights three times prior to making this statement, and the record supports the OCCA's determination that he understood those rights and that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. In light of this, and the fact that Mr. Valdez's statement came after he confessed, the OCCA's determination that Mr. Valdez's statement was an ambiguous request for counsel is not an objectively unreasonable application of Davis. 

Grandison's fourth claim regarding the state proceedings is that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at resentencing. Specifically, he contends that Tuminelli and Purpura, whom he discharged eight days before the resentencing hearing began, failed to investigate and develop mitigation evidence regarding his alleged mental health problems. He asserts that, if only his counsel had investigated these problems so that the resentencing jury, which sentenced him to death on the basis of Maryland's "murder for hire" aggravating circumstance, could have considered them, the jury would not have sentenced him to death.*fn12

In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Grandison must show (1) that his attorneys' actions, in light of all the surrounding circumstances, were professionally unreasonable, i.e., "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance," Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984); and that (2) "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," id. at 694. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id.

When applying the first prong of the Strickland test, "court[s] must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." Id. at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, "strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation." Id. at 690-91. "In other words counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." Id. at 691. "In any ineffective assistance case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments." Id. Also important to keep in mind is that

 [t]he reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own state ments or actions. Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defen dant and on information supplied by the defendant. In par ticular, what investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such information . . . . [W]hen a defendant has given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investi gations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel's failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable. Id.

With these familiar principles in mind, we address Grandison's claim that Tuminelli and Purpura were ineffective. *fn13 The state post-conviction court found that this claim was without merit, noting that there was simply no indication on the record that Tuminelli and Purpura were aware, or should have been aware, of any alleged mental problems that could be used as mitigation evidence. As noted during our discussion of Grandison's claim that he was not competent to waive counsel and that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary, see supra Part II.B, both Tuminelli and Purpura testified that they found Grandison to be an intelligent and articulate client. Tuminelli's overall assessment of Grandison's performance as a client bears repeating: "All I can say is that in my contact with Anthony Grandison he appeared to be rational, intelligent and competent and I didn't see a basis for trying to have him evaluated [by a mental health professional]." (J.A. at 872.) As the state post-conviction court noted, even Dr. Knable, who testified on Grandison's behalf, said that the nonprogressive dementia with which he diagnosed Grandison "would not be clear to the general public." (J.A. at 717.) *fn14

Moreover, as the state post-conviction court noted, Grandison did not want his counsel to present any defense that alleged he was suffering from a mental impairment. Tuminelli testified that "[i]n addition we never had any reason, that I have no recollection of ever thinking that Mr. Grandison had some kind of deficiency. But even if he did, I mean, there were limitations on what kind of defense was acceptable to Mr. Grandison." (J.A. at 857.) Also relevant is that, according to Tuminelli, one of Grandison's prior attorneys, Phil Dantes, had been fired specifically because he had suggested using mental health evidence in Grandison's defense. Grandison states that he never directly instructed Tuminelli and Purpura not to pursue a mental-health mitigation defense; this assertion, however, is contradicted by the following portion of Tuminelli's testimony: "And Mr. Grandison made clear and the information we had from Capital Defense and from Mr. Dantes was that [a mitigation defense based upon mental impairment] was not open to discussion." (J.A. at 857.) Moreover, as noted earlier, Tuminelli and Purpura had planned, at resentencing, to pursue a defense in regard to the "murder for hire" aggravating circumstance that, even if Evans was the triggerman, Grandison did not order or offer to pay for the shooting because he was familiar enough with the rules of evidence to know that the Piechowiczs' prior testimony from motion hearings and grand jury proceedings could be admitted against him at trial in the event of their death. Surely, as a strategic matter, offering evidence of a debilitating mental impairment would have been inconsistent with, and detrimental to, that line of defense, which would have relied upon Grandison's strong mental abilities. In these circumstances, we fail to see how Tuminelli and Purpura could have been placed on notice that they needed to investigate questions about Grandison's alleged mental impairments as they prepared for resentencing. As the state post-conviction court noted, Grandison felt such a defense to be unacceptable, and his behavior was that of an intelligent and articulate individual. Grandison thus fails to meet the first prong of the Strickland test;*fn15 this failure obviates the need for us to consider the second prong.*fn16 The state post-conviction court's decision rejecting Grandison's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.

Sustache-Rivera v. United States, No. 99-2128 (1st Cir. 07/25/2000) First Circuit denies relief on  a claim that relies on the troactivity of Jones v. United States &  Apprendi v. New Jersey.

Steed v. Head, No. 99-13903  (11th Cir 07/26/00) "Steed appeals the district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition as untimely. Steed contends that his petition was not time-barred because the statute of limitations is tolled to include the ninety day period during which he could have petitioned the United States Supreme for certiorari review of the denial of his state habeas corpus petition. Alternatively, he argues that equitable tolling applies. . . . We conclude that Section 2244(d)(2) does not permit the tolling of the statute of limitations for the period of time a defendant could have petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari review of the denial of state habeas corpus relief. Moreover, the record does not support the application of the doctrine of equitable tolling. Steed's petition for federal habeas corpus relief was time-barred."

Henderson v. Simms, No. 99-1706 (4th Cir 07/28/2000) "Appellants . . . filed a 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 1999) suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against Appellees Stuart O. Simms, Richard A. Lanham, Sr., and William O. Filbert in their individual capacities. Appellants sought damages arising out of their summary arrests and reincarceration, pursuant to retake warrants for escapees, following their release from incarceration on mandatory supervision. The district court dismissed Appellants' suit on the ground of qualified immunity, reasoning that Appellees did not vio- late Appellants' clearly established constitutional rights under the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment. We hold that Appellees' arrests of Appellants pursuant to retake warrants for escapees did not violate Appellants' Fourth Amendment rights. We further hold that Appel- lees did not violate Appellants' Fourteenth Amendment rights in fail- ing to provide Appellants a hearing to challenge their arrests and reincarceration because Appellees reasonably thought that Appellants were mistakenly released prisoners with no cognizable interest in remaining at liberty. We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of Appellants' complaint."

Sikes v. Gaytan, No. 99-50316 (5th Cir.  July07/25/00) "In this section 1983 appeal, Robert Sikes, a Texas prisoner, claims that Juan Gaytan, a Texas prison guard, used excessive force against him and thereby violated his Eighth Amendment rights to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. Sikes proved to a jury that on August 22, 1995, he was severely beaten by the defendant, a sergeant at the Connally Unit. . . .In denying the defendant's request for a separate jury interrogatory on qualified immunity, the trial court concluded that giving separate interrogatories created the possibility of confusing the jury, resulting in the return of "irreconcilable" answers. It is plausible that a jury could be confused by an interrogatory asking whether the force Gaytan used against Sikes amounted to cruel and unusual punishment, and then being asked in an immediately following interrogatory whether the conduct of Gaytan was reasonable. Indeed, finding that the force used against Sikes was cruel and unusual would ordinarily seem to preclude the possibility of a finding that actions of Gaytan were reasonable. Still, we are constrained also to say that a plausible argument can be made that a separate interrogatory on qualified immunity, supported by a clear jury instruction, arguably could clarify rather than confuse the issue before the jury. In the light of this equipoise, we must conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in this case by giving a single jury instruction on the issues of liability and qualified immunity."

Cuocu v. Moritsugu   No. 98-2954 (2nd Cir. 7/28/00)"Plaintiff John Andrew Cuoco brought a pro se action claiming that she was denied estrogen treatments while incarcerated as a pre-trial detainee in the all-male Federal Correctional Institution at Otisville, New York ("FCI Otisville") in violation of, inter alia, her Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.   We conclude that all of the defendants enjoyed either qualified or absolute immunity from suit and were thus entitled to summary judgment." 

Sherrod v. Lingle No. 99-3385 (7th Cir 07/27/00) Remand granted as triable issues exist in this claim relating to failure to properly treat a prisoner's appendix

Zahrey v. Coffey, No. 99-9119 (2d Cir. 07/20/2000) "Appeal dismissing, on ground of qualified immunity, a claim that a prosecutor's  fabrication of evidence in his investigative capacity resulted in a violation of a constitutional right. Reversed and remanded." (link unavailable)

Massey v. Wheeler, No. 99-2663 (7th Cir. 07/20/2000) (link unavailable) "Inmate Michael Massey and his attorney, Richard L. Steagall, brought a two-count complaint against the staff of the Federal Correctional Center at Pekin, Illinois, where Massey is incarcerated, alleging violations of their constitutional rights. The plaintiffs allege that the prison's restrictions on inmates' unmonitored telephone calls violate their First and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed Count One without prejudice for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. Count Two, which Steagall brought both as a third-party asserting Massey's rights and in his own name asserting his own constitutional rights, also was dismissed. The district court dismissed without prejudice the third-party claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and dismissed with prejudice Steagall's first-party action for failure to state a claim. We affirm the district court's order and further hold that Steagall lacked standing to bring the third-party action in this case." 
 

 
This Term, the Supremes Made History
The National Law Journal
August 2, 2000 Try wrapping your arms around the Supreme Court term that just ended and it would seem to be an easy task, given that the number of decisions dropped to 74. But the number of sharply divided decisions was up. And it's difficult to think of an issue on the public-political agenda in the past few years that did not crowd the high court's docket this term. In retrospect, the term was remarkable. Is it historic though?
 

A Small, Potent Docket
The National Law Journal
In a just-ended term, the U.S. Supreme Court refined law, pushed it in new directions and secured old moorings. Was it a historic term, with landmark rulings? Consider the number of contentious cases and the shifting alliances among justices. Some say the history lies in the Court reminding the nation of its own institutional importance.
Related Chart: Voting Alignments on the Supreme Court

14th Amendment Is Real Issue in Federalism Cases
Special to The National Law Journal
For most commentators, the big story in the wake of the Supreme Court's recent federalism cases has been that a 5-4 majority of the court seems committed to cutting back on congressional power in favor of the states whenever possible. That description is only partly accurate, and it isn't the big story. 
 

No Landmarks Among First Amendment Cases 
Special to The National Law Journal 
Great anticipation accompanies the decisions of the Court involving the First Amendment. There is an almost perennial hope that the justices will make a landmark statement in a muddled area. Because there are many such areas in First Amendment doctrine, each decision is understandably scrutinized for signs of any tinkering. The 1999-2000 term did not disappoint. 
 

Supreme Court Rulings in Business Cases Covered a Broad Range
Special to The National Law Journal
The Supreme Court decided several cases affecting businesses last fall. It vigorously enforced federal preemption and declined to expand regulatory schemes. Yet businesses facing employment discrimination suits or private-citizen environmental actions fared poorly. 

---

Related Articles and Cases 

U.S. Supreme Court Wrap-Up: Circuitry

U.S. Supreme Court Wrap-Up: Insight Into the Issues and Cases of a Tumultuous Term 2000

 Clinton Postpones Federal Execution
President Clinton signed an order granting a reprieve to federal death row inmate Juan Raul Garza.  The stay will allow Garza the opportunity to petition for clemency under new procedures issued by the Department of Justice. Garza's attorneys stated they will point to racial and geographic disparities in the application of the federal death penalty.  The Justice Department is currently finishing a report on such disparities. Garza is now scheduled to be executed on December 12, 2000.  (Associated Press, 8/2/00 and New York Times, 8/3/00)  See also, Federal Death Penalty

 Oregon Voters Unable to Vote on Death Penalty Repeal
Backers of former Senator Mark Hatfield's "Life for Life Campaign" in Oregon fell short of the number of signatures needed to put their initiative on the state's election ballot.  The proposal would have replaced Oregon's death penalty with a sentence of mandatory life in prison without parole.  (Associated Press, 8/3/00) For more information, see also the Life for Life Campaign.

 European Union Calls for Moratorium on Federal Executions in the U.S.
In a letter to President Clinton, the French Presidency of the European Union has urged authorities to declare a moratorium on all federal executions.  The letter, written by the French Ambassador, Mr. Francois de l'Estang, urged Clinton not to break the de facto moratorium on federal executions and to commute federal death row inmate Juan Raul Garza's sentence to life imprisonment.  (French Presidency of the European Union Press Release, 7/27/00)  The letter to President Clinton, as well as other materials concerning the European policy related to the death penalty are available on the Delegation of the European Union's Web site.

 Federal Prosecution Against Mentally Ill Man Stalled for Two Years
Attorneys for Russell Weston, Jr., the man accused of killing two U.S. Capitol police officers in 1998, are objecting to federal prosecutors' demands that Weston forcibly receive medication to curb his mental illness. Weston's attorneys have said they would change their views about medicating him if the prosecution would agree not to seek the death penalty.  For the past two years, Weston has not received psychiatric treatment because neither Weston nor his lawyers will agree to anti-psychotic medication.  If Weston's condition improves and he is deemed competent for trial he could face the death penalty. (Washington Post, 7/28/00)

 Racial Disparity in Federal Death Penalty Plea Agreements
According to data collected by the Federal Death Penalty Resource Counsel Project, white defendants are more likely than black defendants to receive plea agreements in federal death penalty cases. An analysis of 146 cases prosecuted since Congress reinstated the federal death penalty in 1988 shows that while 60% of white defendants have avoided capital punishment through plea bargaining, only 41% of black defendants have reached the same agreements with federal prosecutors. (Chicago Tribune, 7/24/00) See also, Federal Death Penalty.

New Resources
"United States of America: Worlds Apart. Violations of the Rights of Foreign Nationals on Death Row." This new report by Amnesty International details the cases of 10 European citizens, from countries such as France, Germany, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom, who are currently on death row in the U.S. "In a clear breach of international law, none of these people were informed upon arrest of their right to consular assistance," Amnesty International said. "In many of these cases, timely consular intervention could have meant the difference between life and death." (Amnesty International Press Release, 7/18/00) See also, foreign nationals.

 Judge Rules Puerto Rico Not Subject to Federal Death Penalty
U.S. District Judge Salvador Casellas ruled that the federal death penalty cannot be applied in Puerto Rico because residents there have no voting representation in Congress, which passed laws reinstating the federal death penalty. "It shocks the conscience to impose the ultimate penalty, death, upon American citizens who are denied the right to participate directly or indirectly in the government that enacts and authorizes the imposition of such punishment," wrote Casellas. U.S. Attorney Guillermo Gil said his office will ask the solicitor general to appeal. Puerto Rico's Constitution prohibits the use of the death penalty, and the U.S. territory has not executed anybody in 73 years. (Orlando Sentinel, 7/19/00) See also, Federal Death Penalty

A discussion list for legal professionals doing capital litigation is in the beginning stages.  The hope of the new list is to get some cross-pollination of ideas, as well as to give those practitioner's, who may not be at a public defender's office or similar non-profit, a forum to seek advice and bounce ideas around. The list is private, and moderated only to try to weed out prosecutors and law enforcement.
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List owner:   capitaldefense-owner@onelist.comAs always, this newsletter was put together, flying by the seat of my pants, and only reviewed while under the influence of a caffeine induced stupor, or put another way, please excuse any creative use of the mother tongue, typos and/or errors.
 
 

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