Capital Defense Weekly

SUPREME COURT
Grant v. Oklahoma, --- U.S. -- (US 10/6/2003) Summary grant and reversal in light of Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U. S. ___ (2003). On that issue the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had noted:

No family members were called to provide mitigation evidence on Grant's behalf. In proposition thirteen, Grant claims that the failure to call certain family members in the second stage constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. An evidentiary hearing was held pursuant to Rule 3.11 , Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2001), wherein the record in this case could be supplemented with the evidence regarding this issue. Pursuant to this rule, the trial court made written findings of fact and conclusions of law. We give strong deference to the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the trial court in determining the propositions; however, we shall determine the ultimate issue regarding effective assistance of counsel. Rule 3.11 .

During the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel was asked why he did not call family members as mitigation witnesses. He testified that there were two main reasons. First, Grant told him that he basically had no contact with his family since he left home at the age of fifteen and was incarcerated since the age of nineteen. Grant indicated that he did not know where his family was located other than somewhere in Oregon. Grant told him that he didn't want his family involved in the proceedings. Regardless, Bowen did ask his investigators to try and contact Grant's family. One investigator testified that he was unable to locate Grant's family before trial. Appellant, John Grant, did not testify at this hearing.

Secondly, Bowen testified that because the family members had no close contact with Grant in some twenty years, their testimony would be of little help. He felt like if they testified about their relationship, they would be vulnerable on cross-examination because they hadn't had any contact with him since he had been incarcerated.

The trial court found, and we concur, that the family members could have been contacted with the use of information located in Grant's prison records and they would have been willing to testify at trial. The trial court also found that the witnesses' testimony would have been cumulative to each other and would not have had a positive impact on the jury. We agree.

HOT LIST
Carruthers v. Tennessee, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 839 (Tenn. Crim. App. 10/1/2003) Trial court's order unsealing jury records reversed, explicit guidelines and weighing factors set forth for the post-conviction trial court on remand:

Essentially the Appellant's claim raises two separate issues: (1) juror misconduct alleging misrepresentation of pertinent facts during voir dire; and (2) challenging the validity of the verdict pursuant to Rule 606(b), Tennessee Rules of Evidence. The two are distinct as "Rule 606(b) applies to juror deliberations, but it does not apply to pretrial voir dire." Fed. R. Evid. 606, Commentary. We conclude that either of these two grounds, if properly established, may constitute a basis for unsealing the jury records. Accordingly, we, in turn, examine the Defendant's issues.

A. Juror Misconduct

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section IX of the Tennessee Constitution guarantee a criminal Defendant the right to trial "by an impartial jury." Moreover, the Tennessee Constitution guarantees every accused "a trial by a jury free of . . . disqualification on account of some bias or partiality toward one side or the other of the litigation." State v. Akins, 867 S.W.2d 350, 354 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (quoting Toombs v. State, 197 Tenn. 229, 270 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tenn. 1954)). [*18] Thus, the function of voir dire is essential. Voir dire permits questioning by the court and counsel in order to lead respective counsel to the intelligent exercise of challenges. Id. (citing 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 195 (1969)). "Since full knowledge of facts which might bear upon a juror's qualifications is essential to the intelligent exercise of peremptory and cause challenges, jurors are obligated to make 'full and truthful answers . . . neither falsely stating any fact nor concealing any material matter.'" Id. at 355 (quoting 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 208 (1969)).

The common law rules governing challenges to juror qualifications typically fall in two categories: propter defectum or propter affectum. An objection based upon general disqualifications, such as alienage, family relationship, or statutory mandate, falls within the propter defectum, or "on account of defect," class, and, as such, must be made before the return of a jury verdict. Id. Propter affectum, meaning "on account of prejudice," is based upon the existence of bias, prejudice, or partiality towards one party in the litigation [*19] actually shown to exist or presumed to exist from circumstances and may be challenged after the return of the jury verdict. Id. This court has described "bias in a juror [as] a leaning of the mind; propensity or prepossession towards an object or view, not leaving the mind indifferent; a bent; for inclination." Id. at 354 (citation omitted). Thus, when a juror conceals or misrepresents information tending to indicate a lack of impartiality, a challenge may properly be made in a motion for new trial. Id. at 355.

"When a juror willfully conceals (or fails to disclose) information on voir dire which reflects on the juror's lack of impartiality, a presumption of prejudice arises." Id. (citing Durham v. State, 182 Tenn. 577, 188 S.W.2d 555, 559 (Tenn. 1945)). The presumption of bias, however, may be dispelled by an absence of actual favor or partiality by the juror. See State v. Taylor, 669 S.W.2d 694, 700 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1984). Moreover, the Defendant bears the burden of providing a prima facie case of bias or partiality. Akins, 867 S.W.2d at 355 (citing Taylor, 669 S.W.2d at 700). [*20] We conclude that the Defendant has established a compelling need for interviewing Juror 121 in order to determine whether Juror 121 willfully concealed information during voir dire, whether he was biased against the Defendant based upon his history with the Defendant's family, and whether he conveyed that information to the other jurors.

B. Rule 606(b)

As previously noted, Rule 606(b), Tennessee Rules of Evidence, prohibits extraneous prejudicial information from being brought to the jury's attention. A juror's personal experiences directly relating to the parties may be extraneous information. United States v. Herndon, 156 F.3d 629, 636 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that juror's recollection during jury deliberations that he might have had prior business dealings with the defendant constituted evidence of extraneous rather than internal influence on jury deliberations); see also Fed. R. Evid. 606 n.23; United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1529-30 (holding that juror's failure to reveal during voir dire that he had served on a committee with the defendant was extraneous information); State v. Crenshaw, 64 S.W.3d 374, 393-94 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001); [*21] State v. Ruth Stanford, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1003, No. 02C01-9812-CC-00365 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Oct. 6, 1999). "An extraneous influence on a juror is one derived from specific knowledge about or a relationship with either the parties or their witnesses." Herndon, 156 F.3d at 636.

Although jurors may be asked about extraneous information imparted, they may not be asked about "the effect of that information on the juror's mental processes or the jury's deliberations." Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265, 333 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Bibbins v. Dalsheim, 21 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Fed. R. Evid 606, Commentary; United States v. Simpson, 950 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th Cir. 1991) (juror may testify as to whether any extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to bear on juror deliberations, but a juror may not testify as to the effect the outside information had upon the juror). For these reasons, we conclude that Rule 606(b) permits the other jurors to testify whether Juror 121 related information to them about his prior history involving the Defendant and/or his family. This is [*22] relevant to both whether Juror 121 was truthful during voir dire and whether he imparted extraneous information to other jurors at any time.

C. Guidelines

The following determinations must be made upon remand. If questioning during voir dire should have reasonably solicited the information concerning Juror 121's history with the Defendant's family, then the Defendant may proceed with a juror misconduct claim. n3 This inquiry focuses upon the issue of whether the questions as poised were sufficient to establish that Juror 121 willfully concealed or failed to disclose his history with the Defendant's family. If the proof reveals that the Defendant conveyed this information to the other jurors but did not willfully conceal information during voir dire, then the Defendant may proceed with a Rule 606(b) claim. If the proof shows both that the Defendant willfully concealed information during voir dire and that he conveyed that information to the jury, then the Defendant may proceed under either theory of relief.

In accordance with these guidelines, the following procedures should be employed upon remand to maintain the appropriate balance between jury anonymity and the Defendant's right to pursue his claims. First, defense counsel may interview Juror 121. We note that Juror 121 is no longer anonymous as he was identified by the Defendant's mother; nonetheless, the following procedures should be followed upon remand. The interview shall be held within 30 days from the entry of this order and shall occur at a mutually agreeable time and location. The scope of the examination shall be limited to alleged misrepresentations during voir dire and any communications with other jurors about knowledge of the Defendant and/or his family.

Second, if defense counsel believe they have a basis for going forward, a hearing shall be conducted in which Juror 121 may testify and other relevant witnesses may be presented. In addition, the Defendant may testify as to why he did not object to Juror 121 remaining on the panel, and appellate counsel may also testify as to why they did not pursue this issue in the motion for new trial and on appeal.

Third, if the post-conviction court is able to determine the [*24] issue of ineffective assistance of counsel without the necessity of evidence from the remaining jurors, then there is no reason to secure information from the other jurors. However, if information from other jurors is necessary to determine the issue, the following procedures shall be used. Jurors will be individually contacted by the clerk's office as to whether he/she wishes to remain anonymous. If not, he/she may be interviewed only as to whether Juror 121 revealed information to them relating to his personal knowledge of the Defendant or his family and, if so, the nature and content of this information. A juror may not be asked about the effect of such information upon deliberations. For those jurors wishing to remain anonymous, defense counsel and counsel for the State shall submit written questions, or interrogatories within the above guidelines, to be approved by the post-conviction judge, which will be given to the Criminal Court Clerk. Each juror will answer these questions in writing, under oath, and in the presence of the clerk by signing as "Juror No.__;" thus, their anonymity will be preserved.

Fourth, the post-conviction court will then determine whether the information [*25] is sufficient for a determination of the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. In the event the post-conviction court determines that testimony of the jurors is necessary, the jurors shall be summoned by the clerk's office, so as to retain their anonymity, and shall testify by using the designation "Juror No. __." Neither their names nor addresses need to be revealed.

CAPITAL CASES (Favorable Disposition)
Missouri v. Buchanan, 2003 Mo. LEXIS 131 (Mo 9/30/2003) Death sentence vacated and a sentence of LWOP ordered in light Ring v. Arizona.

Pennsylvania v. McGill, 2003 Pa. LEXIS 1765 (PA 9/29/2003) Remand ordered for an evidentiary hearing on claims relating to failing to investigate fully and present mitigating mental health evidence in light of the post-conviction trial court's mischaracterization of the record as being devoid of evidence supporting this portion of the Appellant's IAC claim.

CAPITAL CASES (Unfavorable Disposition)
Pennsylvania v. McCrae, 2003 Pa. LEXIS 1767 (PA 9/29/2003) Relief denied on claims relating to whether testimony at the preliminary hearing testimony was so unreliable that its admission violated the hearsay rule and his right of confrontation & whether a series of comments by the prosecutor, which went uncorrected by the trial court, violated confrontation rights under Bruton v. United States

Wilcher v. Mississippi, 2003 Miss. LEXIS 492 (Miss 10/2/2003) Relief denied on claims including, failure to allow cross of Sheriff on his prior conviction for extortion, effectiveness of counsel, improper execusal of jurors, death qualfications, denial of individual sequestered voir dire, use of certain standard jury insructions, Lackey, jury contamination by contact with Sheriff's deputies, and premature jury deliberations.

Simpson v. Texas, 2003 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 10/1/2003) Relief denied on claims relating to death qualifications of jurors, Batson violations, prosecution's closing penalty phase argument, and admission of hearsay. Of special note is the holding that death qualifications during voir dire are subject to harmless error analysis even where trial counsel has not been afforded an opportunity to create a record or rehabilitate the venireman. Even though the defense wasn't allowed to rehabilitate a venireman, a black venireman was so thoroughly examined the prosecutor was able to offer this detailed reason for the strike during a Batson challenge:

United States v. Kincaide, 02-50380 (9th Cir 10/02/2003) Forced inmate DNA analysis requires individualized suspicion under the Fourth Amendment, and the compulsory collection of blood samples under the fedreal law does not fall within the "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment.

Experts Warn Execution Drug May Mask Suffering
A growing number of medical and legal experts are warning that the chemical pancuronium bromide, a commonly used lethal injection drug, could leave a wide-awake inmate unable to speak or cry out as he slowly suffocates. Advances in medicine and a study published in 2002 have found that the drug, used by executioners to paralyze the skeletal muscles while not affecting the body's brain or nerves, can mask severe suffering. While the American Veterinary Medical Association condemns the use of pancuronium bromide in the euthanasia process because "the animal may perceive pain and distress after it is immobilized," the majority of states that maintain the death penalty continue to incorporate it as the second of three drugs used to execute those on death row. When questioned about what death row inmates would feel if the first short-term anesthesia drug did not function properly and the remaining two drugs, including pancuronium bromide, were administered, Dr. Mark J.S. Heath of Columbia University stated, "It would basically deliver the maximum amount of pain the veins can deliver, which is a lot." (New York Times, October 7, 2003). See Methods of Execution and Botched Executions.

Inadequate Representation in Pennsylvania Produces Large Death Row
When New Jersey enacted its death penalty law in 1982, it established a special unit of lawyers and experts for defendants facing capital charges. After two decades, the state has 14 individuals on death row. In contrast, when Pennsylvania enacted its death penalty law, the state failed to establish a similar system for assistance. For Pennsylvania, a state of comparable population to New Jersey, the result of this decision has been a death row population of 237 and a capital punishment system that is plagued by evidence of inadequate representation. The systemic flaws and sentence reversals led the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to appoint a committee to examine the problem. (Philadelphia Inquirer, October 6, 2003). See DPIC's report With Justice for Few: The Growing Crisis in Death Penalty Representation.

NEW VIDEO: American Constitution Society Death Penalty Panel
A streaming video on the death penalty from the American Constitution Society's first National Conference August 1-3, 2003 in Washington, DC is now available. Participants included Joseph Curran, Attorney General of Maryland; Angela Davis, American University professor of law; John Gibbons, former Chief Justice of the 3d Circuit US Court of Appeals; Bryan Stevenson, Executive Director of Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama; and Diann Rust-Tierney, Director of the ACLU Capital Punishment Project. To watch the video recording of the death penalty panel, visit http://nmmstream.net:8080/ramgen/acs/convention03/deathpenalty.smil

Death Penalty Declines in Key Areas
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and Pima County, Arizona have been the main jurisdictions in their respective states for death sentences in the past. Now they are sending considerably fewer people to death row or seeking the death penalty less. Philadelphia prosecutors have sought the death penalty 24 times since last September, but jurors from the city have not sent anyone to death row in more than a year. In fact, the city has only secured death sentences against 4 people since 2000. In the majority of cases where jurors have chosen not to send defendants to death row, they have imposed a sentence of life in prison without parole. Cathie Abookire, a spokeswoman for Philadelphia District Attorney Lynne M. Abraham, noted: "When someone wants to plead guilty to the crime of murder, and we know that life means life in Pennyslvania, then we are all for it. It gives the family some peace of mind, because it is over. There are not going to be 20 years of appeals." (Associated Press, October 3, 2003)
Similarly, the number of death sentences pursued in Pima County, Arizona has decreased by a third. "We've made a conscious effort to limit the death notices to the worst cases. We have a fuller discussion about can we - and should we - pursue death. It's a more thoughtful process," said prosecutor Rick Unklesbay. The policy shift was embraced by victim advocate Gail Leland, who stated, "I think the process and the options that we have now regarding sentencing have really been improved." (Associated Press, October 5, 2003). See Life Without Parole.

NEW RESOURCE: "Poetic Justice" Explores Life on Death Row
"Poetic Justice: Reflections on the Big House, the Death House and the American Way of Justice" is Professor Robert Johnson's first collection of poems about prison and capital punishment. The collection explores the day-to-day life of prisoners and examines the emotional impact of serving time on death row. Johnson, a professor of justice, law and society at American University, is an award-winning author of several social science books on crime and punishment and has won the Outstanding Book Award from the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences. (Northwoods Press, 2003) See Resources.

DPIC Announces New Searchable Database
The Death Penalty Information Center has added a new and versatile feature to its extensive Web site. Users may now search a fully functional "Executions Database" for detailed information on all executions in the United States in the modern era, 1977 to the present. The database enables users to search by year, by state, by race of defendant and victim, and by many other categories. For example, you can now find a list of all the executions in Texas involving white defendants, or a list of all the executions by electrocution since 1990. We believe this feature will be very useful, particularly to journalists, attorneys, students, and other researchers. To use this new database, visit http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions.php

Congressional Leaders Reach Consensus on DNA Legislation
A broad bi-partisan coalition of House and Senate lawmakers has introduced legislation to establish a five-year, $1 billion initiative to ensure DNA testing for death row inmates who claim innocence. The "Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology Bill," supported by House Judiciary Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner and Senate Judiciary Chairman Orrin Hatch, includes an Innocence Protection Act (IPA) provision aimed at reducing the risk of wrongful convictions. Under this portion of the bill, all states applying for IPA grant funding must provide death row inmates with access to DNA testing. (Associated Press, September 30, 2003) Additional funding is available to establish training services for lawyers assigned to capital cases, to increase the maximum amount of compensation for federal inmates who were wrongfully convicted, and to establish in-state DNA Testing Programs, which are named in honor of Kirk Bloodsworth, the first death row inmate exonerated by DNA evidence. Learn more about this bill. See Innocence.

House Judiciary Committee Passes Innocence Protection Measure

This just in via email :

The House Judiciary Committee voted 28-1 to report favorably H.R. 3214, the Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology Act of 2003, a comprehensive package of programs that provides over $1 billion over the next five years to assist Federal and State authorities in solving crimes and protecting the innocent.

H.R. 3214 includes the Innocence Protection Act of 2003, which would help ensure eligible inmates access to DNA testing to establish their innocence and would authorize grants to the States to improve the quality of legal representation in capital cases.

The bill currently has 147 cosponsors, and we anticipate that it will shortly come before the full House. An identical bill has been introduced in the Senate (S. 1700) with 18 cosponsors.

Major credit is due Congressman Bill Delahunt (D-MA) and his counsel and Legislative Director Mark Agrast.

Government to Appeal Moussaoui Ruling

No surprise here, but the Government has decided to appeal Judge Brinkema's ruling in the Zacarias Moussaoui case.

The government wants an appellate ruling that affirms their refusal to make three al-Qaida prisoners available to Moussaoui. The government defied two district court orders that gave the defendant the right to question the captives because they might help his defense.

To sanction the government for its defiance, U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema on Thursday barred the government from seeking the death penalty or presenting any evidence that could link Moussaoui to the Sept. 11 suicide hijackings.

The issues before the 4th Circuit, which has already heard one set of oral arguments in the case, but said it could not rule until Judge Brinkema imposed sanctions, are these:

The government would be expected to renew arguments that the courts have no authority to interfere with decisions made by the executive branch about prisoners captured in a war. The government also has contended and will again that every word uttered by the prisoners could reveal classified information.

Moussaoui's legal team has said Moussaoui has a constitutional right to introduce favorable witnesses and that he cannot receive a fair trial without them.

New oral arguments are expected around November or December.

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Patriot Act: Why it is Attracting Fierce Opposition

The Guardian has a special report today on the Patriot Act, focusing on the growing criticism of the Act, particularly with respect to the Justice Department's application of its provisions in non-terror cases, and the threat such use represents to all of our civil liberties. Written by Guardian reporter Christopher Reed, it is a thorough analysis and we recommend reading the whole thing. We spoke with Mr. Reed for almost an hour on the phone as he was writing the article, and can attest to his determination to make sure his conclusions were supported by facts.

Reed quotes from Congressman Sensenbrenner's (R-WI) statement to Congress when introducing the bill:

The Wisconsin Republican assured his colleagues: "This bill does not do anything to take away the freedoms of innocent citizens. Of course we all recognise that the fourth amendment to the constitution prevents the government from conducting unrea sonable searches and seizures. That is why this legislation does not change the constitution from the rights guaranteed to citizens of this country under the Bill of Rights."

Reed then quotes from an ACLU letter that was introduced into the Congressional record before the bill was passed:

"Sadly, most Americans do not seem to realise that Congress is about to pass a law that drastically expands government power to invade our privacy, to imprison people without due process, and to punish dissent. More disturbing is that this power grab of our freedoms and civil liberties is in fact not necessary to fight terrorism."

Reed also mentions that not only was the bill passed without committee hearings in the Senate, but many members of Congress hadn't even had time to read the 342 page bill before voting on it. The vote was 97 to 1 in the Senate (Sen. Russ Feingold (D-WI) was the lone dissenter) and 309-118 in the House of Representatives.

Fast forwarding to the present, the article lays out the specific concerns of civil libertarians over the bill's application in non-terror cases and to ordinary citizens. Reed notes:

MORE...

Criticism Mounting Over Execution Drug

We've been reporting for some time (here and here ) on the mounting criticism of pancuronium bromide (also known as pavulon), one of three drugs used to execute prisoners in the U.S. Now you can read about it Tuesday in the New York Times:

...a growing number of legal and medical experts are warning that the apparent tranquillity of a lethal injection may be deceptive. They say the standard method of executing people in most states could lead to paralysis that masks intense distress, leaving a wide-awake inmate unable to speak or cry out as he slowly suffocates.

Pancuronium bromide paralyzes the skeletal muscles but does not affect the brain or nerves. A person injected with it remains conscious but cannot move or speak.

The drug has been banned in Tennessee--for use by vetinarians performing euthanasia on animals. Yet Tennesse and 30 other states use it to kill inmates.

High Court Allows Suit by Wrongfully Convicted Man Against Public Defender's Office

The Supreme Court ruled today that Roberto Miranda, a former death row inmate later determined to be innocent of the crime may sue the public defender's office for its alleged mishandling of the case. The case is Clark County v. Miranda, 02-1629.

Central to the case are the policies of this defender office:

Miranda's lawyers claim that the office routinely gave lie detector tests to new clients, and then used the results to decide how vigorous the client's defense would be. Miranda, a black native Spanish speaker from Cuba, also claims whites and members of the Mormon church got better legal help than minorities and non-Mormons.

Miranda claims he was given a county-paid lawyer, Thomas Rigsby, who had been on the job barely a year and had never tried a capital case. Miranda claims Rigsby asked him to take a lie detector test, which was administered by an English-speaking examiner. The examiner concluded that Miranda failed the test.

"Thereafter, Rigsby did virtually nothing to prepare for Mr. Miranda's trial," Miranda's lawyers said in papers filed with the Supreme Court.

We wrote a long analysis of the case back in February, available here.

High Court Refuses Drug-Using Mother's Appeal

The High Court today rejected the case of Regina Knight, a drug addict who was convicted and sent to prison due to delivering a still-born baby.

Regina McKnight is serving 12 to 20 years in South Carolina for killing her daughter. McKnight tested positive for cocaine in the hospital and acknowledged that she had used crack cocaine while pregnant. The dead child had drugs in her system.

McKnight's lawyers say she is the only woman convicted of homicide after suffering a stillbirth. She challenged her treatment as unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment, and her case also raised questions about the legal and constitutional rights of pregnant women and the fetuses they carry.

Ms. McKnight had the support of a large segment of the medical community, inlcuding the American Public Health Association, American Psychiatric Association and the National Association of Social Workers. Here's a letter signed by numerous groups, detailing why she should not have been convicted.

McKnight's supporters say her case represents a dangerous trend toward holding pregnant women legally liable for all manner of questionable behavior or potentially harmful decisions. "It is quite disturbing in terms of women's autonomy over their bodies while pregnant," said Wyndi Anderson, director of South Carolina Advocates for Pregnant Women.

Ramzi Yousef Loses High Court Appeal

Ramzi Yousef, convicted of being the mastermind behind the 1993 World Trade Center attacks, lost his bid to have the Supreme Court throw out his conviction.

Justices refused to consider whether the government overstepped its reach in prosecuting Ramzi Yousef in the bombing and for plotting to blow up a dozen U.S. jumbo jets over the Far East. "The opportunity for this court to review the extent of extra-territoriality that the U.S. and its courts can exercise to punish 'terrorist' acts must not be passed by as the issue becomes of ever more immediate importance in the world of the 21st Century," Bernard V. Kleinman, one of his attorneys, wrote in the appeal.

If you have found this e-zine useful feel free to pass it on to a friend or colleague. You might also want to visit: http://www.lidab.com/ (Louisiana's public defender), probono.net (ABA/ABCNY) & http://www.capdefnet.org/ (federal defender & arguably the best death penalty defense site on the net). These other resources have many prepackaged motions and law guides dealing with death penalty issue. Findlaw.com 's new service provides e-mail style newsletters on a wide variety of subjects at newsletters.findlaw.com , including both a free weekly free criminal law and limited state court decision lists. For information generally on the death penalty please visit the Death Penalty Information Center (http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org).

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