Capital Defense Weekly

Two opinions of note are had for the period between January 22, 2007 and January 29, 2007.

"Until recently North Carolina law mandates that a doctor be present at executions — in part to make sure that the condemned person is fully anesthetized before being put to death. But professional medical associations and ethics boards nationally and in many states, including North Carolina, have strongly advised physicians not to participate in executions."* The legal consequence of the intersection of these two events is laid out in Robinson, et. al v. Beck, et. al. The state trial court holds that the deletion of physician involvement in the execution process has not been properly reviewed under state administrative law and therefore pending executions must be stayed under such review is undertaken. The Attorney General's did not appeal the ruling.

In James Melton v. Ayers a federal district court judge, Robert Takasugi, grants relief on competency related issuesl. During his trial Melton was given daily doses of 750 milligrams of Mellaril, an antipsychotic medicine, and 100 milligrams of Phenergan, which can act as a sedative. The court notes dryly "[c]ompetent defense counsel would have at least attempted to find out why their client required such powerful antipsychotic medications." "These medications had a profound affect on Melton's physical and mental functioning…. It is impossible to determine whether he understood the evidence against him."

In other litigation news, on January 29, 2007, the Supreme Court in Ayers v. Visciotti granted the government's application to stay an evidentiary hearing while the Ninth Circuit determines whether or note to grant a writ of mandamus. On February 2, 2007, the Eighth Circuit issued an order granting rehearing en banc in Smulls v. Roper, 467 F.3d 1108, on the issue of a potential Batson violation.

Ninety day reprieves were issued on Thursday, February 1, 2007, by Tennessee Governor Phil Bredesen to four men. The 90 day reprieves occurred when the Governor invalidated the state’s lethal injection protocol and ordered a new protocol to be crafted and implemented by May 2, 2007. The Governor’s order is here.

In the news, favorable legislative developments in Nebraska, Montana & Washington are noted where repeal &/or moratorium bills have been filed. For the first time in 50 years a federal death sentence has been returned in NYC. In Florida, the commission looking in to the problems with that state’s lethal injection protocol heard conflicting testimony about the botched execution of Angel Diaz. Reuters is looking at recent developments in lethal injection & its intersection with the declining support of capital punishment.

U of Texas's Tarlton Law Library, Lawrence Solum, and Death Penalty Open Access Research all note new germane scholarship.

Looking ahead to the next edition several grants of relief are noted. A panel of the Sixth Circuit has granted relief in Von Davis v. Coyle for the exclusion of relevant mitigating evidence. The Mississippi Supreme Court in Curtis Flowers v. State grants relief finding “that the State engaged in racially discriminatory practices during the jury selection process and that the trial court committed reversible error in upholding the peremptory strikes exercised against” minority members of the venire. In Florida, an Orlando federal district court judge granted penalty phase relief in Fotopoulos v. Crosby on allegations trial counsel’s failed to utilize evidence from an earlier trial where the State relied on a contradictory theory of culpability as to the co-defendant.

The last few months have seen a seeming “speeding up” of the case law & issues surrounding capital litigation. It seems of late by the time the Weekly is published the information is dated, often outdated. The daily blog covers much of these more timely developments, as does Stand Down - Texas & Week – at – a – Glance by the Habeas Assistance & Training folks.

On an administrative note, in order to solve some printing & formatting issues we are sending out the weekly in both HTML & PDF formats.

Finally, if something gets missed or you need to let us know about an upcoming event please feel free to shoot us an email. - k

Recent Executions

January
30 Christopher Swift (Texas-volunteer)

Stays & Reprieves of Execution Dates

February
18 Daryl Keith Holton (Tennessee)
22 Edward Harbison (Tennessee)

March
7 Michael Joe Boyd (Tennessee)

April
11 Pervis Payne (Tennessee)

Pending Executions

February
7   James Jackson (Texas)
22 Newton Anderson (Texas)
27 Donald Miller (Texas)

March
6 Robert Perez (Texas)
7 Joseph Nichols (Texas)
20 Kenneth Biros (Ohio)
28 Vincent Gutierrez (Texas)
29 Roy Pippin (Texas)

More Execution information**


Supreme Court

Ayers v. Visciotti, 06A711 (1/29/2007)
Warden’s application to stay evidentiary hearing before the district court granted. The stay is granted pending the disposition on the merits of the warden’s related mandamus petition in the Ninth Circuit.

In Favor of Life or Liberty

Week of January 22, 2007

James Melton v. Ayers, Case 2:89-CV-04182-RMT (C.D.CA 1/23/2007)
The "Court finds that as a result of [ ] improper medical treatment with excessive doses of psychotropic drugs for significant periods of time during his trial . . . Melton lacked a rational understanding of the proceedings against him and was deprived of the ability to participate in his defense in a rational manner."

Robinson, et. al v. Beck, et. al, 07-CVS-001109 (N.C. Super. Wake 1/25/2007)
The deletion of physician involvement in the execution process has not been properly reviewed under state administrative law and therefore pending executions must be stayed under such review is undertaken.

Advance Sheet for the Week of January 29, 2007

Von Davis v. Coyle, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 1878 (6th Cir. 1/29/2007)
Habeas relief granted where the panel disagrees on whether it should grant relief under Skipper for the exclusion of relevant mitigating evidence or Gardner as the “death sentence was imposed, at least in part, on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain.” The majority concludes the ”testimony would have established that Davis was classified as an “A” prisoner, indicating that he had no discipline or conduct problems; that he was the clerk on death row for the unit manager and helped conduct tours of death row; and that he had created no problems for other inmates or for security personnel and had no conduct write-ups. . . . the unit manager for death row [ ] complimented Davis’s positive attitude and pleasant personality. . . . his case manager, observed that Davis was cooperative and courteous . . . and that he had been placed in various positions of trust within the unit. Although there could conceivably be some question about the relevance of such evidence in the abstract, the record in this case establishes without doubt that it was highly relevant to the single aggravating factor relied upon by the state [, future dangerousness].”

Curtis Flowers v. State, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 24 (Miss 2/1/2007)
“After carefully reviewing the record before this Court and the applicable law, we find that the State engaged in racially discriminatory practices during the jury selection process and that the trial court committed reversible error in upholding the peremptory strikes exercised against Vickie Curry and Connie Pittman. Based on the State's Batson violation, we are required to reverse the judgment of the Montgomery County Circuit Court and remand this case for a new trial.”

Fotopoulos v. Crosby, 6:03-CV-1578-Orl-31KRS (M.D. FL 1/29/2007)
Fotopoulos was denied effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his trial due to counsel’s failure to utilize evidence from the co-defendant’s earlier trial where the State relied on contradictory theories in the penalties phases of both trials.

Favoring Death

Week of January 22, 2007

Christopher Emmett v. Kelly, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 1405 (4th Cir 1/23/2007) (dissent)
Relief denied on two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing: "(1) failure to adequately investigate Emmett’s family and social background; and (2) failure to request the assistance of a toxicologist or substance abuse expert to present evidence about Emmett’s intoxication at the time of the crime." HAT has additional analysis.

Derrick Sonnier v. Quarterman, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 1336 (5th Cir 1/22/2007)
Relief denied. "Having received no COA from the district court, Sonnier asked the Fifth Circuit for a COA on three issues: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel for (a) failing to investigate mitigating evidence and (b) failing to present mitigating evidence; (2) constitutional entitlement to instruction that life sentence meant no possibility of parole for 35 years; and (3) the Texas death penalty statute, as amended in September 1991, is unconstitutional." HAT has additional analysis.

Von Taylor v. State, 2007 Utah 12 (Utah 1/26/2007)
"Taylor argues that he is entitled to post-conviction relief primarily because he received ineffective assistance of counsel from both his trial and appellate counsel. Specifically, he argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) challenge Taylor's guilty plea; (2) conduct a mitigation investigation or challenge trial counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigation evidence; (3) challenge the jury instructions; (4) challenge the voir dire procedure; (5) challenge trial counsel's behavior during jury selection; (6) challenge the trial court's failure to order competency hearings; (7) challenge the admission of hearsay evidence at sentencing; (8) raise a claim of prosecutorial misconduct; and (9) raise various constitutional challenges to his death sentence. We address each of Taylor's claims in turn and ultimately affirm the district court's order of summary judgment." Note that HAT has additional analysis.

Advance Sheet for the Week of January 29, 2007

John McNeill v. Polk, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 2059 (4th Cir 1/31/2007)(dissent)
Relief denied on: “(1) whether McNeil was denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel admitted without McNeill’s consent that he was guilty of non-felonious breaking and entering, (2) whether McNeill was denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel admitted without McNeill’s consent that he was guilty of second degree murder, [ ] (3) whether McNeill’s due process rights were violated when the trial court permitted the jury to find him eligible for a death sentence if it concluded that the aggravating and mitigating circumstances were in equipoise.” “[4] whether McNeill’s due process rights were violated when a juror consulted a dictionary to determine the meaning of the term "mitigate"; [5]whether McNeill was denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to investigate and present certain evidence concerning McNeill’s behavior, character, and mental capacity; and [6] whether McNeill’s due process rights were violated when a juror failed to disclose that his half-sister had been murdered by an ex-boyfriend.” Dissent would have ordered a remand to determine the impact of the jury's use of a dictionary in the penalty phase of the proceedings. HAT & Decision of the Day have further analysis.

Daniel Cummings v. Polk, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 2237 (4th Cir 2/1/2007)
Relief denied both issues raised on appeal. On the first issue, because the Supreme Court has not clearly spoken on the use of unadjudicated prior bad acts in the penalty phase relief is precluded. On the second issue, the panel holds that an officer's editorializing of the Petitioner's Miranda rights (noting that he would likely have to repay the state if he exercised his right to have counsel present at questioning) was not erroneous as the Supreme Court has not mandated a precise formulation of the warnings that must be provided. HAT & Decision of the Day have more analysis.

Johnny Ray Conner v. Quarterman, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 1891 (5th Cir 1/29/2007)
State court's rulding on failure of trial counsel to investigate the inability of Conner to run from the crime scene was not objectively unreasonable. The district court's finding below to the contrary, “that the state courts' application of Strickland and ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine was objectively unreasonable because the behavior of counsel in not investigating Conner's medical condition was deficient and prejudicial,“ was erroneous.

Billy Slagle v. Bagley, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 2265 (6th Cir. 2/2/2007) (en banc)
Denial from a rehearing en banc. Sharp dissent noted on the politicization of the death penalty. Decision of the Day has more analysis.

Kenneth Stewart v. Secretary, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 2057 (11th Cir 1/31/2007)
Relief denied on whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide defense experts readily available information to identify mitigating circumstances, as well as failed to adequately investigate and prepare mitigating evidence during the penalty phase, including but not limited to evidence about Stewart's childhood.

People v. Ricardo Harris, 2007 Ill. LEXIS 425 (Ill 2/1/2007)
Relief denied on 10 issues on direct appeal. Relief denied on numerous state law evidentiary issues, Witherspoon, unanimity instruction, and constitutionality of the Illinois scheme following Ring / Apprendi.

Robert Garza v. Texas, 2007 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 98 (Tex. Crim. App 1/31/2007)
Relief denied on direct appeal. Notably, however, one of the two death sentences imposed here was struck. “[T]he trial court did not err to instruct the jury that it could convict the appellant for both the offense of capital murder and the separate offense of engaging in organized criminal activity by committing capital murder as a member of a criminal street gang and that it could punish the appellant for both. However, the trial court did err to sentence the appellant to death for the latter. “

Selected Excerpts from, & Commentary on, this Edition's Cases

Christopher Emmett v. Kelly, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 1405 (4th Cir 1/23/2007) (dissent)
Relief denied on two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing: "(1) failure to adequately investigate Emmett’s family and social background; and (2) failure to request the assistance of a toxicologist or substance abuse expert to present evidence about Emmett’s intoxication at the time of the crime." HAT has this analysis:

On January 23, 2007, the Fourth Circuit (Traxler with Shedd; concurring and dissenting opinion by Gregory) issued a published opinion affirming the denial of habeas relief to Christopher Emmett. Emmett v. Kelly, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 155186 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2007). The Fourth Circuit had issued a COA on two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing: (1) failure to adequately investigate Emmett’s family and social background; and (2) failure to request the assistance of a toxicologist or substance abuse expert to present evidence about Emmett’s intoxication at the time of the crime.

Emmett was sentenced to death for the murder and robbery of a coworker. The sleeping coworker was beaten to death with a lamp and his money taken by Emmett to purchase crack cocaine. The jury found both charged statutory aggravators: (1) future dangerousness; and (2) vileness. As part of the case in mitigation, defense counsel called Emmett’s mother, who testified that Emmett’s father was an abusive alcoholic who failed to care for his family. She eventually remarried and her new husband raised Emmett. She then described how in the months preceding the homicide, Emmett’s behavior had changed, which was corroborated by one of Emmett’s step-sisters. A family friend told the jury about Emmett’s positive characteristics and the assistance he provided to her and her family. Defense counsel also called a witness who testified about conditions of confinement for inmates convicted of murder, as well as two witnesses who spoke to Emmett’s positive adjustment during a prior incarceration and in jail.

Emmett argued that trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to interview all of his siblings and half-siblings, and failing to obtain records from Emmett’s court-ordered mental health counseling as a juvenile. Had counsel taken these steps, he would have been discovered that Emmett was raised in an environment “of poverty, poor housing, hunger, neglect, and physical abuse, which led him to an early, persistent, and lifelong criminal path.” In rejecting his claim, the panel recounted in detail the information that was obtained through Emmett, his mother, his step-father and a half sister. None of them provided the information developed in state habeas proceedings or gave any reason to believe that Emmett suffered mental health problems. Nor did the forensic psychologist who had been appointed to assist in the preparation and presentation of mitigating evidence at trial receive information from Emmett that contradicted the picture presented to trial counsel by Emmett and his family members. Because Emmett reported to the expert “an extensive and troubling juvenile and adult criminal history,” some of which the prosecution was unaware of, the expert ultimately was not called to testify because his findings were deemed to be more harmful than helpful. A juvenile probation officer was interview by defense counsel and she informed counsel that although she recalled poor living conditions, she was unaware of violent behavior in Emmett’s home or other abuse. She remembered Emmett as “sad little kid who ran away a lot.” Although she believed Emmett’s mother may have lacked some parenting skills she recalled positive parental involvement by the stepfather. Given the information trial counsel had obtained, and concern about opening the door to evidence about Emmett’s extensive criminal history, defense counsel decided to focus the case in mitigation on trying to humanize Emmett, demonstrate that his behavior changed in the time before the crime due to drug use, and that he would not be a danger if given a life sentence. The state court, as well as the panel, concluded this was reasonable, finding no reason for trial counsel to have disbelieved the accounts of Emmett’s background that had been received. The panel went on to find that the claim also failed on the prejudice prong of the Strickland test.

As for failure to present expert testimony about Emmett’s intoxication at the time of the crime, the panel found reasonable counsel’s conclusion that this could not be successfully raised in mitigation. Although Emmett’s confession included claims of alcohol and crack cocaine use in the hours leading up to the crime, “the evidence available to counsel indicated that Emmett was nonetheless calm and in control of his actions at the time of the murder.” Further, the mental health expert who interviewed Emmett reported that although the combination of drugs and alcohol could have reduced Emmett’s impulse control, he had consumed them voluntarily, he was experienced with their effects, and he clearly knew what he was doing when he chose to attack his coworker. In light of this evidence, the panel is unable to find either deficient performance or prejudice, and, therefore, no abuse of discretion in the district court’s refusal to authorize funds for a toxicologist or substance abuse expert.

Judge Gregory concurred with the ruling on the intoxication issue but dissented as to the first claim. In Gregory’s view, “counsel failed to investigate adequately Emmett’s childhood, and counsel’s inadequate investigation prejudiced the sentencing phase of Emmett’s trial. The Supreme Court of Virginia unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in ruling otherwise.” In support of this position, Gregory recounted in detail the horrific and abusive living conditions that Emmett actually endured as a child, but that the jury never learned about. Gregory further set forth why it was unreasonable for trial counsel to rely on the information he had and not to conduct additional investigation before settling upon his penalty phase strategy.

Derrick Sonnier v. Quarterman, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 1336 (5th Cir 1/22/2007)
Relief denied "Having received no COA from the district court, Sonnier asked the Fifth Circuit for a COA on three issues: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel for (a) failing to investigate mitigating evidence and (b) failing to present mitigating evidence; (2) constitutional entitlement to instruction that life sentence meant no possibility of parole for 35 years; and (3) the Texas death penalty statute, as amended in September 1991, is unconstitutional." HAT has this analysis:

On January 22, 2007, the Fifth Circuit (Dennis, with Higginbotham and Benavides) denied in its entirely Derrick Sonnier’s request for a COA. Sonnier v. Quarterman, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 136460 (5th Cir. Jan. 22, 2007). Sonnier was convicted of the murders of Melody Flowers and her son, Patrick Flowers. At sentencing, pursuant to Sonnier’s wishes and instructions, defense counsel presented no mitigating evidence. On the record, Sonnier explained that the lack of mitigation was based on his consistent instructions to counsel. Sonnier was subsequently sentenced to death. Having received no COA from the district court, Sonnier asked the Fifth Circuit for a COA on three issues: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel for (a) failing to investigate mitigating evidence and (b) failing to present mitigating evidence; (2) constitutional entitlement to instruction that life sentence meant no possibility of parole for 35 years; and (3) the Texas death penalty statute, as amended in September 1991, is unconstitutional.


As to the alleged failure to investigate, the state court had credited an affidavit by one of Sonnier’s trial attorneys who recounted Sonnier’s lack of cooperation as to the development of mitigating evidence. The attorney further asserted that family members who defense counsel wanted to call were present in the courtroom at the request of the second attorney for purposes of presenting mitigating testimony. The panel nevertheless concluded that trial counsels’ efforts were constitutionally inadequate, given that counsel had a duty: (1) to fully inform Sonnier of all available mitigating evidence and their opinion of its potential effectiveness; and (2) persuade the sentencing jury that Sonnier’s moral culpability was not sufficient to warrant the death penalty. According to the record, Sonnier’s trial attorneys “did not talk to Sonnier’s family and acquaintances at the length or in the depth required for these purposes. If any of these persons could have presented or directed counsel to highly effective mitigation evidence, it appears unlikely that the truncated investigation of the family and other witnesses by Sonner’s trial attorneys would have uncovered it. Sonnier’s refusal to consent to their undertaking more extensive and in-depth discussions with his family and acquaintances to determine the nature and extent of the mitigation evidence available was not reasonable grounds for their failure to do so.” The panel went on to find, however, that the mitigating evidence Sonnier argued should have been developed by trial counsel, which was primarily “good character” evidence, was inadequate to support a showing of prejudice.

As for Sonnier’s claim that counsel was ineffective in not presenting any mitigating evidence, the panel found that under Fifth Circuit precedent Sonnier’s conduct in opposing mitigation doomed the claim. Further, Sonnier could not show the requisite prejudice. Sonnier’s argument about his right to inform the jury about parole eligibility was also foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent.

In his final claim, Sonnier argued that the removal of the “deliberateness” special issue in 1991 rendered the Texas sentencing statute impermissible in that it now fails to adequately narrow the class of death eligible defendants. The panel pointed out, however, that the initial narrowing in Texas occurs with the definition of capital murder. Finding sufficient similarities between the Texas scheme and the one approved by the Supreme Court in Kansas v. Marsh,, 126 S.Ct. 2516 (2006), the panel concluded the Eighth Amendment claim was baseless. In addition, Fifth Circuit precedent indicated that a jury finding on the future dangerousness special circumstance was alone sufficient to satisfy the Eighth Amendment. In light of that, Sonnier’s complaint about the elimination of the “deliberateness” special issue failed. Finally, the panel rejected Sonnier’s equal protection argument based on different treatment for those tried before and after September 1991. It pointed out that Sonnier failed to even allege invidious purpose on the part of the Texas legislature in amending the statute.

Von Taylor v. State, 2007 Utah 12 (Utah 1/26/2007)
"Taylor argues that he is entitled to post-conviction relief primarily because he received ineffective assistance of counsel from both his trial and appellate counsel. Specifically, he argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) challenge Taylor's guilty plea; (2) conduct a mitigation investigation or challenge trial counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigation evidence; (3) challenge the jury instructions; (4) challenge the voir dire procedure; (5) challenge trial counsel's behavior during jury selection; (6) challenge the trial court's failure to order competency hearings; (7) challenge the admission of hearsay evidence at sentencing; (8) raise a claim of prosecutorial misconduct; and (9) raise various constitutional challenges to his death sentence. We address each of Taylor's claims in turn and ultimately affirm the district court's order of summary judgment." HAT has this analysis.

In Taylor v. State, ___ P.3d ___, 2007 WL 188572 (Utah Jan. 26, 2007), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief to death row inmate Von Lester Taylor. After Taylor was sentenced to death, new counsel had been appointed for the appeal. Appellate counsel then filed a motion for remand to the trial court for fact-finding on allegations of ineffective assistance by trial counsel. Following the remand, the trial court rejected the claims and the Taylor’s convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal. New counsel who was appointed for post-conviction proceedings raised, among other things, additional allegations of ineffective assistance by trial counsel. These allegations were found to be procedurally barred because Taylor had already challenged trial counsel’s effectiveness in the direct appeal. Also procedurally barred were challenges to rulings by the trial court and to the constitutionality of the death penalty. Properly before the court, however, were claims of ineffective assistance by appellate counsel. Taylor alleged, inter alia, that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to conduct an adequate investigation into the mitigating evidence that trial counsel should have developed. In ruling on this claim, the Utah Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in striking an affidavit by Taylor’s post-conviction paralegal/private investigator which recounted what Taylor’s family members had told him. The trial court had ruled that the affidavit contained inadmissible hearsay. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed for the most part, explaining that the bulk of the statements by family members were not offered to prove the truth of their assertions, but rather to show what prior counsel would have been told had he interviewed the witnesses. Also found to be erroneous was the trial court’s striking of a portion of the Strickland expert’s affidavit which discussed what reasonably competent defense counsel would have understood about brain damage as mitigation at the time of trial. Contrary to the trial court’s finding, the stricken section did not purport to offer an expert opinion about the effects of brain damage.

Turning to the merits of the claim, the Utah Supreme Court found evidence of the prevailing norms concerning mitigation investigation in 1991, the time of Taylor’s trial, in the Strickland expert’s affidavit, as well as in the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases. The court then held that counsel’s decision to cease investigating when he did was deficient. At the very least, a report counsel had received from a mental health expert which found indicia of personality disorders and possible brain damage “would have prompted a reasonable attorney to investigate further.” The court further found: “a reasonable investigation in this case would have included more than just a separate consultation with a neurologist or other medical experts. . . . Based upon the prevailing professional norms reflected in the ABA Guidelines, we think that reasonable trial counsel at the time of Taylor´s penalty phase would have spoken to Taylor´s immediate family members and friends to determine whether they knew if Taylor had suffered head injuries or whether they had any other information that would suggest brain injury. In addition, we think reasonable trial counsel would have conducted an independent investigation into Taylor´s health records, rather than merely relying on his representations about his medical history.” Finally, the state supreme court found that reasonable trial counsel would have obtained school records, particularly in light of an incident described in one of the state expert’s reports whereupon psychological counseling was recommended when Taylor acted out in third grade, and that same expert concluded that Taylor had a learning disability. That the state experts, who evaluated Taylor for purposes of possible insanity or diminished capacity defenses, concluded that Taylor did not present any evidence of head injury or brain impairment and was not mentally ill did “not excuse trial counsel´s failure to conduct his own mitigation investigation into Taylor´s mental health.” On the record before it, however, the Utah Supreme Court found no prejudice. It also found no basis for overturning the lower court’s rulings on Taylor’s numerous other claims.

SMALL PRINT

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ISSN: 1523-6684

As always, please forgive the typos & unorthodox citation methods.  Thanks for the tip-offs, thanks for reading & most importantly thanks for all the hard work. - k

*From the Los Angeles Times article entitled N.C. is 11th state to halt lethal injections published on January 26, 2007.
**Execution date information per Rick Halperin and other sources