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Capital
Defense
Weekly
[Available at http://capitaldefenseweekly.com/archives/070618.htm]
As
happens from time to time, this edition covers two weeks, including
lower courts decision from June 4, 2007 to June 18, 2007, as well as
all United States Supreme Court opinions since the last edition.
By far the most important cases of the edition are a pair of
decisions out of Texas, Ex
Parte Cathy Lynn Henderson & Irving
Davis v. State. Neither opinion would be unusually noteworthy,
except for the fact that the it is the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
that granted relief. In
Henderson a stay is entered so that the trial court can examine the
possibility that the death in Henderson's case (a small baby in her
care) was an accident and not murder. In Davis
the trial court excluded testimony of “nine lay witnesses" who would
have testified as to future dangerousness. lay
witnesses who actually knew the appellant” and would have testified,
despite expert testimony, he would not present a future danger to
society. Taken
together with other recent developments, it appears the Court of
Criminal Appeals may be moderating from its late nineties reputation of
never meeting a capital case it would not affirm.
In
Georgia two favorable cases are also noted, Crystal
Mae Wagner v. State and Exzavious
Gibson v. Head. In Wagner the
Georgia Supreme Court quashes an indictment on interlocutory appeal as
the indictment "mixed the
elements of malice murder and felony murder, which was a material
defect." In Gibson
a remand is ordered to determine "whether Gibson's conflict of interest
claim is procedurally
barred and, if not, whether it has merit."
The
New Jersey Supreme Court in State
v. Donald Loftin
looks at the legacy of lynching and its impact on capital jury
trials.
Specifically, one of the jurors at trial indicated to a co-worker his
desire to lynch Loftin. The juror made the comment in the middle
of the guilt phase. Upon learning
of the problem the trial court did not adequately investigate whether
the
juror's predetermination of guilt unduly infected the other
jurors. The failure to explore potential contamination of the others
jurors, even though the juror in question was designated an alternate,
means the death sentence here must be set aside.
In William
Kuenzel v. Allen the Eleventh Circuit remands "for consideration of
whether Kuenzel's allegations
of actual innocence overcome the procedural default of his claims.
Kuenzel's federal habeas petition had been dismissed earlier as
untimely."
CapDefNet is reporting a
decision we have been unable to locate, Porter
v. Crosby, 6:03-cv-1465-Orl-31 KRS (M.D. Fla.). The Porter Court
purportedly finds trial counsel “'did little, if any, investigation of
[Porter's] mental
health issues, history of being abused as a child, and many years of
military service.' Judge Presnell also concluded that trial counsel
failed to advocate effectively before the jury by “mixing up or being
unaware of basic facts, eliciting irrelevant testimony."
In
a two-defendant death-penalty case in New Mexico (State v. Good &
Dominguez)
the trial court has ruled the New Mexico Capital Felony Sentencing Act
(CFSA) unconstitutional based on data of the Capital Jury Project
showing that about half of death-penalty case jurors pre-decide the
issue of penalty before the penalty phase even begins. The Court found
the CFSA unconstitutional but he did not dismiss the death penalty but
rather ordered separate juries for guilt-innocence and, if necessary,
penalty. Once the judge announced his ruling the district attorney
withdrew its notice of intent to seek death. The opinion is here.
In
the news, the Governor of Virginia granted a reprieve to
Christopher
Scott Emmett until October 17, 2007. Rwanda's
parliament has voted to abolish the death penalty and replace it
with
life without parole, a move that officials hope will clear the way for
suspects in the nation's 1994 genocide to be extradited back to Rwanda
for trial. Fayetteville
Observer
has a fantastic editorial piece on the disparity between the punishment
for prosecutorial misconduct
in the Duke LaCrosse case and the Alan Gell capital murder
prosecution. Scientific
America's Perspective column looks at lethal injection. N.C.
House
Republicans failed to amend a
bill that adjusts laws governing the practice of medicine in the
state.that would have barred the state medical board from
disciplining any doctor for participating in an execution."
A>sample juror questionnaire library have been made available at
a new
website called Deliberations.Tarlton Law Library
has added to its online resource collection, an Actual
Innocence awareness database.South Dakota has updated its lethal
injection protocol. The Sixth Circuit has stayed the mandate in
Richard Cooey v. Strickland pending the
outcome of an appeal to the US Supreme Court seeking review in the
case.
Looking ahead, the Kentucky Supreme Court in Comm.
v. Charles Bussell finds counsel failed to investigate readily
available exculpatory and mitigatory evidence, as well as that
the
prosecution hid evidence relating to an alternate suspect. The
New Jersey Supreme Court in
State v. Porfirio Jimenez holds that for purposes of Atkins
v. Virginia a jury must be unanimous in its finding the Defendant
is not mentally retarded if the matter is to be tried capitally,
anything else and death may not be imposed. A split panel of the
Seventh Circuit grants relief in Christopher
Stevens v. McBride, holding counsel provided deficient penalty
phase representation as
“the only evidence presented by the defense concerning mental state at
the time of the killing was the testimony of a psychologist who
believes that mental illness is a myth.” The Ninth Circuit holds
in George
Lopez v Shriro the district court erred in finding
"Lopez's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim for failure to investigate and present
mitigating evidence [were] unexhausted. The South Carolina Supreme
Court in State
v James Earl Reed finds that although Petitioner is
competent, he has not made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his
right to appellate review. The Montana Supreme Court in Miller
& Lebrum v. 18th Judicial District grants relief as the trial
prosecutor filed his notice of intent to seek the death penalty too
late. In an unpublished opinion the Third Circuit upheld the
grant of habeas relief in William Wallace v. Price as the state trial
court improperly
excluded evidence pointing to another person as the triggerman in the
crime for which Wallace was convicted.
As always thanks for reading. - k
Reprieves
/ Stays of Serious Dates
13 Christopher Emmett (VA)
13 Cathy Henderson (Texas)
Recent
Executions
15 Michael Lambert (Indiana)
20 Lionell Rodriguez (Texas)
21 Gilberto Reyes (Texas)
22 Calvin Shuler (S.C.)
Pending
Executions
June
26 Patrick Knight (Texas)
26 Jimmy Dale Bland (Oklahoma)
26 John Hightower (Georgia)
July
9-13 Elijah Page (S.D. -vol)
10 Rolando Ruiz (Texas)
24 Lonnie Johnson (Texas)
26 Darrell Grayson (Alabama)
SCOTUS
(Since the last edition)
- Fry v. Pliler, No. 06-5247
(6/11/2007) A federal court sitting in habeas must assess the
prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal
trial under Brecht's “substantial and injurious effect”
standard,whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error
and reviewed it for harmlessness under Chapman v. California's
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
- Bowles v.
Russell, No. 06-5306 (6/14/2007) Petitioner relied upon the trial
court's calculations for the deadline to appeal. The trial court
was wrong and Bowles filed a few days late. Unfortunately for Bowles,
the Court holds that Congress, by including the details of the
rules in statutory form,
automatically codified the filing deadlines into jurisdictional
requirements. [SCOTUSBlog
has more].
- Brendlin
v. California, No 06-8120 (6/18/2007) When police make a traffic
stop, a passenger in the car, like the driver, is seized for Fourth
Amendment purposes and thus may challenge the stop's constitutionality.
[John
Wesley Hall has more]
- Rita v.
United States, No. 06-5754 (6/21/2007) A court of appeals may apply
a presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence within the
United States Sentencing Guidelines. [Doug Berman has more
thoughts on how to litigate these claims.]
Week
of June 4,
2007 -- In
Favor of Life or
Liberty
- State
v. Donald Loftin, 2007 N.J. LEXIS 605 (NJ 06/05/2007) One of the
jurors prejudged the
case and the trial court did not properly investigate whether the
juror's predetermination of guilt unduly infected the other
jurors. Procedurally, this is a multi-layered ineffective
assistance of
counsel claim due to trial & appellate counsel's performance. [more
here] [Congrats to counsel: David B. Glazer and Michele A. Adubato]
Week
of June 4,
2007 --
In Favor of Death
- Eric
Nenno v. Quarterman, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 13146 (5th Cir
6/6/2007) COA denied on claims relating to: "1. Whether a polygraph
examiner's deliberate silence after he scored Nenno's polygraph -- a
tactic he knew was likely to evoke an incriminating statement
from an accused who had just taken a polygraph -- amounted to a "subtle
form of psychological persuasion," n1 which overcame Nenno's reluctance
to admit involvement in the capital murder and made his confessions
thereafter involuntary;" and "2.
Whether the Constitution requires that the states provide condemned
prisoners with counsel who provide effective assistance in state habeas
proceedings?"
- Michael
Taylor v. Crawford, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 12851 (8th Cir. 6/4/2007)
"Mr.
Taylor has not adduced evidence at any stage of this litigation
that carries his burden of proving a constitutional violation. We have
very carefully examined the entire record, and we find no evidence to
indicate that any of the last six inmates executed suffered any
unnecessary pain that would rise to an Eighth Amendment violation or
that any state actor was deliberately indifferent to the Constitution's
requirement that no unnecessary pain be wantonly inflicted during the
execution process."
- People
v. Charles Stevens, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 5492 (CA
6/4/2007) Relief denied on claims including: race based strikes;
sufficiency of the lying-in-wait special-circumstance; and (for lack of
a better term) prosecutorial misconduct when the
mother of one of the victims kissed a photograph of the victim as she
left the stand.
- Michael
Bell
v. McDonough, 2007 Fla. LEXIS 1045 (FL 6/7/2007) From Findlaw:
"Denial of
defendant's motion to vacate his two convictions of first-degree murder
and two sentences of death and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
is affirmed and denied, respectively, over procedurally barred claims
and claims that: 1) trial counsel was ineffective for numerous reasons;
2) there was cumulative error; 3) appellate counsel was ineffective for
various reasons; 4) petitioner's death sentence is unconstitutional
under Apprendi; and 5) the trial court gave unconstitutional jury
instructions."
-
Comm.
v. Dewitt Crawley, 2007 Pa. LEXIS 1193 (PA 5/31/2007) PCRA appeal
denied as Crawley failed to "establish
that he
was mentally retarded by a preponderance of the evidence" and his
request for the state supreme court to revise its prior holdings on the
appropriate standard for Atkins relief is denied.
- Comm.
v. Derrick Ragan, 2007 Pa. LEXIS 1191 (PA 5/31/2007) . PCRA
petition denied as newly discovered evidence held meritless.
- State
v. Roger Todd, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 434
(Tenn. Crim. App 5/31/2007) "Roger Todd, appeals from a
trial court order denying funding for his psychological expert. After a
thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that
Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b)
does not provide a proper mechanism by which this Court may address an
appeal of an order denying expert funding. Accordingly, the Defendant's
appeal is dismissed."
- Victor
Saldano v. State, 2007 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 698
(Tex. Crim. App. 6/6/2007) Relief denied, following penalty phase
retrial, on claims including: whether the future-dangerousness
special issue is unconstitutionally vague; whether, a veniremember
was challengeable for cause simply because
he would have placed the burden of proof of mitigation on the defense;
and admission of autopsy
photographs.
- Teresa
Lewis v. Warden, 2007 Va. LEXIS 95 (VA 6/8/2007) "The issues
addressed by the Supreme Court of Virginia involve trial
counsel's conduct related to their decisions concerning the
investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence for Lewis'
sentencing hearing, and their advice to Lewis that she plead guilty.
Upon review of the evidence in mitigation and aggravation of the
offenses, the Supreme Court concludes that Lewis failed to demonstrate
that her defense was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to
investigate and present the available mitigation evidence introduced at
the habeas hearing. The Supreme Court further holds that the record
does not demonstrate that, but for trial counsel's alleged failures,
there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings
would have been different." [from the
Synopses of Opinions of the Executive Secretary, Judicial
Planning Department, Supreme Court of Virginia]
- Ricky
Gray v. Comm, 2007 Va. LEXIS 94 (VA 6/8/2007) Relief denied
on "the following issues: (1) the
sentences of death were imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice, and other arbitrary factors; (2) the sentences of death are
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases;
(3) the circuit court erred by failing to declare Code §
18.2-31(12)
unconstitutional as violating his right to equal protection under the
law; and (4) the Virginia death penalty statutes otherwise violate the
Virginia and United States Constitutions. Gray's first two assignments
of error tracked nearly verbatim the mandatory review of a sentence of
death required by Code § 17.1-313(C). The Supreme Court conducted
the
mandatory review and found no error." [from the
Synopses of Opinions of the Executive Secretary, Judicial
Planning Department, Supreme Court of Virginia]
- Denard
Manns v. Quarterman, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 12923 (5th Cir 6/4/23007)
(unpublished) Relief denied on claims relating to who bares the
burden on the
mitigation special question under both Penry II and Apprendi /
Ring,
as well as the trial court erred in not requiring the jury to
unanimously agree whether the offense elevating murder to capital
murder was robbery, kidnapping, or aggravated sexual assault and
"appellate counsel provided constitutionally deficient assistance by
failing to raise on direct appeal the issue of the lack of juror
unanimity as to which
enumerated offense elevated murder to capital murder." Oddly this
is
an unpublished opinion yet drew a "specially concurring" opinion from
Judge Emilio Garza on the juror unanimity argument.
Week
of June 11,
2007 -- In
Favor of Life or
Liberty
- Ex
Parte Cathy Lynn Henderson, 2007 Tex. Crim. App.
LEXIS 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 6/11/2007) Trial judge ordered to
examine the possibility that the death for which Henderson was
convicted was due to an accident and not murder.
- Irving
Davis v. State, 2007 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 808 (Tex.
Crim. App. 6/13/2007) The trial court excluded the testimony of “nine
lay witnesses lay
witnesses who actually knew the appellant” and would have testified,
despite expert testimony, he would not present a future danger to
society. The exclusion held not to be harmless. Majority
/ dissent.
[Congrats to counsel, Matthew Dekoatz.]
- Crystal
Mae Wagner v. State, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 428 (Ga 6/11/2007)
Interlocutory appeal granted in part. The Georgia Supreme Court's
summary notes that the trial our "that the indictment mixed the
elements of malice murder and felony murder, which was a material
defect," and ruled that to the extent Bailey v. State, 280 Ga. 884 (635
SE2d 137) (2006) “can be construed to hold that a material defect that
is not prejudicial to the defendant does not require the quashing of a
defective count of an indictment, it is disapproved.”"
- Exzavious
Gibson v. Head,2007 Ga. LEXIS 431 (Ga 6/11/2007) Remand ordered
"the habeas court will again consider, in a manner consistent with this
opinion, whether Gibson's conflict of interest claim is procedurally
barred and, if not, whether it has merit." The Georgia Supreme
Court's summary notes that the trial court "erred in holding that
Gibson's claim that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest
because he was a Special Assistant Attorney General at the time he
represented Gibson was procedurally barred because trial counsel's
employment with the Attorney General was a matter of public record. The
Supreme Court held that the attorney was under an affirmative duty to
disclose the potential conflict and thus Gibson was entitled to presume
that the potential conflict did not exist. The Court also held that a
claim that counsel had a conflict of interest is a constitutional claim
cognizable in habeas. Thus the Court reversed in part and remanded to
the habeas court for a determination of whether Gibson's claim was
procedurally barred by his knowledge at the time he filed his first
habeas petition of his counsel's employment with the Attorney General,
and if not, whether the claim has merit."
- William
Kuenzel v. Allen, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
13805 (11th Cir 6/13/2007)"Remanding to
the district court for consideration of whether Kuenzel's allegations
of actual innocence overcome the procedural default of his claims.
Kuenzel's federal habeas petition had been dismissed earlier as
untimely. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the untimeliness
of the state post-conviction relief petition did not by itself render
that petition improperly filed for purposes of tolling the federal
statute of limitations. On remand, the district court found that Pace
v. DiGuigliemo,
125 S.Ct. 1807 (2005) had effectively overruled Eleventh Circuit
precedent on this issue. The panel here noted that another panel has
found that Pace did not overrule the Eleventh Circuit's decision. See
Siebert v. Allen, 480 F.3d 1089, 1090 (11th Cir. 2007)."
- Richard Cooey v. Strickland, No. 05-4057 (6th Cir 6/13/2007
) Mandate stayed in the Ohio
lethal injection protocol challenge. The mandate is stayed pending the
outcome of an appeal to the US Supreme Court seeking review in the
case. They stay of the mandate means no executions are likely in Ohio
until at least mid-fall.
Week
of June 11,
2007 --
In Favor of Death
- Michael
Lambert v. Buss, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 13704 (7th
Cir 6/12/2007) Motion to recall mandate denied, most notably to await
the outcome of Panetti v. Quarterman.
- Michael
Lambert v. Buss, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 14512 (7th Cir
6/14/2007) Relief denied on lethal injection challenge in a memorandum
opinion.
- Jimmy
Dill v. Allen, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 13815 (11th Cir
6/13/2007) Relief denied on "whether petitioner's trial counsel were
constitutionally ineffective in failing to uncover and present
mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of petitioner's trial" and
"whether counsel were constitutionally ineffective in failing to
develop and present evidence that the shooting was not the cause of
[the victim's] death.
- James
Belcher v. State, 2007 Fla. LEXIS 1050 (FL 6/14/2007) Relief denied
on claims including: "1) failure
to object to State's voir dire comment misstating the State's burden of
proof and misstating Belcher's presumption of innocence; (2) allowing
comments denigrating the role of the jury; (3) failure to object to and
request a curative instruction to the State's voir dire comment which
failed to distinguish Belcher's lesser burden of proof to establish
mitigating circumstances; (4) failure to object to and request a
curative instruction to the State's voir dire comment indicating that
Belcher had the burden of proving that the mitigating circumstances
must outweigh the aggravating circumstances, and not vice versa; (5)
failure to object to and request a curative instruction to the State's
comments indicating that a killing done instantly after deciding to
kill is premeditated, first-degree murder; (6) failure to object to and
request a curative instruction to the State's voir dire comment
suggesting that the State did not have to prove intent for
first-degree, premeditated murder; (7) conceding that the victim
suffered a sexual battery, the predicate offense needed for a felony
first-degree murder conviction in the subject case; (8) allowing
impermissible appeals to the emotions and sympathy of the jurors; (9)
failure to use a defense gynecologist to counter the State's expert's
opinion that the physical evidence in the case evidenced a forcible,
sexual battery; (10) failure to object to nonstatutory aggravating
circumstances in the form of testimony about the nutritious food,
diversions, risk of escape, and taxpayer expense incurred by prisoners
in prison; and (11) failure to call certain witnesses to testify at the
penalty phase.. . . (12) Ring v. Arizona, Schriro v. Summerlin, and
Apprendi v. New Jersey, require that aggravating circumstances be
charged
in the indictment and found by the jury, and that the jury's death
recommendation be unanimous; (13) a Brady v. Maryland, violation
regarding the State's failure to disclose the
mishandling of DNA-related items at crime labs; and (14) cumulative
errors of defense counsel."
- John
Allen Muhammad v . Warden, 2007 Va. LEXIS 97 (Va
6/12/2007) Relief denied on claims including: Brady, right to
counsel, and that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel.
(Advance
Sheet for the Week
of June 18,
2007) In
Favor of Life or
Liberty
- Comm.
v. Charles Bussell, 2007 Ky. LEXIS 133 (6/21/2007) Relief granted
on counsel's failure to investigate, prepare & present readily
available exculpatory and mitigatory evidence, as well as the
prosecution's failure to produce evidence that another person, and not
Bussell, committed the crimes for which Appellant was convicted.
[Congrats go
out to Kentucky defenders, Susan J. Martin; David Hare Harshaw, III,
& Theodore S.
Shouse]
- State
v. Porfirio Jimenez, 2007 N.J. LEXIS 700 (NJ 6/18/2007) For
purposes of making a Mental Retardation determination under Atkins
v. Virginia: (A) a jury must be unanimous in its finding the Defendant
is not mentally retarded if the matter is to be tried capitally, and
(B) anything less than unanimous jury (that is at least one juror
believing the defendant is mentally retarded) means a sentence less
than death must be imposed. [Congrats go out to New Jersey defenders
Stephen Kirsch, Joseph E. Krakora, and Susan Remis Silver]
- Christopher
Stevens v. McBride , 2007 U.S. App LEXIS ----- (7th Cir 6/18/2007)
A divided three-judge Seventh
Circuit
panel vacates this Indiana death sentence imposed on “an emotionally
disturbed young man who had been abused and raped as a child” where
“the only evidence presented by the defense concerning mental state at
the time of the killing was the testimony of a psychologist who
believes that mental illness is a myth.” The vote in favor of setting
aside the death sentence was 2-1. One of the judges in the majority on
that issue would have also set aside the habeas petitioner's murder
conviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel, but neither of the
other two judges agreed on that issue. [Congrats to counsel]
- George
Lopez v Shriro, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 14470 (9th Cir
6/20/2007) “[T]he district court erred by determining that Lopez's
ineffective
assistance of counsel claim for failure to investigate and present
mitigating evidence was unexhausted.” [Congrats go out to counsel Cary
Sandman, Waterfall, Economidis, Caldwell, Hanshaw & Villamana,
P.C., Tucson, Arizona]
- State
v James Earl Reed, No. 26345 (S.C.
6/18/2007) Although
Petitioner is
competent, he has not made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his
right to appellate review. [Congrats go out to counsel: Teresa L. Norris,
of Blume, Weyble & Norris]
- Miller
& Lebrum v. 18th Judicial District,
2007 MT 149 (6/19/2007) Prosecutor
failed to file a
Notice of intent to seek the death penalty within 60 days after
arraignment, a deadline prescribed by a Montana Supreme Court Rule. As
the Court noted, “filing the required notice of
intent 72 days late clearly is a ‘material' violation of (our rules).”(link includes access to the briefs of the
parties). [Congrats go out to counsel: Al Avignone & Lisa
Banick
(both of Garrity, Avignone & Banick), as well as Randi Hood &
Peter Ohman (both public defenders from Bozeman, Mt)].
- William Wallace v. Price, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 14326 (3rd
Cir
6/18/2007) (unpublished) Relief granted as the trial court
improperly
excluded statement of an alleged co-conspirator asserting that Wallace
was not the triggerman for which he was convicted and sentenced to
death.
(Advance
Sheet for the Week
of June 18,
2007)
In Favor of Death
- Cone
v. Ricky Bell, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 14362 6th Cir. 6/19/2007) Panel
splits 2-1. Relief denied on claims "(1) that the jury's improper
consideration of the HAC and “great risk of death” aggravating factors
at sentencing has not been cured and so he deserves a new sentencing
hearing; and (2) that we should revisit our first decision's holding
that Cone's Brady claims are procedurally defaulted, because the
Supreme Court has since decided Banks v. Dretke."
- State
v. Cory Morris, 2007 Ariz. LEXIS 65 (AZ 6/18/2007) Relief
denied on claims relating to: "that the State presented insufficient
evidence of the corpus delicti for the deaths of Codman and Davis;"
"that prescreening prospective jurors to determine which ones could
serve for the length of the trial violated his right to be present at
all stages of the criminal proceeding against him;" "that the
prosecutor engaged in misconduct;" and "that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting excessively gruesome photographs."
- People
v. Steven Bonilla, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 6394 (CA 6/18/2007) Relief
denied on claims including (1) sufficiency of evidence of the
lying-in-wait special circumstance;
(2) Wheeler/Batson error as the People all prospective jurors who were
Hispanic women and 67 percent of its strikes on women; (3) sleeping
jurors; and (4) photographs of the victim's grave site and mummified
remains. The actual killer in this pay for hire homicide
cooperated with the State and received just 3 years.
- James
Reed .v. Ozmint, 2007 S.C. LEXIS 254 (S.C. 6/18/2008) Relief
denied on claims "the trial judge erred in (1) failing to disqualify
the Tenth
Judicial Circuit Solicitor's Office and (2) refusing to dismiss a
juror."
- Ronnie
Williams v. State, 2007 Fla. LEXIS 1106 (FL 6/21/2007) Findlaw
notes that relief is denied on claims relating to "1) admission of
out-of-court statements made by the victim during a 911 call, to an
officer, and while in the intensive care unit of the hospital; 2) the
alleged departure of the trial court from a neutral stance; 3) jury
access to a transcript of a 911 call that was prepared by the state; 4)
admission of evidence of the victim's pregnancy; 5) submission of a
felony murder case with sexual battery or attempted sexual battery as
the underlying felony; 6) jury instruction on the aggravating
circumstance that the murder occurred during a sexual battery or an
attempted sexual battery; 7) premeditation; 8) improper constructive
amendment of the indictment; 9) the presumption of innocence; 10) the
unanimity of the verdict; 11) the weighing of aggravating and
mitigating factors; 12) a failure to make the required findings for
imposition of the death penalty; 13) the use of defendant's! conviction
for indecent assault as a prior violent felony aggravator; 14) the
heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) aggravator; 15) the cold,
calculated, and premeditated (CCP) aggravator; 16) the proportionality
of the death sentence; and 17) the constitutionality of the death
penalty."
- Quawn
Franklin v. State, 2007 Fla. LEXIS 1107 (FL 6/21/2007)Relief
denied on "claims that (1) the admission of hearsay statements relating
to his prior violent felony convictions during the penalty phase
violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses in light of the
United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); (2) the trial court erred in admitting
the objected-to portions of Franklin's taped interview with the
newspaper reporter; (3) the guilt phase admission of hearsay statements
made by the victim also constituted a Crawford violation; (4) the trial
court erred by refusing to accept Franklin's stipulation to his prior
violent felony convictions in lieu of testimony regarding the crimes;
(5) improper victim impact evidence was presented to the jury; (6) the
CCP aggravating factor was not properly found; (7) the pecuniary gain
aggravating factor was not properly found; and (8) Florida's capital
sentencing statute is facially unconstitutional under Ring because the
judge rather than the jury determines the sentence to be imposed.
Noncapital
of note:
- State v. Barbara Oakly, et. al. , 2007 Tex. LEXIS 525 (Tex
6/8/2007) Examination of Texas's compensation statute for those
wrongfully convicted.
Selected
Excerpts
from, & Commentary on, this Edition's Cases
[Note formatting may be off below this point.]
Ex
Parte Cathy Lynn Henderson, 2007 Tex. Crim. App.
LEXIS 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 6/11/2007) Trial judge ordered to
examine the possibility that the death for which Henderson was
convicted was due to an accident and not murder.
On
June 11,
2007, in a per curiam opinion, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
granted a stay of execution to Cathy Henderson and remanded the case to
the lower court for consideration of her subsequent application for
writ of habeas corpus. Ex Parte Henderson, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2007
WL 1673130 (Tex. Crim. App. June 11, 2007). Henderson was sentenced to
death for the murder of a child she was baby sitting. The defense at
trial was that the death was accidental. A highly experienced medical
examiner testified that it was impossible for the child to have
received the injuries that he suffered as a result of being dropped as
Henderson claimed. In the subsequent habeas application, Henderson
alleged that newly available evidence shows that: (1) she is innocent
of capital murder; (2) but for constitutional errors she would not have
been found guilty; and (3) she is no longer death eligible. In support
of these claims, Henderson submitted significant new scientific
research along with affidavits and reports from several scientists. The
scientists explained that recent advances in the area of biomechanics
and physics suggest that it is possible that the child's head injuries
were caused by an accidental short-distance fall. Henderson also
presented an affidavit from the medical examiner essentially recanting
his trial testimony. He stated: “Based on the physical evidence in the
case, I cannot determine with a reasonable degree of medical certainty
whether Brandon Baugh´s injuries resulted from an intentional act
or an
accidental fall. In fact, had the new scientific information been
available to me in 1995, I would not have been able to testify the way
I did about the degree of force needed to cause Brandon Baugh´s
head
injury.” The court remanded to the lower court for further
consideration of Henderson's first two claims and dismissed the third
because it was not legally cognizable under the relevant statute. Judge
Meyers did not participate. Judge Price filed a concurring statement.
Presiding Judge Keller filed a dissenting opinion which was joined by
Judge Hervey. Judge Keasler filed a dissenting statement.
William
Kuenzel v. Allen, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
13805 (11th Cir 6/13/2007)"Remanding to
the district court for consideration of whether Kuenzel's allegations
of actual innocence overcome the procedural default of his claims.
Kuenzel's federal habeas petition had been dismissed earlier as
untimely. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the untimeliness
of the state post-conviction relief petition did not by itself render
that petition improperly filed for purposes of tolling the federal
statute of limitations. On remand, the district court found that Pace
v. DiGuigliemo,
125 S.Ct. 1807 (2005) had effectively overruled Eleventh Circuit
precedent on this issue. The panel here noted that another panel has
found that Pace did not overrule the Eleventh Circuit's decision. See
Siebert v. Allen, 480 F.3d 1089, 1090 (11th Cir. 2007)." CapDefNet
notes:
On June 13,
2007, the Eleventh
Circuit (Edmondson, Anderson and Dubina) issued a per curiam opinion in
Kuenzel v. Allen,
___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 1695110 (11th Cir. June 13, 2007), remanding to
the district court for consideration of whether Kuenzel's allegations
of actual innocence overcome the procedural default of his claims.
Kuenzel's federal habeas petition had been dismissed earlier as
untimely. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the untimeliness
of the state post-conviction relief petition did not by itself render
that petition improperly filed for purposes of tolling the federal
statute of limitations. On remand, the district court found that Pace
v. DiGuigliemo,
125 S.Ct. 1807 (2005) had effectively overruled Eleventh Circuit
precedent on this issue. The panel here noted that another panel has
found that Pace did not overrule the Eleventh Circuit's decision. See
Siebert v. Allen, 480 F.3d 1089, 1090 (11th Cir. 2007).
State
v. Donald Loftin, 2007 N.J. LEXIS 605 (NJ 06/05/2007) One of the
jurors prejudged the
case and the trial court did not properly investigate whether the
juror's predetermination of guilt unduly infected the other
jurors. Procedurally, this is a multi-layered ineffective
assistance of
counsel claim due to trial & appellate counsel's performance. [more
here] [Congrats to counsel: David B. Glazer and Michele A. Adubato]
The New Jersey Supreme Court in State
v. Donald Loftin
(No. A-78-05) grants relief on jury related issues. The facts at issue
are essentially one of the jurors prejudged the case. Procedurally,
this is a multi-layered ineffective assistance of counsel claim due to
trial & appellate counsel's performance.
The germane facts, from the opinion note:
Early in the State's presentation, Juror No.
4, a
white juror, expressed to at least one of his African-American
co-workers a desire to hang by a strong rope defendant, who also was
African-American. We do not know whether his comments were intended
metaphorically or humorously. Certainly, Juror No. 4's African-American
co-workers did not consider his remarks to be a laughing matter.
Perhaps that is because the language of lynching when applied to a
black defendant has a decided racial undertone that evokes an era of
vigilante and mindless mob justice that reigned during a dark period in
American history.
After the incident the trial court agreed to
make
Juror No. 4 an alternate. What the trial court did not do is
investigate whether the juror's desire to lynch Loftin was expressed to
any of the other jurors.
In light of this juror's admission to having
uttered
words co-workers indicating that he had prejudged the case and harbored
a racial bias, it was not enough for the trial court to accept the
juror's after-the-fact explanation that he still could be fair. The
juror claimed that his damning and racially insensitive statements were
intended to stop his African-American co-workers from asking further
questions about the case. We do not find that that explanation
dissipated the serious doubts raised about the juror's impartiality.
The juror's conduct alone undermined any trust that he could perform
his duties in accordance with his oath.
Although a new trial is ordered, the Loftin
Court
also addresses the failure of counsel to go with his client to a
presentence interview on an unrelated charge. The client made
potentially damaging statements. Finding that trial counsel was
ineffective, the Loftin Court nonetheless concludes the report of that
presentence interview will be admissible at the penalty phase on
retrial. Note, however, the Court doesn't address the issue of the
admissibility of the statement under Estelle v. Smith and whether
Miranda warnings were issued to Loftin prior to the unrelated
presentence interview.
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1997-2007
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