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Capital
Defense
Weekly [Available at http://capitaldefenseweekly.com/archives/070716.htm] Two wins are noted from the period of July 16 to July 30, 2007 The first is the California
Supreme Court's holding in In re
James Hardy. The California Supreme Court in In
re James
Edward Hardy
has vacated Hardy’s death sentence. A new penalty phase is needed
because there is now “substantial doubt” that he was the actual killer.
The Hardy Court held it appears likely the actual killer in the
murder-for-hire
plot was another man who was not prosecuted for the slayings. The
evidence put forward by habeas counsel that Hardy wasn't the actual
killer "so undermines our confidence
in the penalty verdict that a different, more favorable result was
reasonably probable had this evidence been presented to the jury." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding in Comm.
v. Michael Rainey is less dramatic. In Rainey counsel failed to
adequately investigate and present readily available mitigation
evidence. The record is unclear as to why and counsel has never
been afforded the opportunity to explain why.. “We do not know what
counsel
chose, because counsel did not testify at a hearing regarding his
motives.” Turning to the news of the week, the big news is that the Georgia Supreme Court has ordered oral arguments for Troy Davis, who has a palpable claim of factual innocence. A new study indicates that among those who have been sentenced to death Blacks & Latinos who kill whites are far more likely to be executed than whites who kills whites; the study is Who Survives on Death Row?, American Sociological Review, 2007, VOL. 72 (August:610–632). Ohio Governor Ted Strickland has issued a seventh execution reprieve for John Spriko. Gallup reports national support for the death penalty has dropped again. The John R. Justice Prosecutors and Defenders Incentive Act of 2007 passed as an amendment to S. 1642 [pdf - scroll to page 600] by a vote of 95-0. An Ohio trial court has ruled that it can, and will, rule on a state lethal injection suit pretrial. The court notes that should it find lethal injection unconstitutional it will preclude the state from seeking death. n continuing a series that DPIC has highlighted, “the Denver Post has featured more than a dozen news articles and a series of online videos, providing an in-depth look at the handling of crucial biological evidence gathered during criminal investigations. Looking ahead, the only favorable opinion noted is Jack
Alderman v. Donald from the Northern District of Georgia that
merely lets a lethal injection suit proceed,. As always thanks for reading. - k Executions Pending
Executions
Week
of July 16,
2007 --
In Favor of Life or
Liberty
Week of July 16, 2007 -- In Favor of Death
Week of July 23, 2007 -- In Favor of Life or Liberty
(Advance Sheet Week of July 30, 2007) -- In Favor of Life or Liberty
(Advance
Sheet Week
of July 30,
2007) --
In Favor of Death
Selected
Excerpts
from, & Commentary on, this Edition's Cases In re
James Hardy, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 7881 (Ca 7/26/2007) The California
Supreme Court in In
re James
Edward Hardy
has vacated Hardy’s death sentence. A new penalty phase is needed
because there is now “substantial doubt” that he was the actual killer
as the prosecution had argued. The
Supreme Court said it appears the actual killer in the murder-for-hire
plot was another man who was not prosecuted for the slayings. On July 26, 2007, the California Supreme Court granted in part a habeas petition filed by James Hardy, vacating his death sentence. In re James Edward Hardy, ___ Cal.4th ___, 2007 WL 2128322 (Cal. July 26, 2007). The court found that trial counsel had performed deficiently and prejudicially in failing to present evidence at the sentencing phase implicating a third party as the actual killer of the victims. The court rejected the warden’s argument that the evidence at issue would have been inadmissible at the penalty phase. The court concluded that the evidence was relevant to three statutory sentencing factors: (1) circumstances of the crime; (2) lesser degree of participation; and (3) the catch-all mitigator. The court did not decide whether the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517 (2006) was retroactively applicable, finding instead that this case was distinguishable. In Guzek, the Supreme Court held that the defendant did not have a constitutional right at a capital resentencing to present new evidence showing he was not present at the time of the murder. The Supreme Court distinguished between typical sentencing evidence that goes to how a crime was committed and evidence about whether the defendant committed the crime he was convicted of. Here, evidence that the third party was the actual killer and that Hardy was merely a coconspirator was relevant to how the crime was committed rather than whether Hardy was guilty. The evidence also shed light on the manner in which the crime was committed, a relevant sentencing consideration. The California Supreme Court denied Hardy’s claim of actual innocence, finding that Hardy’s new evidence failed to undermine the prosecutor’s entire case against Hardy or point unerringly to his innocence. The court also denied relief on Hardy’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase of the trial. Although it agreed with Hardy that counsel performed deficiently in failing to uncover and present the evidence of third party culpability, a point conceded by the warden at oral argument, the court was unable to find prejudice. It pointed out that while the prosecutor argued that Hardy was the actual killer of the two victims, the jury was presented with the alternative theories that Hardy was guilty as a co-conspirator and/or as an aider and abettor. Looking to the record, the court was convinced that sufficient evidence remained to inculpate Hardy under both of those alternative theories. On July 18, 2007, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued an opinion affirming in large part the denial of post-conviction relief to Michael Rainey, but remanding to the lower court for an evidentiary hearing on Rainey’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present background and mental health mitigation evidence during the penalty phase of the trial. Commonwealth v. Rainey, ___ A.2d ___, 2007 WL 2049772 (Pa. July 18, 2007). At the penalty phase, the Commonwealth had stipulated to two mitigating circumstances – age of defendant at time of crime (18) and no significant history of prior criminal convictions. The jury found a third mitigating circumstance – the catchall mitigator. This was supported by testimony from Rainey’s mother that she had to work long hours when Rainey was growing up, leaving him alone to care for his siblings. In support of his claim that counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase, Rainey presented declarations from family members and friends, as well as the summary of a mental health evaluation. The declarations indicated that Rainey had been abandoned by his father and that his mother worked long hours. Growing up, Rainey had a history of head injuries which left him with lasting symptoms such as headaches, dizziness, jumpiness and blackouts. Rainey was described as mentally slow, accident-prone, and easily confused. He had performed poorly in school and was unable to hold a job. The mental health expert made a number of findings, including that Rainey had impaired reasoning and deficits in higher thought processes. Rainey’s “functional and adaptive deficiencies” were found to “seriously impair him” and were “symptomatic of underlying neurological involvement (brain damage).” The expert went on to find “symptomatology reflecting Schizophrenia, Paranoia type and Bipolar Affective Disorder.” In denying relief on this claim, the lower court found that the declarations from friends and family were “of questionable accuracy” and “without medical corroboration.” Regarding the mental health expert’s findings, the lower court deemed them “conclusory and general, based mainly on anecdotal evidence.” In addition, the lower court pointed out that Rainey had failed to allege that trial counsel was aware of Rainey’s alleged infirmities at the time of trial. Without such an allegation, Rainey’s ineffectiveness claim faltered. The lower court further surmised that trial counsel made a considered decision not to present the evidence at issue because it would have led the jury to conclude that Rainey was unable to control himself and was a danger to others. The state supreme court agreed with Rainey that it was impossible to attribute a reasonable basis to trial counsel’s performance because counsel had never been asked to explain his conduct. “We do not know what counsel chose, because counsel did not testify at a hearing regarding his motives.” The court was unpersuaded by the Commonwealth’s argument that Rainey’s failure to affirmatively allege that he informed counsel about his background and mental health problems was fatal to his claim. In the court’s view, “at the very least, the testimony of [Rainey’s] mother should have prompted counsel’s awareness, to some degree, of [Rainey’s] difficult background.” In finding that a remand for an evidentiary hearing was in order, the court observed that it did not know what counsel knew about Rainey’s dysfunctional family background and mental health problems. Nor did it know what investigation had been conducted, to what extent Rainey’s mother had been interviewed, “or whether [counsel] obtained medical, educational, or social history records.” .
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