|
Capital
Defense
Weekly [Available at http://capitaldefenseweekly.com/archives/070903.htm] This
edition covers the period from August 27, 2007 to September 3,
2007. The lead opinion of the week is the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' grant of relief in Ricky Ray Malone v. State. Here the prosecutor "blatantly" violated the boundaries placed on penalty phase closing arguments by suggesting "that Malone’s jurors should sentence him to death because the family member victims were counting on them to do sol" "by invoking the powerlessness, the indignities, and the depersonalization that the American system of trial by jury imposes upon all crime victims and their surviving families," and the infamous “three hots and a cot” argument that seems to have found popularity of late in Oklahoma.The court also found plain error occurred in the admission of certain victim impact evidence and counsel's failure to object to same. The other wins of the week cover well worn
ground. The California
Supreme Court in a rather straight forward opinion has granted relief
in People
v.
Arthur Hans Halvorsen on self-representation / Faretta related
claims. The Mississippi Supreme Court in Roger
Eric Thorson v. State remands for further analysis on claims of
mental retardation. The
Birmingham News notes
a rare trial court level postconviction win in Alabama. “LaSamuel
Gamble, 29, no longer faces the death penalty for his role in the
killing of two people at John’s 280 Pawn on July 25, 1996.” A new
sentencing hearing was ordered where death will be off the table due to
“[i]neffective assistance of counsel because his defense lawyers failed
to fully explore Gamble’s background for mitigating circumstances in
the penalty phase” and “[t]he greater culpability of Gamble’s
co-defendant, Marcus Presley, who was sentenced to death in the case
but barred from the death penalty by a 2005 Supreme Court ruling.” In other case related news, the Albany Times
Union in New York in Case stirs death
looks at Monday’s oral arguments in that state’s sole remaining capital
case. The
Wichita (Kansas) Eagle carries an AP report, “One word at core of
death penalty case,” that word is “or.” On
Tuesday the Nebraska Supreme Court held oral argument on whether electrocution
is constitutional: In non-case related news, the Bowling Green Daily News in an article entitled Public Advocate pushes to abolish death sentence looks at Kentucky’s top public defender, Ernie Lewis, his career, and his unquenchable desire to abolish the death penalty in the Bluegrass state. Timothy Young has been named new head of the Office of Ohio Public Defender. DPIC has four great posts from earlier in the week: Death Penalty in Flux (detailing all the states in which the death penalty is on hold and noting lots of recent state legislation); Death Penalty for Offenses Other Than Murder (detailing all the state statutes that contain capital crimes other than those involving the murder of the victim); Time on Death Row (detailing the length of time inmates spend on Death Row and the implications of that time) and Law Review: The Right to Confront Witnesses in Capital Sentencing Proceedings (looking at the Confrontation Clause in the penalty phase). The Montgomery Advertiser notes Alabama’s Attorney General is proposing “for the state to pay $400 an hour to a Massachusetts physician to analyze the combination of drugs used in Alabama executions.” The PBS show Expose looks at four states, eighty capital cases with one reporter going inside the criminal justice system, the full show is now online. Dan Rather Reports - Did Texas Execute Innocent Men? is likewise available on line. Finally, Murder Victims Families for Human Rights, has launched a new blog at www.mvfhr.blogspot.com. The comment period for the new “fast track” authorization
regulations authorized by 28 U.S.C sec. 2265 is about to expire. From
the “HAT Week At-A-Glance:”
You can also go to this
link provided by Equal Justice USA to send a direct comment via a
template to DoJ or to just get more information. Few appellate capital cases were decided this past week, indeed, I’ve spotted just two. A fairly interesting one is found in Ex parte Tommy Gillentine, 2007 Ala. LEXIS 184 (Ala 9/6/2007). Gillentine is an old fashion double jeopardy case that, showing how difficult the subject can be, a lot of smart judges in the courts below got wrong. The other interesting case was United States v. Lezmond Mitchell, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 21201 (9th Cir 9/5/2007), which has a few issues that might cause the case to go en banc or, less likely, cert, including a “procedurally clean” issue that the SCOTUS punted on last term, prosecutorial comments in the penalty phase closing and waiver of a capital defendant’s presence in the penalty phase in light of Rule 12 of the Fed. R. Crim. Proc. As always thanks for reading. - k Commuted Pending
Executions Week
of August 27,
2007 --
In Favor of Life or
Liberty
Week
of August 27,
2007 --
In Favor of Death
(Advance
Sheet Week
of September 3,
2007) --
In Favor of Death
Selected
Excerpts
from, & Commentary on, this Edition's Cases Ricky
Ray Malone v. State, 2007 OK CR 34 (Okla Crim App 8/31/2007) "It
was improper for the prosecutor to so blatantly suggest that Malone’s
jurors should sentence him to death because the family member victims
were counting on them to do so. It was improper to so directly
and profusely appeal to sympathy for the family member victims.
And it was highly improper to seek this sympathy based not only upon
the loss of Green, but also by invoking the powerlessness, the
indignities, and the depersonalization that the American system of
trial by jury imposes upon all crime victims and their surviving
families. It was likewise improper to imply that Malone’s family
members should be compensated for their fifteen-month endurance of this
painful process by a death penalty verdict from the jury, and that
“[a]nything less would be a travesty.” And the prosecutor’s
comparison of Malone’s situation (of limited but continuing “human
contact”) with that of his dead victim (who “will never know human
contact again”) is yet another version of the infamous, but
ever-popular, “three hots and a
cot” argument that this Court
has so strenuously, but unsuccessfully, sought
to eliminate from the Oklahoma prosecutorial repertoire of favorite,
death-seeking, closing argument incantations." On August 31, 2007, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the death sentence imposed on Ricky Malone for the killing of a police officer. Malone v. State, ___ P.3d ___, 2007 WL 2460648 (Okla. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2007). The court found, among other things, that plain error occurred in the admission of certain victim impact evidence. It concluded that “while Malone might have had only a slim chance of avoiding a death sentence in his original trial, the religious and duty-based plea of the victim´s wife that Malone be shown ‘no mercy’ squelched whatever slim chance he had.” (The court continued to adhere to its belief, however, that sentencing recommendations by the victim’s survivors is not per se unconstitutional.) The court went on to find that the “numerous other errors committed in connection with the victim impact evidence in this case - including the failure to hold the required hearing on this evidence, the failure to use the required instruction, the presentation of inadmissible hearsay through cards from the victim, and being both too extensive and too focused upon the emotional impact of [the victim’s] death - further strengthen this Court´s determination that we cannot make a ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ finding in the current case.” The court also pointed out that the potential prejudice from the improper victim impact testimony was enhanced by the prosecutor’s closing argument. In regard to Malone’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately prepare the guilt-innocence phase defense in advance of trial, the court agreed that counsel performed deficiently, stating: “This Court does not hesitate to conclude that it is unreasonable and deficient performance for attorneys who are defending a case in which the only plausible defense to first-degree murder involves drug use that impaired the defendant´s mental processes - where the fact that the defendant killed the victim is established by overwhelming evidence - to fail to arrange a meeting between the ddefendant and his chosen expert until the defendant´s murder trial is well underway.” Malone failed to establish prejudice, however. The court also found that Malone could not established prejudice from the “failure of defense counsel to ensure that Malone´s jury was accurately and comprehensibly instructed on his theory of defense, i.e., drug-induced intoxication.” As for Malone’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase, the court “conclude[d] that defense counsel´s performance in regard to the victim impact evidence presented in this case was both deficient and unreasonable and that Malone was prejudiced thereby.” The court also found that the failure of counsel to present the significant mitigating evidence that was attached to Malone’s request for an evidentiary hearing undermined the court´s confidence in the jury´s sentencing verdict. In particular, the court looked to affidavits from former co-workers who attested to Malone’s positive qualities and contributions, noting that they would likely be given more weight than family testimony because the witnesses were objective. The court did, however, find family affidavits significant as well. The extensive mitigation evidence presented by Malone showed that he “apparently did have a life that was noteworthy, honorable, and admirable prior to his descent into drugs and crime.” And “[w]hile his trial counsel attempted to argue this theory at trial, he did not discover or present to Malone´s jury the facts to back it up.” Also of note to the court were statements made by some of Malone’s witnesses that mitigated some of the aggravating incidents offered by the prosecution. Although finding that the evidence presented by Malone was sufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing on Malone’s claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to develop and present mitigating evidence, the court ultimately concluded the claim was moot given that sentencing relief was granted to Malone on other grounds. Finally, the court condemned many of the arguments made by the prosecutor during the sentencing phase, stating: “It was improper for the prosecutor to so blatantly suggest that Malone´s jurors should sentence him to death because the family member victims were counting on them to do so. It was improper to so directly and profusely appeal to sympathy for the family member victims. And it was highly improper to seek this sympathy based not only upon the loss of [the victim], but also by invoking the powerlessness, the indignities, and the depersonalization that the American system of trial by jury imposes upon all crime victims and their surviving families. [Footnote omitted.] It was likewise improper to imply that Malone´s family members should be compensated for their fifteen-month endurance of this painful process by a death penalty verdict from the jury, and that ‘[a]nything less would be a travesty.’ And the prosecutor´s comparison of Malone´s situation (of limited but continuing ‘human contact’) with that of his dead victim (who ‘will never know human contact again’) is yet another version of the infamous, but ever-popular, ‘three hots and a cot’ argument that this Court has so strenuously, but unsuccessfully, sought to eliminate from the Oklahoma prosecutorial repertoire of favorite, death-seeking, closing argument incantations.” These improper remarks further strengthened and confirmed the court´’s conclusion that the death sentence in this case could not be allowed to stand. Judges Lumpkin and Lewis dissented in part. They would have affirmed Malone’s death sentence. On August 30, 2007, the Mississippi Supreme Court denied in part Roger Thorson’s petition for post-conviction relief but remanded for a hearing on Thorson’s claim that he is ineligible for execution due to his mental retardation. Thorson v. State, ___ So.2d ___, 2007 WL 2446474 (Miss. Aug. 30, 2007). The court rejected the State’s contention that the Atkins claim was procedurally defaulted because Thorson had failed to raise it on direct appeal. The court pointed out that although the Atkins decision had been issued before Thorson filed his brief on direct appeal, it did not exist at the time of Thorson’s trial. Under state law, Thorson could not have brought the claim on appeal because it had not, understandably, been raised at trial. As for the merits, in finding that further proceedings were in order the court looked to an affidavit from Dr. Marc Zimmerman opining that Thorson met the criteria for a diagnosis of mental retardation. That an expert at the pre-Atkins trial had testified that Thorson was mentally handicapped but not mentally retarded did not foreclose a hearing on the claim. Nor did previously reported IQ scores of 77 and 74. (Dr. Zimmerman found that Thorson had a full-scale IQ of 70.) The court dismissed as moot Thorson’s claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to develop evidence of his mental disorders and learning disabilities. It also found the subclaim to be without merit given that the trial expert evaluated Thorson for approximately ten and one-half hours, performed numerous tests on Thorson and concluded that Thorson was “borderline retarded.” As for counsel’s alleged failure to investigate other matters that would have aided in showing Thorman is mentally retarded, because the case was tried before Atkins the court would not find counsel deficient for not investigating mental retardation further. Additional allegations of ineffective assistance by counsel directed towards the guilt-innocence phase of the trial were rejected. A challenge to execution by lethal injection was found to be procedurally barred because it could have been, but was not, raised on direct appeal. Further, the court found the claim to be without merit, noting that Thorson failed to “submit any affidavit which legitimately questions the lethal injection protocol employed by the Mississippi Department of Corrections.” Thorson’s Brady allegations were hampered by the fact that most of the trial files were destroyed by Hurricane Katrina, leaving Thorson without clear evidence of what was and was not provided to trial counsel by the prosecution. Finally, the court denied Thorson’s claim of cumulative error, although it did reject the State’s contention that the claim was barred by res judicata because a cumulative error argument had also been made on direct appeal
SMALL
PRINT 1997-2007
COPYRIGHT / DISCLAIMER / FAIR USE
NOTICE: In plain English, you can use these materials without
attribution (although I would appreciate the attribution) for any
noncommercial purposes you see fit, (such as
professional education, your newsletter, etc.) save those works created
by others contained in this newsletter identified above; you can't use
the intellectual property of others contained herein because
under federal law I simply can't give away the rights of others to
their intellectual property. Any derivative works must provide at least
as equal or
greater waiver of intellectual property rights. The legalese,
copyright, disclaimers, notices, & terms of usage are available in
full at http://capitaldefenseweekly.com/blog/about/. Where in conflict
with the plain English version of this disclaimer / copyright notice,
the terms at http://capitaldefenseweekly.com/blog/about/
control. ADDITIONAL DISCLAIMER:
In plain English, due your own due diligence. Legalese: Use does not
constitute establishment of attorney-client relationship. On a
semi-regular basis cases in which I have participated in one manner
or another (including as counsel of record) may be covered here. As
always, the views expressed here represent my attempt to show what a
given Court held, not whether a particular court reached the right
decision. The views expressed herein do not reflect the views of my
employer or indeed my views as counsel on the merits in any matter in
which I have participated (which normally would be either "my
client got shafted" or "the court made the correct
decision"). The opinions noted above are normally "slip
opinions" that may be modified or withdrawn by the issuing court
without notice. Note we purposefully do not use Blue Book, or any
other traditional, citation form. *Execution information
derived from Rick Halperin, DPIC & media accounts |