Capital Defense Weekly

[Available at http://capitaldefenseweekly.com/archives/071008.htm]

The highlight of this edition is the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Vernon Brown. Specifically, in Brown the prosecution suppressed exculpatory police reports that included witness statements indicating that someone other than Brown had claimed responsibility for / confessed to the murders for which he was convicted.  The Ohio Supremes also granted relief trial counsel failed to file a pretrial motion challenging the testimony of the state's primary witness who, documents suggest, was legally married to Brown and, therefore, would have had the legal right to refuse to testify against him.

The United States Supreme Court has "GVR'd" (Granted, Vacated, & Remanded) a Sixth Circuit capital case, Hudson V. Frank Spisak in light of its recent opinions in  Carey v. Musladin and Schriro v. Landrigan; three justices would have granted cert.  Smith v. Arizona, a cert denial on the issue of prolonged stays on death row and the Eighth Amendment, drew a dissent from Justice Breyer.  The Supreme Court also heard oral arguments in Medellin v. Texas last Wednesday; the SCOTUSBlog's in-depth coverage of the oral arguments preempts the need for any additional analysis. Also from the SCOTUSBlog, this major analysis of the breakdown of the "rule of four" in stay cases.

The American Bar Association's Pennsylvania Death Penalty Assessment Report has been released.  In the modern era, more Pennsylvania death row inmates have been exonerated than executed. The report reveals an amazingly constructive critique of the problems with Pennsylvania's death penalty practice, as well as suggestions for judicial and legislative changes that need to be made before the Keystone state's death chamber resumes activity.  [Executive Summary of the Pennsylvania Death Penalty Report & Full Pennsylvania Death Penalty Assessment Report]

In other news, Floyd Brown, who has been locked up in the state mental hospital for 14 years because he is too mentally retarded to stand trial for a capital murder he may well have not committed, has been released in North Carolina. The latest edition of the National Institute of Justice Journal is available and includes several potentially useful articles including: Police Lineups: Making Eyewitness Identification More Reliable, Sexual Assault: Virtual Training Takes Responders From Exam Room to Courtroom, & Forensic Databases: Paint, Shoe Prints, and BeyondDPIC notes member nations of the European Union and the Council of Europe marked October 10th as "European Day Against the Death Penalty," an action to underscore the continent's firm commitment to ending executions throughout the world.

In the realm of new scholarship DPIC also notes, "[a] recent edition of the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review features articles about the impact of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) in limiting appeals by prisoners and death row inmates. AEDPA was enacted in 1996, and Harvard Law School sponsored a symposium marking the legislation's tenth anniversary. One article by Bryan Stevenson, Director of the Alabama-based Equal Justice Initiative, "Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to Collateral Review of Criminal Cases," discusses how AEDPA and related court decisions have created barriers to challenging constitutional violations and restricted substantive review in death penalty cases." Symposium: "Pro Se Litigation Ten Years After AEDPA," 41 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 289 (2006).

Elsewhere, the Michael Richard execution controversy in Texas has heated up.   For those unfamiliar with the controversy press accounts note a formal judicial complaint has been filed against Sharon Keller, the PJ of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals arising out of her shutting the courthouse doors to Richard without consulting the other judges of the TCCA:  Then on Monday the Honorable Judge Susan Criss of the 212th Judicial District Court indicated on the Burnt Orange Report that she is joining in filing a complaint against Judge Keller. And, as all things seems to do these days, an online petition / judicial complaint is now making the rounds that you too can sign to add your name to call for accountability.

Please note,  as the edition was being completed, William Castillo, a volunteer in Nevada, has received a stay on what some had percieved as the last likely execution of the year.

Looking ahead, three favorable dispositions are noted. In Rolando Ruiz v. Quarterman a Fifth Circuit panel, in a powerful blast aimed at the failure of the Texas capital representation scheme, and heaping well deserved praise on the Texas Defenders, remands with instruction to decide the claim of ineffective trial counsel on its merits.  The Fifth Circuit also granted a COA on three additional issues in Jonathan Bruce Reed v. Quarterman  (prosecutorial discovery violations, a Penry II claim, & failure to grant a jury instruction on first-degree, non-capital murder.  Finally, in Crosley Green v. State, the Florida Supreme Court grants relief as counsel "was prejudicially ineffective in failing to investigate the case file in defendant's prior New York case."

As always thanks for reading & my apologies for a late mailing. - k

Stay / Commuted
October
15 William Castillo (Nev.-vol)

November
1 Jeffrey Landrigan (Az.)

Pending Executions
October
16 Jack Jones Jr. (Arkansas)
17 Christopher Emmett (Va.)
19 Jack Alderman (Ga.)
23 Curtis Osborne (Ga.)
25 Daniel Siebert (Alabama)
30 Earl Berry (Mississippi)

More information on pending execution dates*


Week of  October 1, 2007 --  In Favor of Life or Liberty

  • State v. Vernon Brown, 2007 Ohio 4837 (Ohio 10/3/2007) Relief granted as the State failed to turn over exculpatory police reports that indicated someone else confessed to the crime.  As an alternate ground for relief, counsel held to be ineffective for failing to make the appropriate motions that may have precluded the State from presenting a crucial witness.

Week of  October 1, 2007 --  In Favor of Death

  • David Wood v. Quarterman, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 23510 (5th Cir 10/5/2007) COA denied on claims including: "(1) the indictment was defective because it did not state a capital offense; (2) trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of an extraneous offense during the guilt phase of the trial."

  • Norman Grim v. State, 2007 Fla. LEXIS 1842 (FL 10/4/2007) Postconviction relief denied on the "following claims: (A) the State committed two Brady violations; (B) his guilt-phase counsel was ineffective in various respects; (C) penalty-phase counsel was ineffective; and (D) special counsel had an undisclosed conflict of interest." In his contemporaneously filed habeas petition relief denied on claims including: "(1) section 921.141, Florida Statutes (2006), is unconstitutional; (2) the State’s failure to specify aggravators in the indictment is unconstitutional; (3) the jury instructions improperly shifted the burden of proof; and (4) appellate counsel was ineffective."

  • Thomas Edwin Loden, Jr. v. State, 2007 Miss. LEXIS 558 (Miss 10/4/2007)  Relief denied on claims relating to whether:  (A) the trial court improperly denied funds to retain the assistance of a forensic social worker to investigate and present relevant mitigating factors; (B)  indictment failed to charge a death-penalty eligible offense; (C)  trial court erred in weighing the "avoiding arrest" aggravating circumstance; (D) double jeopardy / double counting of aggs; (E)  trial court erred in considering both the Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-19-101(5)(d) aggravating circumstance and the "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravating circumstance; (F)  proportionality review; and (G) erroneous advice of trial counsel prejudiced Loden by causing him to enter an involuntary guilty plea to capital murder.

  • State v. Frederick Mundt,  2007 Ohio 4836 (Ohio 10/3/2007) Relief denied on ineffectiveness claims including: (A)  failure to seek disqualification of several jury members; (B) failure to object to various portions of the state's evidence and witness testimony, and (C) failure   to introduce mitigation evidence about Mundt's low IQ and poor performance as a student.Other claims on which relief is denied include, as the Court provided summary notes: "prosecutorial misconduct, improper admission by the trial court of prejudicial “victim impact” evidence regarding the injuries inflicted on Brittany, alleged flaws in the instructions given to the jury and claims that Ohio's death penalty statute is unconstitutional."

  • Elijah Dwayne Joubert v. State, 2007 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1268 (Tex. Crim. App. 10/3/2007)  Relief denied on claims including: (A) "trial court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss the indictment for its alleged failure to include the special punishment issues;" (B) failure to remove for cause a life hesitant juror; (C) failure of the trial court to permit an argument for intra-case proportionality to the jury; and (D) the special issues "permitted a finding in favor of the death penalty without a finding that he intended that a killing occur."

(Advance Sheet Week of  October 8, 2007) --  In Favor of Life or Liberty

  • Rolando Ruiz v. Quarterman, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 23920 (5th Cir 10/11/2007) Rule 60 motion granted, remand ordered to address ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Very strong and sharp language about the gross deficiencies in the Texas scheme for the appointment of counsel.

  • Jonathan Bruce Reed v. Quarterman, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 23728 (5th Cir 10/9/2007) COA granted on 1) a denial of a request for discovery of files regarding contact between the prosecution and an informant; 2) a Penry claim arguing that the former Texas capital sentencing scheme did not permit the sentencing jury to consider fully his mitigating evidence; and 3) a claim that his due process rights violated by a denial of a requested jury instruction on first-degree, non-capital murder as a lesser included offense.  Briefing  scheduled set. 

  • Crosley Green v. State, No. SC05-2265, SC06-1533 (FL 10/11/2007)  Emphasizing the need to look at a client's prior convictions, the trial court's ordering "a new penalty phase is affirmed as the trial court properly determined that counsel was prejudicially ineffective in failing to investigate the case file in defendant's prior New York case."

(Advance Sheet Week of  October 8, 2007) --  In Favor of Death

  • Ricardo Ortiz v. Quarterman, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 23729 (5th Cir 10/10/2007) Relief denied on claims including whether the "Texas retaliation statute was an unconstitutional ex post facto law when applied to him" and COA denied on "two additional issues, arguing that reasonable jurists would find debatable whether the trial court improperly excluded a veniremember from jury service because of her views regarding the death penalty and whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the requisite burden of proof for imposition of the death penalty."

  • David Frances v. State, No. SC05-892 (FL 10/11/2007) Relief denied among three main claims, with various subclaims, including, broadly  "(1) the trial court improperly restricted his presentation of guilt and penalty phase evidence that was relevant to his relative culpability for the crimes and what sentence he should receive; (2) the trial court improperly found the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance (HAC), excluded existing mitigating evidence, and concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances; and (3) Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona. We address each claim in turn below."

  • Johnny Kormondy v. State, No. SC05-1200, No. SC06-210 (FL 10/11/2007) Postconviction relief denied on claims "that (1) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the guilt phase of trial by failing to require Kormondy’s presence at pretrial conferences; (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by allowing Kormondy’s statements to law enforcement officers to be introduced into evidence; (3) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by conceding Kornondy’s guilt for burglary and robbery; (4) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to impeach the State’s witnesses; (5) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move for the disqualification of Judge Kuder and failing to withdraw from representation before the first trial; (6) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the second penalty phase; (7) trial court erred by finding that the newly discovered evidence of recanted testimony was not credible; (8) rule 4-3.5(d)(4) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, which prevents counsel from contacting jurors, is unconstitutional; (9) execution by electrocution and lethal injection are cruel or unusual punishment or both; (10) his constitutional right against cruel and unusual punishment will be violated as he may be incompetent at the time of execution; and (11) the cumulative effect of errors deprived Kormondy of a fair trial."  Habeas relief denied on claims "that (1) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue to this Court that the trial court’s order failed to consider record mitigation in violation of Farr v. State; (2) appellate counsel was ineffective for not presenting Mrs. McAdams’ prior deposition testimony on direct appeal to this Court in order to establish that the trial court erred by not allowing Kormondy to confront Mrs. McAdams; and (3) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that Kormondy’s waiver of mitigation was invalid because the trial court did not ask trial counsel what investigation for mitigation was done and what mitigation was available in violation of Koon v. Dugger."
  • Artemus Walker v. State, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 729 (Ga 10/9/207) Relief denied on claims including: (A) trial court's improper comments on the evidence adduced at trial; (B) improper use of victim-impact evidence during the trial and sentencing; ( C) chain of custody for blood samples; (D) improper prosecutorial comments during the evidence and in closing in both phases of the trial; (E) admission of certain physical evidence; and (F) intracase proportionality where codefendant had received only a life sentence.

  • State v. James Frazier, 2007 Ohio 5048 (Ohio 10/10/2007) Relief denied on claims relating to: (A) the failure to adequately define the standard of proof needed for mitigation leading jurors to speculate that it might be “beyond a reasonable doubt” as in other stages of the trial; (B) mental retardation related claims (including what looks to have been a strong IAC claim); (C) IAC (pretrial preparation, voir dire, during the guilt and sentencing phases of his trial by failing to object at various times, failing to retain a substance-abuse expert to present testimony about his history of abusing drugs and alcohol and failing to request a venue change); & (D) independent reweighing

  • State v. Percy June Hutton, 2007 Ohio 5443  (8th App  Dist Ohio 10/11/2007) Relief denied on n the basis of timeliness of the petition. Claims denied include IAC (guilt/penalty), state discovery violations, Brady, Napue, factual innocence, and denial of an evidentiary hearing.

(Advance Sheet Week of  October 8, 2007) -- Notable
  • State v. Thomas Ice, 2007 Ore. LEXIS 815 (Ore 10/11/2007) Consecutive sentences implicate the Sixth Amendment under state's sentencing scheme.

Selected Excerpts from, & Commentary on, this Edition's Cases
[Note formatting may be off below this point.]

State v. Vernon Brown, 2007 Ohio 4837 (Ohio 10/3/2007) Relief granted as the State failed to turn over exculpatory police reports that someone else confessed to the crime, as well as counsel failed to make the appropriate motions that may have precluded the State from presenting a crucial witness. From the court provided press release:

Citing ineffective assistance provided by the defendant’s trial attorneys and the failure of prosecutors to disclose evidence favorable to the defense, the Supreme Court of Ohio today unanimously vacated the aggravated murder conviction and death sentence of Vernon Brown of Cleveland. In a decision written by Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger, the Court ordered that Brown receive a new trial.

Brown was convicted of the Jan. 1, 2004, shooting deaths of Duane Roan and Tearle Toeran. A jury found Brown guilty of the aggravated murder of Roan with prior calculation and design, including death penalty specifications. He was also convicted of murder for killing Toeran, and of aggravated robbery, carrying a concealed weapon and possession of a firearm under disability.

On appeal, Brown raised 21 allegations of error during his trial as grounds for the Supreme Court to vacate his convictions or reduce his death sentence. In today’s decision, the Court found merit in two of Brown’s claims, and held that those errors were so serious that they rendered the trial court verdict unreliable and therefore required that Brown’s conviction and death sentence be set aside and a new trial conducted.

“The evidence shows that Brown was involved in the deaths of Toeran and Roan and was present at the time they were killed. Under the circumstances of this case, the jury was required to conclude not only that Brown was responsible for the deaths of Toeran and Roan, but also that he acted with prior calculation and design,” wrote Justice Lanzinger. “We are not convinced, however, that Brown’s guilty verdicts and death sentence are worthy of confidence, for the errors by both the prosecution and defense cause us to question whether the jury’s conclusions could have been fairly reached. The prosecution breached its duty to provide to the defense all evidence material to Brown’s guilt or innocence. The defense attorneys also erred by failing to provide effective assistance of counsel.”

The Court noted that under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1963 decision in Brady v. Maryland, prosecutors are required to provide a defendant with any evidence discovered by the state in its investigation of a crime that is favorable to the defendant and is material either to his guilt or punishment.

In this case, Justice Lanzinger wrote, Brown’s attorneys duly requested disclosure of any exculpatory evidence gathered by the police that was material to his guilt or punishment. However, the Cuyahoga County prosecutor’s office failed to disclose two police reports that included witness statements indicating that someone other than Brown had claimed responsibility for the murders. One of the undisclosed reports indicated that a drug dealer named James Donley, who gave testimony damaging to Brown at Brown’s trial, had told a third party that Donley and two other men were responsible for the killings. A second undisclosed police report referred to statements made to investigating officers by Toeran’s father and another man who was a police informant indicating that Donley and another man who was not Brown had been “bragging” on the street after the shootings that they had been responsible.

“Admittedly, the statements contained in these reports are hearsay and might not be admissible,” wrote Justice Lanzinger. “However, they are material, and even if the defense could not directly introduce them at trial, the state’s failure to turn them over was highly prejudicial. The defense was deprived of the opportunity to call the original declarants at trial. They were also deprived of the ability to use the statements to cross-examine Donley when he testified at trial. Donley was an essential witness for the state who contradicted himself during his testimony at trial and contradicted his earlier statements. He alleged that Brown had made incriminating statements about the murders. This testimony would have taken on a decidedly different character if Donley himself had been implicated in the murders.”

Justice Lanzinger rejected the state’s argument that, even if the reports had been turned over, the outcome of the trial would have been the same because of the other evidence presented and because Brown never denied that he shot the victims. “Brown did … deny that he acted with prior calculation and design, and two life sentences for murder is a decidedly different outcome from a sentence of death,” wrote Justice Lanzinger. “ … (T)he relevant inquiry is not whether the outcome would more likely than not be different, but whether the verdict is one worthy of confidence.”

The Court also found merit in Brown’s assertion that he received ineffective assistance from his trial attorneys when they failed to file a pretrial motion challenging the testimony of the state’s primary witness in the case, Jillian Wright, and requiring the trial judge to formally determine whether Wright and Brown were legally married. If defense counsel had entered such a motion and the court determined that Brown and Wright were spouses, Justice Lanzinger wrote, the judge would have been required to advise Wright that, under the Supreme Court of Ohio’s holding in State v. Adamson, she could legally refuse to testify against Brown. She would have been presumed incompetent to testify against him unless, with knowledge of her right to refuse, she made a deliberate choice to testify.

While Wright, who was the only eyewitness to the shootings, had denied to police and prosecutors that she was married to Brown, Justice Lanzinger pointed to significant conflicting evidence including a wedding license dated two days before the murders, a life insurance policy in which Wright had named Brown as her beneficiary and listed him as her husband, and a letter she had written Brown after his arrest stating that this was “a hell of a way to start our marriage.”

“In this case, the error does not lie with the judge but with Brown’s trial counsel. Had the existence of a marriage been undisputed, the judge would have erred by not informing Wright of her right not to testify. However, because there was a question as to whether Brown and Wright were married, it was Brown’s trial counsel’s obligation to request a formal decision on whether Wright and Brown were actually married,” wrote Justice Lanzinger. “The importance of Wright’s testimony to the case against Brown cannot be overstated. Wright was the only eyewitness to the murders of Roan and Toeran. Had she been properly advised that it was her choice whether to testify, and had she chosen not to testify, the case against Brown would have been significantly weakened.”

Justice Lanzinger concluded that “Brown was eligible for the death penalty only because he was convicted of aggravated murder after the jury found that he had acted with prior calculation and design in the death of Roan. Wright is the only one who observed the events of that night. Without her testimony, there would be no firsthand account of Brown’s role in the deaths of Toeran and Roan. The fact that she was not properly found competent to testify severely undermines confidence in the jury’s verdict because it calls into question whether, in the absence of her testimony, the jury still would have found Brown guilty of the aggravated-murder charge and thus death-eligible. … (A)lthough the only difference might be that of Brown’s final sentence, in this case, that difference is monumental — it is the difference between life and death. This difference is enough to explain why Brown was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to properly raise the issue of Wright’s competence to testify.”


SMALL PRINT
SUBSCRIBING & ARCHIVES: Capital Defense Weekly is normally written by Karl Keys. CDW is published forty (40) times (or so) a year.

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ADDITIONAL DISCLAIMER: In plain English, due your own due diligence. Legalese: Use does not constitute establishment of attorney-client relationship. On a semi-regular basis cases in which I have participated in one manner or another (including as counsel of record) may be covered here. As always, the views expressed here represent my attempt to show what a given Court held, not whether a particular court reached the right decision. The views expressed herein do not reflect the views of my employer or indeed my views as counsel on the merits in any matter in which I have participated (which normally would be either "my client got shafted" or "the court made the correct decision"). The opinions noted above are normally "slip opinions" that may be modified or withdrawn by the issuing court without notice. Note we purposefully do not use Blue Book, or any other traditional, citation form.

*Execution information derived from Rick Halperin, DPIC & media accounts
**For purposes of full disclosure indicates possible prior involvement to one degree or another.