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Capital
Defense
Weekly
[Available at http://capitaldefenseweekly.com/archives/071029.htm]
Two major cases shape this edition, the New Mexico Supreme
Court's holding in State
v. Robert Young and the New York Court of Appeals decision in People
v. John Taylor
In State
v. Young the New Mexico suspended two capital trials unless and
until the
Legislature appropriates enough money to compensate the defense counsel
adequately in these cases. The Young Court goes on to lay out a
fairly insightful analysis of what the Sixth Amendment's guarantees of
meaningful assistance costs. As local media notes "All of this
raises the question: Can New Mexico afford the death penalty?" As
an aside, the victim's widow wants the death penalty dropped and the
resources diverted for assistance for murder victims' families.
In People v. LaValle the New
York Court of Appeals stuck down the Empire State's death penalty on
the ground that the statute authorizing the death penalty unduly
coerced new death sentences. A trial court, with some degree of
vision, realized that the statute was unconstitutional and, prior to
the LaValle Court's decision, at trial excised the unconstitutional
part of the statute and a jury returned death. In People
v. John Taylor New York's highest Court strikes down any hope that
the statute might somehow be saved. “[I]t is not within our
power to save the statute.. . . The
Legislature, mindful of our State’s due process protections, may
reenact a sentencing statute" free of its constitutional defects that
is free of coercion and cognizant of
a jury’s need to know the consequences of its choice.”
Despite Young & Taylor, lethal injection
related litigation still dominates the headlines. October was the
first month in some time in which, thanks to lethal injection
litigators, an execution did not occur. In
California a trial court has tentatively held that the state's new
lethal injection protocol violates that state's administrative
procedures act (order here).
In Ohio, the state Supreme
Court has denied a writ of prohibition that had been sought to
prevent a pretrial lethal injection challenge. In Florida the state
Supreme Court in Schwab
v. Florida, and a
companion case Lightbourne
v. McCollum,ruled that Florida’s procedure for carrying out
execution by
lethal injection is constitutional. The Alabama
Supreme Court on Wednesday despite the near uniformity of legal
opinion that all nonconsensual execution will be stayed until at least
February 2008, reset the execution by lethal injection of Tommy Douglas
Arthur for Dec. 6. Boalt Hall's Death
Penalty Lethal Injection Clearinghouse has more.
In other news, New York's Capital
Defender Office is preparing
to close its doors in light of Taylor, the first such office to put
itself out of business in sometime, saving taxpayers millions.
Damien Echols of the West Memphis
III
has purportedly been cleared by recent DNA testing according to press
accounts; stay tuned.
In new scholarship, John Blume has a new article out on SSRN
entitled It’s
Like Déjà Vu All Over Again: Williams V. Taylor, Wiggins
V. Smith, Rompilla V. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines
Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel. Rachel King
in a recently published law review article
entitled, No Due Process: How the Death Penalty Violates the Constitutional,
16 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 195 (2007), looks at the other set of family
members left grieving, those of the condemned
Looking ahead, the Seventh Circuit's Eric
Holmes v. Buss, Judge Posner writing, raises some very interesting
questions about competency for purposes to
proceed with federal habeas corpus litigation. The Sixth Circuit
in Alfred
Morales v. Mitchell vacates a death sentence as "[i]n sum, the
social history report,
records, and testimony proffered by Morales’s habeas counsel
demonstrate conclusively that Morales’s trial attorney failed
adequately to investigate and, thus, was unable to present to the jury
compelling mitigating evidence that was readily available at the time
of trial." Finally, the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v.
Robert Coleman vacates in light of Batson as the trial prosecutor
conceded race was a reason for striking a juror.
Please note because the email is going out late, that on
Monday of this week the U.S. Supreme Court issued Allen
v. Daniel Siebert
holding that Siebert was barred from receiving federal court review of
his habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction because the
habeas petition was filed too late. Note too that today, the en
banc Eleventh Circuit issued an
order
in the lethal injection challenge by the same name, Allen v. Daniel
Siebert, which sent the case back to the original three-judge panel to
consider the
issues raised in Alabama’s petition for rehearing en banc. Finally, the
three-judge panel also issued a
revised decision
that rejected all but one aspect of Siebert’s challenge to Alabama’s
imposition of the death penalty, the as applied challenge. The
SCOTUS on Monday also granted cert in Arave v. Hoffman
(07-110)(Relief granted below on IAC as trial counsel misled
client in to believing hey were death eligible if convicted).
Please also note, we are no longer considering execution dates
scheduled before February 15, 2008 as probable in light of Baze v. Rees
and have suspended the Weekly's "pending execution" data until
then.
As
always thanks for reading. - k
Week of October 22, 2007 – In Favor of Life or Liberty
- State
v. Robert Young,
NO. 29,467 (N.M. 10/25/2007) “Defense counsels’
compensation is
inadequate under the facts of this case, violating defendants’ Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Prosecution of the
death penalty is stayed unless the State makes adequate funds available
for the defense. We have set the hourly rate and maximum compensation
based on the unique circumstances of this case. In doing so, we make no
determination that similar fees or rates are constitutionally required
in other cases.” (Note: no date is listed on the slip op.)
- People
v. John Taylor, 2007 N.Y. LEXIS 2916 (NY 10/23/2007) Taylor
was sentenced under a facially unconstitutional statute, and “it is not
within our power to save the statute.. . . The Legislature, mindful of
our State’s due process protections, may reenact a sentencing statute
that is free of coercion and cognizant of a jury’s need to know the
consequences of its choice.”
- Daniel
Lee Siebert v. Allen,
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 24802 (11th 10/24/2007) Stay granted in light of
Baze v. Rees (Note: En banc the stay & opinion was
subsequently
vacated, then sua sponte the
en banc Court reinstated the stay.
- Curtis Osborne v. Hall, S08W0267 (GA 10/22/2007) Stay
granted in light of Baze v. Rees
Week
of October 22, 2007
– In Favor of Death
- Earl
Wesley Berry v. Epps,
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 25219 (5th Cir 10/26/2007) Despite the Supreme
Court’s grant of cert in Baze v. Rees, “[w]ell-established fifth
circuit [sic] precedent is clear: death-sentenced inmates may not
wait
until execution is imminent before filing an action to enjoin a State’s
method of carrying it out. Such claims are dilatory and should be
dismissed.” Stay subsequently granted by the SCOTUS.
- Arthur
Barnhill v. State,
2007 Fla. LEXIS 1954 (FL 10/25/2007) Relief denied on postconviction
appeal/habeas corpus claims, relating to: “(1) various allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel; 2) whether rule 4-3.5(d)(4) of the
Rules Regulating the Florida Bar and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.575 violate his constitutional right of equal protection and deny him
adequate assistance of counsel; 3) whether lethal injection is cruel
and unusual punishment; 4) erroneous jury instructions; 5) cumulative
errors; and 6) his incompetency at time of execution.” [via Findlaw]
- William
Kelley v. State,
2007 Fla. LEXIS 1951 (FL 10/25/2007) Relief denied on three claims.
“First, Kelley claims that the trial court erred in denying his
prehearing discovery request. Second, Kelley claims that he was denied
due process due to inadequate notice of the evidentiary hearing. Third,
he asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the DNA evidence
no longer exists.”
- Errol Duke
Moses v. Branker,
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 24750 (4th Cir 10/23/2007) “Moses claims that his
trial counsel failed to investigate readily available mitigation
evidence. The district court denied the petition, and we affirm. The
ineffective assistance claim advanced in the federal petition was not
exhausted in state court, and Moses has not established the cause
necessary to excuse the procedural default.”
Week
of October 22, 2007
– Other
- State
v. Siler,
2007 Ohio LEXIS 2588 (Ohio 10/25/2007) Jury override to life. Child’s
statements to police detective were testimonial under the primary
purpose test and therefore the Right to Confrontation is implicated.
- Gollehon v. Mahoney, 2007
U.S. App. LEXIS 25269 (9th
Cir 10/25/2007) State court did not violate habeas petitioner’s rights
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by permitting a death
qualified jury even though the jury had no role in fixing the death
penalty because the exclusion of conscientious jurors did not create a
panel that lacked a fair cross-section or was improperly slanted in
favor of conviction
(Advance Sheet Week of
October 29, 2007) – In Favor of Life or Liberty
- Alfred
Morales v. Mitchell,
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 25582 (6th Cir 11/2/2007) Death sentence vacated
in light of ineffective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase. “In
sum, the social history report, records, and testimony proffered by
Morales’s habeas counsel demonstrate conclusively that Morales’s trial
attorney failed adequately to investigate and, thus, was unable to
present to the jury compelling mitigating evidence that was readily
available at the time of trial.”
- Eric
Holmes v. Buss,
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 25361 (7th Cir 10/30/2007) Remand ordered to
determine competency for purposes to proceed with federal habeas corpus
litigation. (oral
argument)
- State v.
Robert Coleman,
2007 La. LEXIS 2392 (LA 11/2/2007) “[T]he State’s articulated reasons
with respect to the peremptory strike of prospective juror, Mason
Miller was entirely pretextual and inadequate. We conclude that the
manner in which the State exercised its peremptory challenges in this
case, based on race, resulted in a violation of defendant’s
constitutional rights and find this error raises serious federal
constitutional equal protection issues affecting the rights of both the
defendant and the excused venire-member. This error is a structural
one, affecting the framework within which the trial proceeded.
(Advance
Sheet Week of October 29,
2007) – In Favor of Death
- Jesse
Cummings v. Sirmon,
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 25417 (10th Cir 10/30/2007) Relief denied on
claims relating to: “1) ineffective assistance of trial and appellate
counsel; 2) admission of uncorroborated testimony of accomplices; 3)
misjoinder; and 4) the refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury
on the credibility of accomplice testimony/” [via Findlaw]
- Jonathan
Lawrence v. State,
2007 Fla. LEXIS 2012 (FL 11/1/2007) Relief denied on “eight
claims:
(1) his constitutional rights were violated because his guilty plea was
not knowing and voluntary; (2) his convictions and death sentence are
unreliable because no adversarial testing occurred during the pretrial
and guilt-phase proceedings due to the ineffective assistance of his
counsel; (3) his sentence is unreliable because inadequate testing
occurred during the penalty phase due to ineffective assistance of
counsel; (4) the Florida death penalty sentencing statute is
unconstitutional as applied; (5) Lawrence’s constitutional rights were
violated because he was denied the opportunity to interview jurors; (6)
execution by electrocution or lethal injection is cruel or unusual
punishment; (7) Lawrence may be incompetent at the time of execution;
and (8) the cumulative effect of the procedural and substantive errors
deprived Lawrence of a fundamentally fair trial.”
- Ian
Lightbourne v. McCollum,
2007 Fla. LEXIS 2013 (FL 11/1/2007) In a decision that has many
people
scratching their heads as to why not wait until the U.S. Supreme
Court
decides Baze v. Rees, the
Florida Supreme Court holds “Lightbourne has failed to show that
Florida’s current lethal injection procedures, as actually administered
through the DOC, are constitutionally defective in violation of the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”
- Mark
Schwab v. State,
2007 Fla. LEXIS 2011 (FL 11/1/2007) Relief denied on appeal in
this
second postconviction petition (with an execution date) on claims
relating to: “(1) Florida’s lethal injection method of execution
violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution and corresponding provisions of the Florida Constitution;
and (2) newly discovered evidence reveals that Schwab suffers from
neurological brain impairment, which makes his sentence of death
constitutionally unreliable.”
- Michael Jerome Lewis v. State, 2007 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS
201 (Ala
Crim App 11/2/2007) Please check back for our summary on this 100+ page
denial of relief.
(Advance
Sheet Week of October 29,
2007) – Other
- Ellis Louis Mashburn, Jr. v. State, 2007 Ala. Crim. App.
LEXIS 199
(Ala Crim App 11/2/2007) Remand ordered as “the trial court’s written
sentencing order does not comply with the requirements of §
13A-5-47(d), Ala. Code 1975,”
- David
Autry v. State, 2007
Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 40 (Okla Crim App 11/2/2007) Contempt
action
arising from a capital retrial that ended in a mistrial.
The trial
court excluded mention of certain potentially exculpatory evidence
pretrial. Counsel indicated that he believed the trial court was
erroneous (and the OCCA suggests in dicta the trial court was
indeed
wrong). Counsel then mentions the evidence in opening, later
claiming
the State opened the door. Even if the trial court was
wrong, counsel
still had an obligation to follow that order. $500 fine affirmed,
costs above that for jurors dismissed as not authorized by statute.
Selected
Excerpts
from, & Commentary on, this Edition's Cases
[Note
formatting may be off below this point.]
State
v. Robert Young, NO. 29,467 (N.M. 10/25/2007) "Defense
counsels’ compensation is inadequate under the facts of this case,
violating
defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
Prosecution of the
death penalty is stayed unless the State makes adequate funds available
for the defense. We
have set the hourly rate and maximum compensation based on the unique
circumstances of
this case. In doing so, we make no determination that similar fees or
rates are
constitutionally required in other cases." (Note: no date is listed on
the slip op.) From the
daily blog:
We
on the defense side love to complain about getting shorted funds when
doing a case. Capital cases are not only expensive, they are
astronomically so. Although the Nichols case in Atlanta has been
grabbing much of the headlines on the topic, the New Mexico Supreme
Court’s recent opinion in State
v. Robert Young, NO. 29,467 (N.M. 10/25/2007), gives a solid
examination of the subject with numerous great quotes.
The issue in this case is whether indigent defendants
accused of capital crimes are unconstitutionally deprived of effective
assistance of counsel when their counsel are inadequately compensated.
Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, we find that
counsel for the defendants are inadequately compensated, and as such
defendants are deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.
Defendants have asked us to consider three different remedies: (1)
allow their attorneys to withdraw; (2) order the State to compensate
counsel at a reasonable hourly rate; or (3) dismiss the death penalty.
For those unfamiliar with the case, the
AP notes:
Reis Lopez and Robert Young have been charged with
killing Ralph Garcia, who was a guard at a privately operated prison in
Santa Rosa. The state houses inmates in the prison.
Prosecutors brought charges against 15 inmates but sought
the death
penalty against three. The third defendant, David Sanchez, is not part
of the challenge decided by the Supreme Court.. . .
The attorney general’s office and the state Public Defender
Department had argued that enough money had been allocated for an
adequate defense of the inmates. The department is part of Gov. Bill
Richardson’s administration and provides defense lawyers — often
contracting with them — for criminal defendants who can’t afford to
hire an attorney.. . .
Fees for the defense lawyers were revised several times,
according
to the court, and contract amendments were offered that provided for a
total of $46,500 for each main attorney through trial and $23,000 for
each “second-chair” attorney. The defense lawyers did not sign the
contract amendments, however. In 2005, the Legislature provided an
additional $100,000 for each of the three death penalty defense teams.
An extra $200,000 per defense team had been requested from the
Legislature, but lawmakers trimmed the amount.
About $870,000 also had been provided by lawmakers but
defense lawyers say that should go only to pay for expert witnesses.
In addressing the merits the Court in the case.
As a general rule, the gravity of the death penalty and
its requisite heightened scrutiny require a significantly greater
degree of skill and experience on the part of defense counsel than is
required in a noncapital case. See ABA, Guidelines for
the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, Guideline 1.1, History of Guideline (rev. ed. 2003), in
31 Hofstra L. Rev. 913, 921 (2004) [hereinafter ABA Guidelines].
Capital defense teams must spend more time preparing for and
trying a capital case than for non-capital cases. See State
Bar of N.M., Task Force to Study the Administration of the Death
Penalty in New Mexico, Final Report 6 (2003) [hereinafter New
Mexico Task Force Final Report]
(discussing a study of capital defense in federal courts and noting the
“unique strains” placed on capital defense counsel, such as spending
more time with a capital client, “unique and intensive training,” and
lengthy, complex jury selection). Therefore, it is indisputable that
the prosecution and defense of capital murder cases are substantially
more expensive than in non-capital cases.
Yet the financial burden on attorneys who contract to defend
capital
cases is not measured simply by the amount of time devoted to defending
such cases. “[T]he demands of handling a death penalty case frequently
preclude acceptance of other employment while the case is being
litigated.” See id. Unlike the public defenders employed by the PD,
capital defense attorneys must pay overhead. Finally, because
representation in capital cases requires specialized skills, intensive
training relating to substantive areas of mitigation, forensic science,
and practical instruction in advocacy skills is required.
Because of the extraordinary demands on capital defense
attorneys,
ABA Guidelines, Guideline 8.1 Commentary, in 31 Hofstra L. Rev. at 979,
the American Bar Association has condemned flat fees, caps on
compensation, and lump-sum contracts in death penalty cases. Id.,
Guideline 9.1(B)(1), in 31 Hofstra L. Rev. at 981. Rather than a flat
fee or a capped rate, the ABA Guidelines stress that “[c]ounsel in
death penalty cases should be fully compensated at a rate that is
commensurate with the provision of high quality legal representation
and reflects the extraordinary responsibilities inherent in death
penalty representation.” Id., Guideline 9.1(B), in 31 Hofstra L. Rev.
at 981.
The Court’s conclusion:
Defense counsels’ compensation is inadequate under the
facts of this case, violating defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel. Prosecution of the death penalty is
stayed unless the State makes adequate funds available for the defense.
We have set the hourly rate and maximum compensation based on the
unique circumstances of this case. In doing so, we make no
determination that similar fees or rates are constitutionally required
in other cases.
Score one for the indigent defense bar.
People
v. John Taylor, 2007 N.Y. LEXIS 2916 (NY 10/23/2007) Taylor
was sentenced under a facially unconstitutional
statute, and “it is not within our power to save the statute.. . . The
Legislature, mindful of our State’s due process protections, may
reenact a sentencing statute that is free of coercion and cognizant of
a jury’s need to know the consequences of its choice.” From the daily blog:
The Court of Appeals of New
York’s decision in People
v. John Taylor, is rather straightforward: stare decisis
matters, Taylor
was sentenced under a facially unconstitutional statute, and “it is not
within our power to save the statute.. . . The Legislature, mindful of
our State’s due process protections, may reenact a sentencing statute
that is free of coercion and cognizant of a jury’s need to know the
consequences of its choice.”
The New York Times provides this
story that story begins,
Closing a chapter on one of the bloodiest
crimes in
recent New York City history, the state’s highest court today tossed
out the death sentence imposed on a man for his role in the murders of
five workers at a Wendy’s restaurant in Queens seven years ago. The
man, John B. Taylor, was the last remaining inmate on New York State’s
death row. The divided decision by the Court of Appeals not only
ordered the trial court to resentence Mr. Taylor — almost certainly to
life in prison without parole — but it also reaffirmed a landmark
decision in 2004 that effectively invalidated the state’s death penalty
law.
Congrats to Kevin Doyle, as well as, Barry Fisher and Susan
Salomon.
SMALL
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Capital Defense Weekly is normally written by Karl Keys. CDW is
published forty (40) times (or so) a year.
1997-2007
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*Execution information
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**Week at a Glance is the work of the
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