Capital Defense Weekly
[Available at http://capitaldefenseweekly.com/archives/071126.htm]

Leading off this edition are Roy Lee McDuffie v. State and Britt v. State, et al.

The Florida Supreme Court in McDuffie finds the trial court below made repeated and injurious error that requires a new trial.  First the, trial court erred in excluding a defense witness who would have testified as to why McDuffie could have had the amount of money found in his possession for reasons other than as the proceeds of a robbery. Second, the trial court erred in limiting cross-examination of the State's witnesses as to the presence of alternative suspects proffered by the Defendant at the crime scene shortly before the murders.  Finally, the trial court erred in admitting extraneous evidence, in the form of contents of voice mails, to show McDuffie's financial situation.

The Georgia Supreme Court in Britt, as noted last week, weighs in on funding capital cases.  The Court in one opinion addresses the issues raised in the three cases .Britt & Ramseur are criminal contempt cases where counsel refused to proceed in light of a potential conflict of interest relating to what in their mind was insufficient funding; contempt affirmed. In Georgia Public Defender Standards Council, the Court holds, the statewide public defender system does not have to release the spending records as revelation of funding in other cases would potentially reveal trial strategy in those cases.

In the news, a fascinating piece is making the rounds by David Bright, “[j]urors presented with gruesome evidence, such as descriptions or images of torture and mutilation, are up to five times more likely to convict a defendant than jurors not privy to such evidence,” a recent press release about his work say. The Arkansas News Bureau recently carried a report by Jason Wiest, "Group will petition for committee on death penalty if not created by Beebe." Christopher Hill's latest dispatch at Huffington Post is a must read on lethal injection.  Finally, the Baltimore Sun is raising the possibility that Maryland may be the next state, behind New Jersey, in seriously attempting to legislatively repeal the state's death penalty.

Looking ahead, on Tuesday the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Snyder v. Louisiana.  The SCOTUS Wiki notes Snyder is "about race as an issue in jury selection. But it looms larger as a potentially significant inquiry into the use of implied racial imagery to influence not only who sits on a jury but how to turn that jury toward a guilty verdict."  The State later urged an all-white jury to sentence Snyder to death so he wouldn't "get away with it" like O.J. Simpson.

Also this week NJ will have several key votes on repealing the Garden State's death penalty.  The daily blog will be updating all week, including video coverage.  New Jersey is believed to be likely to repeal the death penalty, if at all, by January 9, 2007.

Finally this week, briefs are due apparently in United States v. Friend.  A jury returned a death recommendation for Friend, but the federal district court has yet to sentence her. Press accounts note "Kevin McNally, one of Friend’s lawyers . .. .  recently completed an analysis of more than 1,000 federal death penalty cases. Only 10 percent of the victims were white women, he said. When those cases go to a jury, half of them result in a death sentence, he said. The unfair application of the death penalty depending on the race and sex of the victim makes it unconstitutional, he argued."

Looking ahead, no favorable decisions are yet noted.

Execution Information

Due to the near unanimity of thought on the subject,  we are no longer listing execution dates scheduled before February 15, 2008 as probable in light of Baze v. Rees and have suspended the Weekly's "pending executions" save for volunteers.

Week of  November 19, 2007 –  In Favor of Life or Liberty
  • Roy Lee McDuffie v. State, 2007 Fla. LEXIS 2199 (Fl 11/21/2007) "We conclude that the errors that occurred in this case, when viewed cumulatively, cannot be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. By excluding defense witness Wiggins, the trial court deprived the defense of the only non-family member who could testify to the loans made to McDuffie. Further, the failure to allow full cross-examination of the witnesses who were actually on the scene at or near the times of the crimes prevented the defense from further casting doubt on the reliability of the Matias eyewitness identification. Lastly, the effect on the jury created by the violent and vulgar contents of the voice mail cannot be underestimated. With just two sentences, an image of McDuffie as a potentially violent human being capable of wishing death on another—one who is not even a victim in the case—emerged. For all these reasons, we conclude that the State cannot establish that the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
Week of  November 19, 2007 –  notable
  • Britt v. State, Georgia Public Defender Standards Council v. Sanders et al, & Ramseur v. State, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 847 (Ga 11/21/2007)  The core holding of the opinion is that the statewide public defender system does not have to release the spending records of unrelated capital cases as revelation of funding in other cases would potentially reveal trial strategy in those cases. As to Britt & Ramseur, litigation of the claims against GPDSC, even if it created a potential conflict of interest, did not permit trial counsel to refuse to proceed to trial when ordered by the court below, rather counsel should have sought an interlocutory appeal; criminal contempt affirmed.
Week of  November 19, 2007 –  In Favor of Death
  • Eric Lawrence Call. v.  Branker, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 26858 (4th Cir 2007) (unpublished) Relief denied on claims arising from a resentencing hearing as to "whether Call's rights to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment were violated by trial counsel's failure to object to Agent Cabe's testimony at the resentencing hearing on Confrontation Clause grounds and by appellate counsel's failure to raise the Confrontation Clause issue on direct appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court as plain error."
  • State v. Dean Kilgore, 2007 Fla. LEXIS 2201 (Fl 11/21/2007) “[W]e hold that while Kilgore is entitled to prosecute a collateral claim attacking a prior conviction utilized as an aggravator in his capital case, he is not entitled to representation by the same counsel appointed to represent him in the capital case.” This is a matter of state statutory construction so, fortunately, its precedential value is confined to the courts in the Sunshine State.
  • Gerald Ross Pizzuto v. State, 2007 Ida. LEXIS 209 (Ida 11/23/2007)  Relief denied on claims relating to: "1. Did the district court err   in denying Pizzuto's motion for disqualification without cause? 2. Did the district court err in denying Pizzuto's motion for disqualification for cause? 3. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Pizzuto's petition on the ground that it was untimely? 4. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Pizzuto's petition on the ground that he had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact supporting his claim of mental retardation? 5. Did the district court err in dismissing Pizzuto's petition without permitting further testing? 6. Did the district court deny Pizzuto the equal protection of the law by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of mental retardation? 7. Does Idaho Code § 19-2515A violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States?"
  • In re Pers. Restraint of Elmore, 2007 Wash. LEXIS 872 (Wash 11/21/2007) (dissent)  Relief denied, most notably, on " counsel's failure to competently investigate Mr. Elmore's mental deficiencies, counsel's failure to attempt to negotiate a plea bargain with the prosecutor, and counsel's affirmative agreement to Mr. Elmore appearing in shackles before the jury collectively deprived Mr. Elmore of effective assistance  of counsel in violation of his constitutional rights."
(Advance Sheet Week of  November 26, 2007) –  In Favor of Death
  • Comm.  v. Christopher Williams,  2007 Pa. LEXIS 2440 (Penn 11/26/2007) In an opinion that leaves you scratching your head if you don't practice in Pennsylvania (and I don't practice there), Commonwealth's appeal from a postconviction grant of relief reversed on claims relating to admission of inadmissible evidence.  Vacateur of state corrupt organization act conviction affirmed.  Remand ordered on remaining claims for a more thorough analysis which the trial court had avoided in light of the grant of relief previously noted. Note: this matter leads as it might get raised to notable next week.  Due to a very nuanced state law issue on which the case turns, it will need some more time to address.
  • Donald Beaty v. Shriro, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 27464 (9th Cir 11/28/2007) "Statements made in a jail sponsored therapy session were not involuntary nor were part of a confidentiality agreement. The petitioner here was a member of a group therapy session where, in response to comments directed at him by other inmate participants, he made statements to the supervising treating doctor about how “he didn’t mean to kill” the young victim. The 9th affirmed the district court’s denial of relief on this ground (the matter was a remand for this purpose)." (via Ninth Circuit Blog)
  • People v. Martin Mendoza, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 13313 (Cal 11/29/2007)  Relief denied on repeated prosecutorial misconduct, including unduly inflammatory closings as the misconduct was not prejudicial in light of the strength of the proofs.  Vienna Convention claim denied, however, the  Court invites to raise the claims on state habeas corpus.
  • State v. Marlon Kiser, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 890 (Tenn. Crim. App 11/29/2007)  Relief denied on appeal over claims "that (1) his right to an impartial jury was violated by the trial court's failure to excuse incompetent jurors for cause; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to excuse for cause jurors who would not consider mitigating evidence; (3) the prosecution used peremptory challenges to excuse jurors in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986); (4) the trial court erred by failing to a hold a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of proposed expert scientific testimony; (5) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (6) the trial court erred by permitting testimony  regarding statements made by the appellant regarding his alleged hostility toward police and willingness to kill; (7) the trial court erred by limiting the appellant's proof; (8) the trial court erred by excluding evidence of another person's alleged confession to the victim's murder; (9) the jury instructions on "reasonable doubt" were unconstitutional; (10) the appellant's waiver of rights at the sentencing hearing was unconstitutional; (11) the trial court erroneously denied the appellant's requested instruction on residual doubt; (12) the jury was required to unanimously agree to a life sentence in violation of established case law; (13) Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.3(b) violates principles of due process and the principles announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), and its progeny; (14) the prosecution is vested with unlimited discretion as to whether to seek the death penalty; (15) the death penalty was imposed in a discriminatory manner; (16) the cumulative effect of the errors at trial violated his due process rights; (17) the statutory capital sentencing scheme in this state fails to articulate or apply meaningful standards for proportionality   review in violation of his due process rights; and (18) lethal injection constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and is unconstitutional in this state. Upon review of the record and the parties briefs, we conclude that the appellant is not entitled to relief and affirm the judgments of conviction but remand the case to the trial court in order for the court to enter only one judgment of conviction for first degree murder."
  • State v. Jeffrey Hessler, 274 Neb. 478 (Neb 11/30/2007) Relief denied over claims relating to the trial court "(1) denying his motions to plead guilty to felony murder; (2) violating the Double Jeopardy Clause  by allowing the State to use the sexual assault of J.B. to prove an aggravating circumstance; (3) failing to excuse for cause potential jurors who had formed opinions regarding Hessler's guilt; (4) overruling his motion to change venue; (5) overruling his motion to declare Nebraska death penalty statutes unconstitutional on various bases, including (a) vagueness of aggravating circumstances described in § 29-2523(1)(a), (b), and (d); (b) failure to require or allow the jury to determine mitigating circumstances, to assign a weight to aggravating circumstances, and to determine the sentence; and (c) unconstitutionally penalizing a defendant's exercise of the right to a jury trial on aggravating circumstances; (6) denying his request for an instruction in the aggravation phase requiring the jury to make unanimous, written findings of fact to support each aggravating circumstance found to exist; (7) granting his request to waive counsel and appear pro se at sentencing and failing to make a determination regarding his competency to waive counsel; and (8) receiving into evidence at sentencing the records of the guilt and aggravation phases of the trial."
  • Michael Dean Overstreet v. State, 2007 Ind. LEXIS 1041 (Ind 11/27/2007) Relief denied on issues relating to: "(a) was Overstreet denied the effective assistance of trial counsel; (b) was Overstreet denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel; (c) did Overstreet receive a fair post-conviction proceeding; and (d) is Overstreet incompetent to be executed because of his mental illness."  Note the court also denies relief on two other issues as they could have been raised on direct appeal and three other issues on the grounds of res judicata. Dissent sees “no principled distinction between the diminished capacities exhibited by Overstreet and the diminished capacities that exempt the mentally retarded from execution." Hence,  “executing Overstreet constitutes purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering thereby violating the Cruel and Unusual Punishment provision of the Indiana Constitution.”
  • Thomas Mitchell Overton v. State, 2007 Fla. LEXIS 2204 (Fl 11/29/2007) Relief denied on access to DNA testing.  Relief also denied on postconviction appeal on claims relating to "(I) access to files and records that were in possession of state agencies were improperly withheld in violation of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852; (II) trial counsel failed to adequately investigate/prepare a case and challenge the State’s case due in part to the actions of the trial court and the State; (III) the State committed Brady3 and Giglio4 violations and trial counsel was ineffective for the failure to present this during the trial; (IV) the State improperly used James Zientek (a jailhouse informant) as an undisclosed agent of law enforcement; (V) Overton was prejudiced by pre-indictment delay; (VI) trial counsel operated under an actual conflict of interest; (VII) an improper jury instruction with regard to expert testimony was used during trial; (VIII) the rule prohibiting attorneys from interviewing jurors prevented trial counsel from being effective; (IX) the voir dire by trial counsel was improper; (X) the combination of errors prevented a fair trial; (XI) trial counsel was ineffective for the failure to object to the introduction of time-barred offenses; and (XII) Overton’s sentence was unconstitutional under Ring."  State habeas petition also denied on appellate ineffectiveness.
Selected Excerpts from, & Commentary on, this Edition's Cases
[Note formatting may be off below this point.]
Britt v. State, Georgia Public Defender Standards Council v. Sanders et al, & Ramseur v. State, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 847 (Ga 11/21/2007)  The core holding of the opinion is that the statewide public defender system does not have to release the spending records of unrelated capital cases as revelation of funding in other cases would potentially reveal trial strategy in those cases. As to Britt & Ramseur, litigation of the claims against GPDSC, even if it created a potential conflict of interest, did not permit trial counsel to refuse to proceed to trial when ordered by the court below, rather counsel should have sought an interlocutory appeal; criminal contempt affirmed. From the CDW daily blog:

The Georgia Supreme Court weighs in on one of the most intricate issues in criminal defense — the relationship between indigent defendants, the constitution, fairness, funding, and the needs of the one versus the needs of the many in Britt v. State, Georgia Public Defender Standards Council v. Sanders et al, & Ramseur v. State. The combined cases arise out of the funding crisis for indigent defense that has been exasperated by the “Atlanta Courthouse Shooting” case.

One opinion disposes of all three cases.

Counsel for Mr. Sanders were concerned about being inadequately funded and moved to subpoena the records of the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council as to funding in all capital cases in Georgia. The trial court ordered production and GPDSC appealed. The core holding of the opinion is that the statewide public defender system does not have to release the spending records as revelation of funding in other cases would potentially reveal trial strategy in those cases.

Counsel (Messrs. Britt & Ramseur), meanwhile, asserted they had a conflict of interest in light of the litigation against the GPDSC as GPDSC employed one attorney and paid the other on a contract basis. While the issue was being fought out in the lower state courts, counsel for Mr. Sanders were ordered to begin the guilt - innocence phase of the trial. “Even after the trial court expressly ordered Sanders’ attorneys to proceed with the motions hearing, they still refused to do so. Accordingly, the trial court held Britt and Ramseur in direct criminal contempt and ordered each of them to serve twenty-four hours in jail and pay a $500.00 fine.” The criminal contempt against counsel on appeal is affirmed, over dissent, as counsel’s remedy if they believed they had a conflict was to appeal and not to violate the trial court’s order; “[e]ven if the trial court’s ruling were ultimately found to be incorrect on appeal (a question we need not reach here), this would not change the fact that, at the time that the order was given, Sanders’ attorneys were obligated to follow it.”

I am going to lay back to see what others have to say, comments are open and an update of this post will likely happen as others weigh in.

The Georgia Supreme’s press office notes:

The Georgia Supreme Court has unanimously reversed a Gwinnett County court’s order and ruled that the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council does not have to turn over documents showing the amount of money spent in the last two years representing dozens of death penalty defendants, including Brian Nichols. By a 5-to-2 vote, the high court has upheld the lower court’s rulings holding attorneys Walt Britt and Douglas Ramseur in criminal contempt. Justice Harold Melton wrote for the Court. In the decision affecting the attorneys, the majority included Chief Justice Leah Ward Sears, Justice Hugh Thompson, Justice Harris Hines and Justice George Carley. Presiding Justice Carol Hunstein wrote the dissent, joined by Justice Robert Benham.

All three appeals stem from a murder case in Gwinnett County, but the underlying issue is the cost of indigent defense in death penalty cases.Under a contract with the Office of the Georgia Capital Defender, Walt Britt has been the lead counsel representing Donald Steven Sanders, who was charged in 2004 with murder and other crimes in Gwinnett County, for which the state is seeking the death penalty. Ramseur, an employee of the Capital Defender, has also represented Sanders. Concerned about the shortfall in funds for indigent death penalty cases and their ability to provide adequate representation, Britt subpoenaed budgetary records on 49 current capital cases from the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council and the Office of the Georgia Capital Defender.The Council and other subpoenaed parties filed a motion to quash the subpoenas, but in February 2007, the trial court denied the motion, ordering the Council to produce “any and all records and documents” relating to funds paid by the Capital Defender office or the Council to any attorneys representing indigent persons in death penalty cases from Jan. 1, 2005 through the present. The order allowed the Council to edit out any attorney-client privileged information but it could not redact experts’ names, fees and rates of pay. It also required the Council to produce all relevant documents in the case of Brian Nichols, who faces a death penalty trial in the Fulton County courthouse shootings.Upon hearing of the Gwinnett County ruling, Judge Hilton Fuller, the presiding judge in the Nichols case, issued an order expressly forbidding the Council from producing the documents.During a motions hearing in Sanders’ case in February 2007, Britt and Ramseur said they could no longer represent Sanders due to a conflict of interest. In seeking to get the records, they argued they had been placed in an adversarial position with respect to their employers, and that this conflict of interest could affect their ability to represent Sanders. The trial court ordered them to proceed and when they refused, held them in contempt and ordered each to serve 24 hours in jail and pay a $500 fine.

In its unanimous reversal, the Supreme Court has ruled that the trial court’s order forcing the Council to reveal experts’ names and pay rates from recent indigent capital cases, as well as documents in the Brian Nichols case, “compels the Council to improperly expose the strategies being employed by the attorneys in scores of pending capital cases.”

“With respect to the substantive merits of the Council’s appeal, the Council correctly argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion to quash,” the opinion says. “Indeed, the documents requested here have no bearing on Sanders’ guilt or innocence and are entirely irrelevant to Sanders’ criminal case.”The trial court did not err, however, in holding the two attorneys in contempt, the majority has ruled. If Ramseur and Britt believed there was a conflict, “their remedy was to appeal, not to disobey the trial court’s direct order to continue with the motions hearing,” the majority opinion says. They had filed 106 motions in Sanders’ case prior to the hearing – “the vast majority of which had nothing to do with any dispute over funding in indigent capital defense cases.”

In the dissent, Presiding Justice Hunstein wrote: “The importance of ensuring that defense counsel is not subject to any conflict of interest that might dilute loyalty to the accused has been long and consistently recognized.” That is particularly true in death penalty cases. “The majority’s holding thereby ignores this Court’s recognition that no conflict of interest is permissible for counsel in death penalty cases…” the dissent says.

The Atlanta Journal Constitution has more at:

 
Roy Lee McDuffie v. State, 2007 Fla. LEXIS 2199 (Fl 11/21/2007) "We conclude that the errors that occurred in this case, when viewed cumulatively, cannot be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. By excluding defense witness Wiggins, the trial court deprived the defense of the only non-family member who could testify to the loans made to McDuffie. Further, the failure to allow full cross-examination of the witnesses who were actually on the scene at or near the times of the crimes prevented the defense from further casting doubt on the reliability of the Matias eyewitness identification. Lastly, the effect on the jury created by the violent and vulgar contents of the voice mail cannot be underestimated. With just two sentences, an image of McDuffie as a potentially violent human being capable of wishing death on another—one who is not even a victim in the case—emerged. For all these reasons, we conclude that the State cannot establish that the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."  From CapDefNet:

On November 21, 2007, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that cumulative errors in the capital trial of Roy McDuffie required reversal of his conviction and death sentence. McDuffie v. State, ___ So.2d ___, 2007 WL 4124241 (Fla. Nov. 21, 2007). McDuffie had been convicted of killing two co-employees during a robbery of a Dollar General store. The prosecutor’s theory was that McDuffie committed the crime because he was in dire financial circumstances. To explain how McDuffie was able to purchase money orders the day after the killing, the defense called family members to testify about assistance they had provided to him. The trial court barred testimony by a friend of McDuffie, whose claim to have also loaned money to McDuffie was partially corroborated by a Western Union receipt, because the defense inadvertently had listed the witness as a penalty phase witness. During closing argument, the prosecution capitalized on his exclusion by pointing out that the purported undocumented loans were only from family members who were not credible. The Florida Supreme Court held that the trial court had erred in excluding the testimony, in large part because it failed to consider less extreme alternatives. The Florida Supreme Court next ruled that the trial court abused its discretion in precluding the defense from cross-examining two prosecution witnesses about photographs of two men who resembled men seen sitting outside the Dollar General store around the time of the offense. That the trial court properly excluded testimony about other crimes committed by the two men, because not sufficiently similar to the capital crime, did not justify the restriction on cross-examination. The Florida Supreme Court also found an abuse of discretion in the admission of testimony about a threatening and vulgar message McDuffie left on an attorney’s voice mail a few days before the capital offense after McDuffie received an eviction notice. (The prosecutor argued this was relevant to showing McDuffie’s state of mind and desperation about his financial situation.) The Florida Supreme Court found that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the highly inflammatory contents of the message, which, among other things, referenced the DC sniper. The state supreme court concluded that mention of random shooting by black men of primarily white victims could only serve the inflame the jury’s emotions. (McDuffie is African American.) Considered cumulatively, the Florida Supreme Court was unable to find the errors harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

SMALL PRINT
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*Execution information derived from Rick Halperin, DPIC & media accounts
**Week at a Glance is the work of the Habeas Assistant & Training Project & Wendy Peoples.