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Capital
Defense
Weekly
[Available at http://capitaldefenseweekly.com/archives/071126.htm]
Leading off this edition are Roy
Lee McDuffie v. State and Britt v. State, et al.
The Florida Supreme Court in McDuffie
finds the trial court below made repeated and injurious error that
requires a new trial. First
the, trial court erred in excluding a defense witness who would have
testified as to why McDuffie could have had the amount of money found
in his possession for
reasons other than as the proceeds of a robbery. Second, the trial
court erred in limiting cross-examination of the State's witnesses as
to the presence of alternative suspects proffered by the Defendant at
the crime
scene shortly before the murders. Finally, the trial court erred
in
admitting extraneous evidence, in the form of contents of voice mails,
to show McDuffie's financial situation.
The Georgia Supreme Court in Britt, as noted
last week, weighs in on funding capital cases. The Court in one
opinion
addresses the issues raised in the three cases .Britt & Ramseur
are criminal contempt cases where counsel refused to proceed in light
of a potential conflict of interest relating to what in their mind was
insufficient funding; contempt affirmed. In Georgia Public
Defender Standards Council, the Court holds, the statewide
public
defender system does not have to release the spending records as
revelation of funding in other cases would potentially reveal trial
strategy in those cases.
In the news, a fascinating
piece is making the rounds by David
Bright,
“[j]urors presented with gruesome evidence, such as descriptions or
images of torture and mutilation, are up to five times more likely to
convict a defendant than jurors not privy to such evidence,” a recent
press release about his work say. The Arkansas News Bureau recently
carried a report by Jason Wiest, "Group
will petition for committee on death penalty if not created by Beebe."
Christopher Hill's latest dispatch at Huffington Post is a must read
on lethal injection. Finally, the Baltimore
Sun is raising the possibility that Maryland may be the next state,
behind New Jersey, in seriously attempting to legislatively repeal the
state's death penalty.
Looking ahead, on Tuesday the Supreme
Court will hear oral argument in
Snyder v. Louisiana. The SCOTUS
Wiki notes Snyder is "about race as an issue in jury
selection. But it looms larger as a potentially significant inquiry
into the use of implied racial imagery to influence not only who sits
on a jury but how to turn that jury toward a guilty verdict." The State later urged an all-white jury to
sentence Snyder to death so he wouldn't "get away with it" like O.J.
Simpson.
Also this week NJ will have several
key votes on repealing the Garden
State's death penalty. The daily blog will be updating all week,
including video coverage. New Jersey is believed to be likely to
repeal the death penalty, if at all, by January 9, 2007.
Finally this week, briefs are due
apparently in United States v. Friend.
A jury returned a death recommendation for Friend, but the federal
district court has yet to sentence her. Press
accounts note "Kevin McNally, one of Friend’s lawyers . ..
. recently
completed an analysis of more than 1,000 federal death penalty cases.
Only 10 percent of the victims were white women, he said. When those
cases go to a jury, half of them result in a death sentence, he said.
The unfair application of the death penalty depending on the race and
sex of the victim makes it unconstitutional, he argued."
Looking ahead, no favorable decisions are yet noted.
Execution Information
Due to the near unanimity of
thought on the subject, we are no longer listing execution dates
scheduled before February 15, 2008 as probable in light of Baze v. Rees and have suspended
the Weekly's "pending executions" save for volunteers.
Week of
November 19, 2007 – In Favor of Life or Liberty
- Roy
Lee McDuffie v. State, 2007 Fla. LEXIS 2199 (Fl 11/21/2007) "We
conclude that the errors that occurred in this case, when viewed
cumulatively, cannot be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
By excluding defense witness Wiggins, the trial court deprived the
defense of the only non-family member who could testify to the loans
made to McDuffie. Further, the failure to allow full cross-examination
of the witnesses who were actually on the scene at or near the times of
the crimes prevented the defense from further casting doubt on the
reliability of the Matias eyewitness identification. Lastly, the effect
on the jury created by the violent and vulgar contents of the voice
mail cannot be underestimated. With just two sentences, an image of
McDuffie as a potentially violent human being capable of wishing death
on another—one who is not even a victim in the case—emerged. For all
these reasons, we conclude that the State cannot establish that the
errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
Week of
November 19, 2007 – notable
- Britt v.
State, Georgia
Public Defender Standards Council v. Sanders et al, & Ramseur v. State,
2007 Ga. LEXIS 847 (Ga 11/21/2007) The core holding of
the opinion is that the statewide
public defender system does
not have to release the spending records of unrelated capital cases as
revelation of funding in
other cases would potentially reveal trial strategy in those cases. As
to Britt & Ramseur,
litigation of the claims against GPDSC, even if it created a potential
conflict of
interest, did not permit trial counsel to refuse to proceed to trial
when ordered by the court below, rather counsel should have sought an
interlocutory appeal; criminal contempt affirmed.
Week of
November 19, 2007 – In Favor of Death
- Eric
Lawrence Call. v. Branker,
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 26858 (4th Cir 2007) (unpublished) Relief denied
on claims arising from a resentencing hearing as to "whether Call's
rights to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment
were violated by trial counsel's failure to object to Agent Cabe's
testimony at the resentencing hearing on Confrontation Clause grounds
and by appellate counsel's failure to raise the Confrontation Clause
issue on direct appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court as plain
error."
- State
v. Dean Kilgore, 2007 Fla. LEXIS 2201 (Fl 11/21/2007) “[W]e hold
that
while Kilgore is entitled to prosecute a collateral claim
attacking a prior conviction utilized as an aggravator in his capital
case, he is not entitled to representation by the same counsel
appointed to represent him in the capital case.” This is a matter of
state statutory construction so, fortunately, its precedential value is
confined to the courts in the Sunshine State.
- Gerald
Ross Pizzuto v. State, 2007 Ida. LEXIS 209 (Ida
11/23/2007) Relief denied on claims relating to:
"1. Did the district court err in denying Pizzuto's motion for
disqualification without cause? 2. Did the district court err in
denying Pizzuto's motion for disqualification for cause? 3. Did the
district court err in summarily dismissing Pizzuto's petition on the
ground that it was untimely? 4. Did the district court err in summarily
dismissing Pizzuto's
petition on the ground that he had failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact supporting his claim of mental retardation? 5. Did the
district court err in dismissing Pizzuto's petition without permitting
further testing? 6. Did the district court deny Pizzuto the equal
protection of the
law by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of mental
retardation? 7. Does Idaho Code § 19-2515A violate the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States?"
- In re Pers.
Restraint of Elmore,
2007 Wash. LEXIS 872 (Wash 11/21/2007) (dissent)
Relief denied, most notably, on " counsel's failure to competently
investigate Mr. Elmore's mental deficiencies, counsel's failure to
attempt to negotiate a plea bargain with the prosecutor, and counsel's
affirmative agreement to Mr. Elmore appearing in shackles before the
jury collectively deprived Mr. Elmore of effective assistance of
counsel in violation of his constitutional rights."
(Advance
Sheet Week of
November 26, 2007) – In Favor of Death
- Comm.
v. Christopher Williams, 2007 Pa. LEXIS
2440 (Penn 11/26/2007) In an opinion that leaves you scratching your
head if you don't practice in Pennsylvania (and I don't practice
there), Commonwealth's appeal from a postconviction grant of relief
reversed on claims relating to admission of inadmissible
evidence. Vacateur of state corrupt organization act conviction
affirmed. Remand ordered on remaining claims for a more thorough
analysis which the trial court had avoided in light of the grant of
relief previously noted. Note: this matter leads as it might get raised
to notable next week. Due to a very nuanced state law issue on
which the case turns, it will need some more time to address.
- Donald
Beaty v. Shriro, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 27464 (9th Cir 11/28/2007)
"Statements made in a jail sponsored therapy session were not
involuntary nor were part of a confidentiality agreement. The
petitioner here was a member of a group therapy session where, in
response to comments directed at him by other inmate participants, he
made statements to the supervising treating doctor about how “he didn’t
mean to kill” the young victim. The 9th affirmed the district court’s
denial of relief on this ground (the matter was a remand for this
purpose)." (via Ninth Circuit
Blog)
- People
v. Martin Mendoza,
2007 Cal. LEXIS 13313 (Cal 11/29/2007) Relief denied on repeated
prosecutorial misconduct, including unduly inflammatory closings as the
misconduct was not prejudicial in light of the strength of the
proofs.
Vienna Convention claim denied, however, the Court invites to
raise
the claims on state habeas corpus.
- State
v. Marlon Kiser, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 890
(Tenn. Crim. App
11/29/2007) Relief denied on appeal over claims "that (1) his
right to
an impartial jury was violated by the
trial court's failure to excuse incompetent jurors for cause; (2) the
trial court erred by refusing to excuse for cause jurors who would not
consider mitigating evidence; (3) the prosecution used peremptory
challenges to excuse jurors in violation of Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986);
(4) the trial court erred by failing to a hold a pretrial hearing on
the admissibility of proposed expert scientific testimony; (5) the
evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (6) the trial
court erred by permitting testimony regarding
statements made by
the appellant regarding his alleged hostility toward police and
willingness to kill; (7) the trial court erred by limiting the
appellant's proof; (8) the trial court erred by excluding evidence of
another person's alleged confession to the victim's murder; (9) the
jury instructions on "reasonable doubt" were unconstitutional; (10) the
appellant's waiver of rights at the sentencing hearing was
unconstitutional; (11) the trial court erroneously denied the
appellant's requested instruction on residual doubt; (12) the jury was
required to unanimously agree to a life sentence in violation of
established case law; (13) Tennessee
Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.3(b) violates principles of due
process and the principles announced in Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000),
and its progeny; (14) the prosecution is vested with unlimited
discretion as to whether to seek the death penalty; (15) the death
penalty was imposed in a discriminatory manner; (16) the cumulative
effect of the errors at trial violated his due process rights; (17) the
statutory capital sentencing scheme in this state fails to articulate
or apply meaningful standards for proportionality
review in
violation of his due process rights; and (18) lethal injection
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and is unconstitutional in
this state. Upon review of the record and the parties briefs, we
conclude that the appellant is not entitled to relief and affirm the
judgments of conviction but remand the case to the trial court in order
for the court to enter only one judgment of conviction for first degree
murder."
- State
v. Jeffrey Hessler, 274 Neb. 478 (Neb 11/30/2007)
Relief denied over claims relating to the trial court "(1) denying his
motions to plead guilty to felony murder; (2) violating
the Double Jeopardy Clause by allowing the State to
use the
sexual assault of J.B. to prove an aggravating circumstance; (3)
failing to excuse for cause potential jurors who had formed opinions
regarding Hessler's guilt; (4) overruling his motion to change venue;
(5) overruling his motion to declare Nebraska death penalty statutes
unconstitutional on various bases, including (a) vagueness of
aggravating circumstances described in §
29-2523(1)(a), (b),
and (d);
(b) failure to require or allow the jury to determine mitigating
circumstances, to assign a weight to aggravating circumstances, and to
determine the sentence; and (c) unconstitutionally penalizing a
defendant's exercise of the right to a jury trial on aggravating
circumstances; (6) denying his request for an instruction in the
aggravation phase requiring the jury to make unanimous, written
findings of fact to support each aggravating circumstance found to
exist; (7) granting his request to waive counsel and appear pro se at
sentencing and failing to make a determination regarding his competency
to waive counsel; and (8) receiving into evidence at sentencing the
records of the guilt and aggravation phases of the trial."
- Michael Dean Overstreet v. State,
2007
Ind. LEXIS 1041 (Ind 11/27/2007) Relief denied on issues relating to:
"(a) was Overstreet denied the effective
assistance of trial counsel; (b) was Overstreet denied the effective
assistance of appellate counsel; (c) did Overstreet receive a fair
post-conviction proceeding; and (d) is Overstreet incompetent to be
executed because of his mental illness." Note the court also
denies
relief on two other issues as they could have been raised on direct
appeal and three other issues on the grounds of res judicata. Dissent
sees “no principled distinction between the diminished
capacities exhibited by Overstreet and the diminished capacities that
exempt the mentally retarded from execution." Hence, “executing
Overstreet constitutes purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering thereby violating the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment provision of the Indiana Constitution.”
- Thomas
Mitchell Overton v. State, 2007 Fla. LEXIS 2204 (Fl 11/29/2007)
Relief denied on access to DNA testing. Relief also denied on
postconviction
appeal
on claims relating to "(I) access to files and records that were in
possession of state agencies were improperly withheld in violation of
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852; (II) trial counsel failed to
adequately investigate/prepare a case and challenge the State’s case
due in part to the actions of the trial court and the State; (III) the
State committed Brady3 and Giglio4 violations and trial counsel was
ineffective for the failure to present this during the trial; (IV) the
State improperly used James Zientek (a jailhouse informant) as an
undisclosed agent of law enforcement; (V) Overton was prejudiced by
pre-indictment delay; (VI) trial counsel operated under an actual
conflict of interest; (VII) an improper jury instruction with regard to
expert testimony was used during trial; (VIII) the rule prohibiting
attorneys from interviewing jurors prevented trial counsel from being
effective; (IX) the voir dire by trial counsel was improper; (X) the
combination of errors prevented a fair trial; (XI) trial counsel was
ineffective for the failure to object to the introduction of
time-barred offenses; and (XII) Overton’s sentence was unconstitutional
under Ring." State habeas petition also denied on appellate
ineffectiveness.
Selected
Excerpts
from, & Commentary on, this Edition's Cases
[Note
formatting may be off below this point.]
Britt v.
State, Georgia
Public Defender Standards Council v. Sanders et al, & Ramseur v. State,
2007 Ga. LEXIS 847 (Ga 11/21/2007) The core holding of
the opinion is that the statewide
public defender system does
not have to release the spending records of unrelated capital cases as
revelation of funding in
other cases would potentially reveal trial strategy in those cases. As
to Britt & Ramseur,
litigation of the claims against GPDSC, even if it created a potential
conflict of
interest, did not permit trial counsel to refuse to proceed to trial
when ordered by the court below, rather counsel should have sought an
interlocutory appeal; criminal contempt affirmed. From the CDW daily blog:
The
Georgia Supreme Court weighs in on one of the most intricate issues in
criminal defense — the relationship between indigent defendants, the
constitution, fairness, funding, and the needs of the one versus the
needs of the many in
Britt v. State, Georgia
Public Defender Standards Council v. Sanders et al, & Ramseur v. State.
The combined cases arise out of the funding crisis for indigent defense
that has been exasperated by the “Atlanta Courthouse Shooting” case.
One opinion disposes of all three cases.
Counsel for Mr. Sanders were concerned about
being
inadequately funded and moved to subpoena the records of the Georgia
Public Defender Standards Council as to funding in all capital cases in
Georgia. The trial court ordered production and GPDSC appealed. The
core holding of the opinion is that the statewide public
defender system does not have to release the spending records as
revelation of funding in other cases would potentially reveal trial
strategy in those cases.
Counsel (Messrs. Britt & Ramseur), meanwhile, asserted
they had
a conflict of interest in light of the litigation against the GPDSC as
GPDSC employed one attorney and paid the other on a contract basis.
While the issue was being fought out in the lower state courts, counsel
for Mr. Sanders were ordered to begin the guilt - innocence phase of
the trial. “Even after the trial court expressly ordered Sanders’
attorneys to proceed with the motions hearing, they still refused to do
so. Accordingly, the trial court held Britt and Ramseur in direct
criminal contempt and ordered each of them to serve twenty-four hours
in jail and pay a $500.00 fine.” The criminal contempt against counsel
on appeal is affirmed, over dissent, as counsel’s remedy if they
believed they had a conflict was to appeal and not to violate the trial
court’s order; “[e]ven if the trial court’s ruling were ultimately
found to be incorrect on appeal (a question we need not reach here),
this would not change the fact that, at the time that the order was
given, Sanders’ attorneys were obligated to follow it.”
I am going to lay back to see what others have to say,
comments are
open and an update of this post will likely happen as others weigh in.
The Georgia Supreme’s press office notes:
The Georgia Supreme Court has unanimously
reversed a
Gwinnett County court’s order and ruled that the Georgia Public
Defender Standards Council does not have to turn over documents showing
the amount of money spent in the last two years representing dozens of
death penalty defendants, including Brian Nichols. By a 5-to-2 vote,
the high court has upheld the lower court’s rulings holding attorneys
Walt Britt and Douglas Ramseur in criminal contempt. Justice Harold
Melton wrote for the Court. In the decision affecting the attorneys,
the majority included Chief Justice Leah Ward Sears, Justice Hugh
Thompson, Justice Harris Hines and Justice George Carley. Presiding
Justice Carol Hunstein wrote the dissent, joined by Justice Robert
Benham.
All three appeals stem from a murder case
in
Gwinnett County, but the underlying issue is the cost of indigent
defense in death penalty cases.Under a contract with the Office of the
Georgia Capital Defender, Walt Britt has been the lead counsel
representing Donald Steven Sanders, who was charged in 2004 with murder
and other crimes in Gwinnett County, for which the state is seeking the
death penalty. Ramseur, an employee of the Capital Defender, has also
represented Sanders. Concerned about the shortfall in funds for
indigent death penalty cases and their ability to provide adequate
representation, Britt subpoenaed budgetary records on 49 current
capital cases from the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council and
the Office of the Georgia Capital Defender.The Council and other
subpoenaed parties filed a motion to quash the subpoenas, but in
February 2007, the trial court denied the motion, ordering the Council
to produce “any and all records and documents” relating to funds paid
by the Capital Defender office or the Council to any attorneys
representing indigent persons in death penalty cases from Jan. 1, 2005
through the present. The order allowed the Council to edit out any
attorney-client privileged information but it could not redact experts’
names, fees and rates of pay. It also required the Council to produce
all relevant documents in the case of Brian Nichols, who faces a death
penalty trial in the Fulton County courthouse shootings.Upon hearing of
the Gwinnett County ruling, Judge Hilton Fuller, the presiding judge in
the Nichols case, issued an order expressly forbidding the Council from
producing the documents.During a motions hearing in Sanders’ case in
February 2007, Britt and Ramseur said they could no longer represent
Sanders due to a conflict of interest. In seeking to get the records,
they argued they had been placed in an adversarial position with
respect to their employers, and that this conflict of interest could
affect their ability to represent Sanders. The trial court ordered them
to proceed and when they refused, held them in contempt and ordered
each to serve 24 hours in jail and pay a $500 fine.
In its unanimous reversal, the Supreme Court has ruled that
the
trial court’s order forcing the Council to reveal experts’ names and
pay rates from recent indigent capital cases, as well as documents in
the Brian Nichols case, “compels the Council to improperly expose the
strategies being employed by the attorneys in scores of pending capital
cases.”
“With respect to the substantive merits of the Council’s
appeal, the
Council correctly argues that the trial court erred in denying its
motion to quash,” the opinion says. “Indeed, the documents requested
here have no bearing on Sanders’ guilt or innocence and are entirely
irrelevant to Sanders’ criminal case.”The trial court did not err,
however, in holding the two attorneys in contempt, the majority has
ruled. If Ramseur and Britt believed there was a conflict, “their
remedy was to appeal, not to disobey the trial court’s direct order to
continue with the motions hearing,” the majority opinion says. They had
filed 106 motions in Sanders’ case prior to the hearing – “the vast
majority of which had nothing to do with any dispute over funding in
indigent capital defense cases.”
In the dissent, Presiding Justice Hunstein wrote: “The
importance of
ensuring that defense counsel is not subject to any conflict of
interest that might dilute loyalty to the accused has been long and
consistently recognized.” That is particularly true in death penalty
cases. “The majority’s holding thereby ignores this Court’s recognition
that no conflict of interest is permissible for counsel in death
penalty cases…” the dissent says.
The Atlanta Journal Constitution has more at:
Roy
Lee McDuffie v. State, 2007
Fla. LEXIS 2199 (Fl 11/21/2007) "We conclude that the errors that
occurred in this case, when viewed cumulatively, cannot be considered
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. By excluding defense witness
Wiggins, the trial court deprived the defense of the only non-family
member who could testify to the loans made to McDuffie. Further, the
failure to allow full cross-examination of the witnesses who were
actually on the scene at or near the times of the crimes prevented the
defense from further casting doubt on the reliability of the Matias
eyewitness identification. Lastly, the effect on the jury created by
the violent and vulgar contents of the voice mail cannot be
underestimated. With just two sentences, an image of McDuffie as a
potentially violent human being capable of wishing death on another—one
who is not even a victim in the case—emerged. For all these reasons, we
conclude that the State cannot establish that the errors were harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt." From CapDefNet:
On November 21, 2007, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that cumulative
errors in the capital trial of Roy McDuffie required reversal of his
conviction and death sentence. McDuffie v. State, ___ So.2d ___, 2007
WL 4124241 (Fla. Nov. 21, 2007). McDuffie had been convicted of killing
two co-employees during a robbery of a Dollar General store. The
prosecutor’s theory was that McDuffie committed the crime because he
was in dire financial circumstances. To explain how McDuffie was able
to purchase money orders the day after the killing, the defense called
family members to testify about assistance they had provided to him.
The trial court barred testimony by a friend of McDuffie, whose claim
to have also loaned money to McDuffie was partially corroborated by a
Western Union receipt, because the defense inadvertently had listed the
witness as a penalty phase witness. During closing argument, the
prosecution capitalized on his exclusion by pointing out that the
purported undocumented loans were only from family members who were not
credible. The Florida Supreme Court held that the trial court had erred
in excluding the testimony, in large part because it failed to consider
less extreme alternatives. The Florida Supreme Court next ruled that
the trial court abused its discretion in precluding the defense from
cross-examining two prosecution witnesses about photographs of two men
who resembled men seen sitting outside the Dollar General store around
the time of the offense. That the trial court properly excluded
testimony about other crimes committed by the two men, because not
sufficiently similar to the capital crime, did not justify the
restriction on cross-examination. The Florida Supreme Court also found
an abuse of discretion in the admission of testimony about a
threatening and vulgar message McDuffie left on an attorney’s voice
mail a few days before the capital offense after McDuffie received an
eviction notice. (The prosecutor argued this was relevant to showing
McDuffie’s state of mind and desperation about his financial
situation.) The Florida Supreme Court found that the probative value of
the evidence was outweighed by the highly inflammatory contents of the
message, which, among other things, referenced the DC sniper. The state
supreme court concluded that mention of random shooting by black men of
primarily white victims could only serve the inflame the jury’s
emotions. (McDuffie is African American.) Considered cumulatively, the
Florida Supreme Court was unable to find the errors harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
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Capital Defense Weekly is normally written by Karl Keys. CDW is
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1997-2007
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*Execution information
derived from Rick Halperin, DPIC & media accounts
**Week at a Glance is the work of the
Habeas Assistant & Training Project & Wendy Peoples.
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