CAPITAL DEFENSE WEEKLY
[Available at http://capitaldefenseweekly.com/archives/080317.htm]
The Supreme Court's holding in Snyder
v. Louisiana dominates this issue. The core holding of Snyder
is a "
straightforward
application " and reaffirmation of Batson
and Miller-El with Justices
Alito and Roberts joining the Miller-El majority. Several
other
fine points, however, deserve mention. First, the opinion suggests
that the burden of
an
ambiguous record, where a the requisite initial showing is made,
is on
the proponent of the strike. Second, this isn't an AEDPA case,
however, the Court
repeatedly hints it will be using Snyder to measure future Batson
claims.. Finally, rather than
contracting Batson
as some commentators had feared, the
majority may be seeking to expand Batson
to a mixed motive analysis (see, e.g., bottom of page
12 & continuing to page13 of the slip.op).
In
the lower courts, the
Eleventh Circuit in James
Charles Lawhorn v. Allen grants penalty phase relief on counsel's
failure to give a penalty phase closing. The federal district
court’s grant of
guilt phase relief, however, is reversed in a fascinating decision on a
confession claim as to when Miranda
warnings must be administered; specifically, relief denied on the
question of how long after a break in interrogations must Miranda
warnings be given again.
Two unpublished
opinions of note are had from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Ex
Parte Mark Robertson & Ex
parte Jose Noey Martinez.
Robertson deals with the trial court's failure to provide an
"adequate
means for the jury to consider beyond the limits of the special issues"
mitigation evidence proffered by the condemned. In Martinez
a remand for a hearing is ordered on an Atkins claim.
The Fifth Circuit has
granted rehearing en banc in Moore
v. Quarterman,
No. 05-70038
(5th Cir. 3/14/2008). The issue on rehearing appears to be Atkins
v. Virginia & the procedural issues surrounding it.
In
the news, press
accounts note some concern over the personnel losses at the Georgia
Capital
Defenders Office (including former director Chris Adams), with over 20%
of its lawyers having left in the last eight months. "U.S.
Attorney General Michael Mukasey said that he hopes that the Guantanamo
prisoners accused of terrorism do not receive the death penalty in the
upcoming Military Commission trials because it would give them the
martyrdom that they want." [more]
Mid-week prosecutors accepted a
guilty plea from Thomas Joe Miller-El (yes, that
Miller-El)
in which he avoids a death sentence in return for what amounts to a
life sentence. In a verdict
we missed in the last edition, “on March 13, 2008, the
jury in US v. Gilberto Caraballo
returned a unanimous life verdict after three hours of
deliberations."
Maryland, wire
stories
are reporting, appears headed for a study of its death
penalty and not abolition as many had hoped.
In other
news, the latest
Harris poll numbers
on the death penalty are now available. "Currently,
63 percent of Americans believe in the death penalty while three in ten
(30%) are opposed to it.. . . One
question with regard to the death penalty is whether or not it serves
as a deterrent to others. Just over half (52%) of Americans believe
that executing people who commit murder does not have much effect on
deterring others from committing murder. Two in five (42%) say that
executing people does deter others from committing murder….When
it comes to whether people would like to see an increase or decrease in
the number of convicted criminals who are executed, there is a bit of a
divide among Americans. Just over one-third (36%) believe there should
be an increase while one-quarter (26%) say there should be a decrease
and three in ten (31%) believe there should be no change….There
is one issue almost all Americans agree on — 95 percent of U.S. adults
say that sometimes innocent people are convicted of murder while only 5
percent believe that this never occurs."
Looking
ahead, the California
Supreme Court in People
v. Gay did the unthinkable, it reversed on lingering
doubt.. "[T]here is a reasonable
possibility the jury would have selected the
lesser but still serious penalty of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole had it been allowed to hear and consider the
compelling defense of lingering doubt in full. As other courts have
noted, “residual doubt is perhaps the most effective strategy to employ
at sentencing.” The jury’s request for clarification of the
instructions on the issue of residual doubt, combined with the jury’s
previous request for the court to read back the eyewitness and expert
testimony relating to the circumstances of the murder, strongly
indicate that the jury was focused on defendant’s role in the murder."
As always
thanks for
reading. - k
SCOTUS
Snyder
v. Louisiana, No.
06-10119 (3/19/2008) Conviction and death sentence reversed in light of
Batson.
Week
of March 10, 2008 –
In
Favor of the Defendant or the Condemned
- James
Charles Lawhorn v. Allen, 2008
U.S. App. LEXIS 5159 (11th Cir 3/11/2008)
Penalty phase relief granted. Trial
counsel made a fairly bad decision to waive closing arguments in
the
penalty phase. The
federal district court’s grant of guilt phase relief, however, reversed
in a fascinating decision on a confession claim as to when Miranda
warnings must be
administered. (Specifically, relief denied on the question of how long
after a break in interrogations must
Miranda warnings be given again).
- Ex
Parte Mark Robertson, No.
AP-74,720 (Tex. Crim. App. 03/12/2008) (unpublished) “The convicting
court found that applicant presented mitigating evidence, for which
under Penry I there had to be an adequate means for the jury to
consider beyond the limits of the special issues, that applicant had
requested such a means, and that when presented with the nullification
instruction, applicant objected that it still did not give the jury a
proper means to consider his mitigating evidence. Based on our review
of the record, we adopt those findings and agree that relief should be
granted.
- Ex
parte Jose Noey Martinez, No. WR-58,358-02 (Tex. Crim. App.
03/12/2008) (unpublished) “Applicant
presents two allegations in his application. In his first claim,
applicant asserts that his execution would violate the United States
Supreme Court’s opinion in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002),
holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of the
mentally
retarded. In his second claim, applicant asserts that his execution
would violate his due process rights unless he is afforded a full and
fair hearing on his claim of mental retardation with access to the
tools necessary to establish his claim.
Week
of March 10, 2008 –
In
Favor of the State or Government
- Richard
Rhodes v. State, 2008 Fla. LEXIS 375 (FL 3/13/2008) Relief denied
on "four claims on appeal: (A) that the State withheld
material
and exculpatory evidence and knowingly presented false or misleading
evidence; (B) that resentencing counsel was ineffective in his
investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence; (C) that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to depose the State's DNA
expert; and (D) that the trial court erred in summarily denying several
of his postconviction claims."
- James
Fraklin Rose v. State, 2008 Fla. LEXIS 378 (FL 3/13/2008) Relief
denied on postconviction appeal. The issues on which he lost include:
"1) whether the trial court failed to properly attach any record or
transcript from a resentencing court other than the original indictment
and the sentencing order; 2) ineffective assistance of counsel; and 3)
the constitutionality of Florida's death penalty." [via Findlaw].
- United
States v. Marvin Charles Gabrion, Nos. 02-1386/1461/1570 (6th Cir
3/14/2008) (dissent) "The dispositive question is whether certain
national forest land falls within the federal government’s territorial
jurisdiction." The panel answers the question in the affirmative and
therefore affirms. The three judge panel manages three different
opinions, none of which appears to have more than one vote.
Week
of March 10, 2008 –
noncapital
- U.S.
v. Lara-Ramirez, No. 06-2108 (1st Cir 3/11/2008) A juror
brought a Bible to deliberations. She
quoted from it and urged her fellow jurors to join her in following it.
The judge ordered a mistrial. On appeal the question that arises
is
whether a manifest necessity existed to declare a mistrial or whether
double jeopardy attached. On these facts, no manifest necessity
and hence double jeopardy bars retrial.
(Initial
List) Week of March 17, 2008 –
In
Favor of the Defendant or the Condemned
- People
v. Kenneth Earl Gay, 2008 Cal. LEXIS 3296 (CA 3/20/2008) "[I]t is
our firm belief
that, notwithstanding this aggravating evidence,
there is a reasonable possibility the jury would have selected the
lesser but still serious penalty of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole had it been allowed to hear and consider the
compelling defense of lingering doubt in full. As other courts have
noted, “residual doubt is perhaps the most effective strategy to employ
at sentencing.” The jury’s request for clarification of the
instructions on the issue of residual doubt, combined with the jury’s
previous request for the court to read back the eyewitness and expert
testimony relating to the circumstances of the murder, strongly
indicate that the jury was focused on defendant’s role in the murder.
Evidence indicating that defendant was not the actual shooter would
have been important to the jury in assessing the appropriate penalty.
Had the jury been allowed to hear—and consider—the four statements in
which Raynard Cummings claimed to be the sole shooter, the testimony of
the four defense eyewitnesses excluding defendant as the shooter, and
the testimony that defendant nonetheless was the man who came out of
the car to retrieve a weapon from the ground (thus offering an
explanation why the prosecution eyewitnesses had been able to recognize
him), there is a reasonable possibility the jury would have selected a
different penalty." [internal citations omitted]
(Initial
List) Week of March 10, 2008 –
In
Favor of the State or Government
- Richard
Eugene Cagle v. Branker, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 5643 (4th Cir
3/17/2008) Cagle lost on the following
claims: "First,
Cagle claims that newly available evidence — a change of heart and
change of story from his co-defendant, Michael Scott — undermines the
jury’s capital sentence and entitles him to a new sentencing
proceeding. Second, Cagle claims he received ineffective assistance of
counsel during both the guilt and penalty phases of trial because his
attorneys failed to sever his case from Scott’s, thus discouraging
Scott from testifying in Cagle’s favor. Third, Cagle again claims
ineffective assistance, this time because his attorneys’ approach to
mitigation at sentencing focused exclusively on his troubled history,
and not at all on his redeeming traits of character. Fourth, Cagle
claims he was entitled to a jury instruction as to voluntary
intoxication during the guilt phase of trial."
- Robert
Stacy Yarbrough v. Johnson, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 5645 (4th Cir
3/17/2008) Relief denied.
"Yarbrough
contends first that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
during the guilt phase of his state trial because 'DNA evidence was
critical to the prosecution and the defense in this case not involving
a confession' and his counsel 'fail[ed] to request funds to engage an
expert in DNA collection, testing and analysis'” Also, "Yarbrough
also contends that his trial counsel performed below an objective
standard of reasonableness because he failed adequately to investigate
and present relevant evidence in mitigation at the second sentencing
trial and that, but for this failure, there was a reasonable
probability that the jury would not have sentenced him to death.
- Jack
Trawick v. Allen, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 5680 (11th Cir 3/18/2008)
"The
only issue [ ]on appeal is whether Trawick is entitled to federal
habeas relief on his claim that the State of Alabama exercised its
peremptory strikes in a discriminatory manner by using eleven of its
fourteen strikes to remove women from the venire in violation of J.E.B.
v. Alabama which prohibits gender discrimination
in jury selection. Although Trawick did not raise any objection to
gender-biased striking during trial, he did argue that claim on direct
appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court on the basis of J.E.B., which the
U.S. Supreme Court decided several weeks after Trawick’s conviction."
- Troy
Davis v.
State, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 262 (GA 3/17/2008) (dissent) In
a sharp 4-3 decision the Georgia Supreme Court denies relief over a
strong claim of innocence. The evidence of innocence, the majority
holds, comes too late.
- Connie
Ray Israel v. State, 2008 Fla. LEXIS 441 (FL 3/20/2008) "Israel
asserts that: (1) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during
closing argument of the penalty phase; (2) trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance in failing to file a sentencing memorandum for
the Spencer2 hearing; (3) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
for failing to present mitigating evidence and to prepare an expert
witness prior to his penalty phase testimony; (4) procedural and
substantive errors deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial; and (5)
Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584
(2002). We address each claim in turn below."
- Thomas
Bevel v. State, 2008 Fla. LEXIS 443 (FL 3/20/2008) Relief
denied. "Bevel has
raised the following nine issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in
failing to strike for cause a juror who favored law enforcement; (2)
whether the trial court erred in finding that the aggravators
outweighed the mitigators; (3) whether Bevel’s death sentence is
disproportionate; (4) whether the trial court erred in denying Bevel’s
motion that Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional because
a jury, rather than a judge, must make a unanimous finding as to the
aggravators; (5) whether the trial court erred in the weight assigned
to the aggravators and mitigators; (6) whether the trial court abused
its discretion in allowing photographic evidence which was gruesome and
unduly prejudicial; (7) whether the trial court erred in admitting
Bevel’s confession; (8) whether the trial court erred in adopting
verbatim the State’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law;
and (9) whether the death penalty is inappropriate because Bevel’s
mental age is under that of an eighteen-year-old."
- David
Martinez v. Quarterman, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 5661 (5th Cir
3/17/2008) (unpublished) Relief denied on a litany of claims relating
to
ineffective assistance of counsel . To be further fleshed out
next week.
Selected
Excerpts from, & Commentary on, this Edition's Cases
Snyder
v. Louisiana, No.
06-10119 (3/19/2008) Conviction and death sentence reversed in light of
Batson.
Death
Watch aptly sums up the central holding of Snyder v. Louisiana.
The Supreme
Court ruled in Snyder v. Louisiana (opinion here, SCOTUSWiki background here)
on Wednesday. The Court did not address the “sexiest” issue in the
case; that the prosecutor made reference to OJ Simpson in a case
involving a black man tried before an all-white jury. Instead, the
decision focused on the State’s use of a peremptory challenge to remove
an African-American from the jury pool, and whether the trial court
properly ruled that it did so for non-racial reasons. You can read
analysis from SCOTUSBlog here. The decision could be said to essentially be
a reaffirmation of Batson
and Miller-El (see below), with the happy addition of
Justices Alito and Roberts on the side of good.
I would make
three additional notes, however.
First,
Chase Law’s Michael J.Z. Mannheimer hits the most important “take away”
from the opinion with this pithy analysis at the CrimProf
blog
First, the case seems to shift the burden
of an ambiguous record from
the opponent of the strike to the proponent of the strike. That is,
where the trial court does not specifically say why it is not convinced
that the strike is motivated by discriminatory animus, it seems that
the proponent of the strike must now prod the court to do so. If the
trial court does not do so, the proponent bears the risk that a
reviewing court will independently view the strike as discriminatory
based on the cold record without giving any deference to the trial
court's ability to judge the demeanor of the prospective juror.
This
seems to be a change in the law, or at least how I understood the law
to be.
Second, as the other team’s Kent Scheidegger
notes
correctly:
.
. . this case arose on direct review, so the habeas deference standard
of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is not involved. However, this case is now
“clearly established” Supreme Court precedent, and it will surely be
cited in most Batson cases from this point onward. Note at
page 6 of the slip opinion that the Court is unwilling to presume that
the trial judge relied on his own observation of the venireman’s
demeanor without any statement from the judge to that effect. Once
again, we see the importance of making the record.
Finally, rather than contracting Batson as
some commentators have suggested, the majority may be seeking to expand
Batson
to a mixed motive analysis. The following quote on the bottom of page
12 & continuing to page13, albeit being dicta, suggests where the
Court may be going next.
In
other circumstances, we have held that, once it is shown that a
discriminatory intent was a substantial or motivating factor in an
action taken by a state actor, the burden shifts to the party defending
the action to show that this factor was not determinative. See Hunter
v. Underwood,
471 U. S. 222, 228 (1985). We have not previously applied this rule in
a Batson case, and we need not decide here whether that standard
governs in this context. For present purposes, it is enough to
recognize that a peremptory strike shown to have been motivated in
substantial part by discriminatory intent could not be sustained based
on any lesser showing by the prosecution.
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