|
The news of the week is best themed "choosing life."
The
Georgia Pardons and Parole Board commuted Samuel Crowe’s death sentence
to life without parole briefly before his scheduled
execution last week. "After careful
and exhaustive consideration of the request, the board
voted to grant clemency." The
Board heard testimony from several people who
knew Crowe, including pastors and a former corrections officer, who
said, "I felt like if they released him that morning he would never get
in any more trouble and he could make a contribution to society,” and
called him a “peacemaker” amongst prison inmates. Crowe
would
have been "the
second inmate to be put to death in Georgia in 16 days and the third in
the country since a de facto moratorium on executions was lifted in
April, when the U.S. Supreme Court approved lethal injection."
Continuing on the theme of choosing life, In the federal
system life verdicts are
noted on tough facts
in United States v. Rudy Sablan (D.Co.), United States v. Steven
Sandstrom (W.D.Mo) and United States v. Jamal Shakir (MD Tn). In
Pennsylvania Herbie
Baker was permitted
to resolve his case with a plea of 35 -70 years in Pennsylvania; Mr.
Baker had spent half of his life on death row. A Houston jury decided
Tuesday
that Juan Leonardo Quintero - an illegal immigrant with a record who
killed Houston police officer Rodney
Johnson while in custody, should spend the rest of his life in prison,
rather than go to
death row, for Johnson’s 2006 murder, the daily blog has more.
In case law developments, the Kansas Supreme Court in
State v. Gavin D. Scott, handed down the most notable opinion of
this edition. As the Kansas
Defenders' blog notes "The court affirmed most of Scott's
convictions (including capital
murder), but reversed his conviction for premeditated murder, and
reversed his death sentence. The court remanded Scott’s case to the
district court for a new sentencing phase." The grounds for
reversal, and potential grounds for reversal, are numerous and detailed
at length below.
The unique state of the
Nebraska's death penalty (retaining capital punishment and a death row
but no means to carry out executions) appears likely to
continue indefinitely, according to press reports. The
Kansas City Star is announcing the Missouri capital rape statute
has failed in the legislature. In Collin
County, Texas the local DA after
18 months, 5,000 man-hours and more than
$47,000 re-investigating the case, announced
that there is no longer a good-faith basis for upholding the murder
conviction of Michael Blair, more in coming days.
The
Jackson v. Taylor opinion should have been cited as should have been
cited as Jackson v. Danberg, No. 06-300 (D. Del 5/19/2008) and linked
as http://capitaldefenseweekly.com/delawarejacksonli.pdf.
As always, thanks for reading. - k
Pending
Execution Dates
May
27 Kevin Green - Va.*
June
3 Derrick Sonnier - Tex.*
6 David Hill - SC (V)*
10 Percy Walton - Va*
11 Karl Chamberlain - Tex*
17 Charles Hood -Tex.*
17 Terry Lynn Short - Okla*
25 Robert Yarbrough - Va*
July
10 Carlton Turner - Tex.*
14 Eric Hanson - Ill (L)
15 Darrell Robinson - La (L)
15 Antoinette Frank - La
22 Lester Bower - Tex.*
28 Gregory Decay - Ark.
31 Larry Davis - Tex.*
August
5 Jose Medellin - Tex.*
14 Michael Rodriguez - Texas* (volunteer)
20 Denard Manns - Tex.
Recent Executions
May
6 William Earl Lynd - Ga.
21 Earl Berry - Miss.
Notable Stays
July
24 Edward Bell - Va
Notable Commutations
22 Samuel Crowe - Ga.
* "serious" execution date / (L) stay believed likely / (V)
Volunteer [Sources: DPIC,
Rick Halperin & AP]
Week of May 12, 2008 –
In
Favor of the Defendant or the Condemned
- State
v. Gavin D. Scott, 2008 Kan. LEXIS 182 (Kan 5/16/2008) Penalty
phase relief granted, and new penalty phase trial ordered, due to
errors
in the unanimity instruction that created "substantial probability
reasonable jurors could
have believed unanimity was required to find mitigating circumstances,"
multiplicitous instructions on "aggravating factor," and portions
of the
penalty phase closing by the state.
- Henry
Skinner v. Quarterman,, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10444 (5th Cir
5/14/2008) Certificate of Appealability granted on
two issues. The first issue addresses trial counsel’s
“failure to
make use of [a] blood spatter report” which indicated a potentially
radically different set of events than those put forward by the
prosecution at trial. The second issue on which the panel granted
a
COA addresses counsel failure to discover and present testimony of a
witness who would have “offered strong circumstantial evidence to
corroborate the defense theory” that another man, and not Skinner,
committed the murder.
- Ex
Parte Gene Wilford Hathorn, Jr., No. AP-75,917, Wednesday ordered,
after previously rejecting the issues at bar, further briefing. The
Court specifically ordered briefing on:
1. Did applicant object at
trial that
his jury was not given an adequate vehicle through which it could give
effect to his mitigating evidence? Was any other objection specifically
pertaining to mitigating evidence made when discussing the charge to be
given the jury?
2. If no objection was
made, does this make a difference regarding the resolution of
applicant’s allegation?
3. Was the mitigating
evidence
presented at applicant’s trial the type of evidence for which applicant
was entitled to a separate vehicle?
4. Although applicant’s
direct appeal
began prior to the time the United States Supreme Court handed down the
decision in Penry, was direct appeal counsel obligated to raise the
claim post-submission considering applicant’s direct appeal remained
pending in this Court for some three years after the Penry decision was
handed down?
- Michael
Emerson Correll v. Ryan, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10431 (9th Cir
5/14/2008) (Amended opinion on denial of rehearing en banc)
Denial of
petition for writ of habeas corpus is reversed and the case remanded
for a new penalty hearing where defendant was constitutionally entitled
to the presentation of a mitigation defense, but did not have an
opportunity to offer mitigating evidence.
Week of May 12, 2008 –
In
Favor of the State or Government
- Robert Hendrix v. Secretary, Florida Department of
Corrections, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10266 (11th Cir 5/13/2008)
"Denial of a habeas petition is affirmed where: 1) the mere appearance
of a judge's alleged bias was insufficient to violate the Due Process
Clause in light of clearly established federal law as set forth by the
Supreme Court; 2) trial counsel's investigation and presentation of
mitigating circumstances was reasonable and did not render ineffective
assistance; and 3) the government's failure to disclose immaterial
information about a witness did not amount to a Brady violation."
- Robert
L Newland v. Hall, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10433 (11th Cir 5/14/2008)
At the risk of vastly over simplifying the issues, relief denied on two
issues: "(1) the performance of his trial and appellate attorneys,
Donald
Manning and John Davis, was constitutionally ineffective concerning the
admissibility of his confession, and (2) Manning was
ineffective in failing adequately to search for and present to the jury
certain mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of the
trial." In concurrence Judge Anderson notes that this case is a
close call and seemingly asks for the Supreme Court to provide further
guidance of the standards to be used in ineffective assistance of
counsel claim cases where the Petitioner at trial attempted to
dissuade trial counsel from a full mitigation investigation.
-
Edward
Lee Busby, Jr., v. State, 2008 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 643 (Tex.
Crim. App 5/14/2008) Relief denied on numerous claims including: (A)
"during closing jury
arguments at the guilt phase, the State made three direct comments on
appellant's failure to testify;" (B) the "10-12" provision of
Article
37.071, § 2(f)(2), is unconstitutional; (C) Article 37.071 is
unconstitutional under Bush v. Gore because
there "are no uniform, statewide standards to guide prosecutors in
deciding" when to seek the death penalty so as to "prevent the
arbitrary and disparate treatment of similarly situated people"; (D)
failure to appoint counsel in a timely manner; (E) fact finding of the
trial court as to the motion to suppress; (F) the trial court committed
reversible error by failing to submit [appellant's] requested jury
charge regarding the voluntariness of his custodial statements;" and
(G) "trial court erroneously denied seven defense challenges for
cause." Addi tonal claims denied relating to whether Article 37.071,
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. is unconstitutional on its face because: "(1) the
mitigation special issue fails to place a burden of proof on the State
regarding aggravating evidence, (2) the mitigation special issue
permits the type of open-ended discretion condemned in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), (3) the mitigation special issue does not
permit "meaningful appellate review," (4) the mitigation special issue
fails to require that mitigation be considered, (5) the definition of
"mitigating evidence" in the mitigation special issue is too narrow,
(6) "various terms and phrases used in the three special issues" are
not defined "in ways that would permit the jury to give full mitigating
significance to those terms," (7) it permitted appellant to be
sentenced to death as a result of "arbitrary and unchecked
discrimination amounting to a denial of equal protection under the
law," and (8) it is so vague as to be fundamentally unfair. Article
37.071 is not unconstitutional on its face."
-
State
v. Tyrone Lee Noling, 2008 Ohio 2394 (Ohio 11th App
5/16/2008) "When
defendant said his
right to a fair trial was violated when the prosecution withheld
material exculpatory evidence, a review of his clam's dismissal only
considered if the evidentiary material in question met the threshold
requirements of R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a) and (b) because his claim was
made in a successive postconviction relief petition.
" [via
Lexisone.com]
Week of May 12, 2008 –
Noncapital of note
- Regina
Denise McKnight v. State, 2008 S.C. LEXIS 142 (S.C.
5/12/2008) McKnight's
trial counsel was
"ineffective in her preparation of McKnight's defense through expert
testimony and cross-examination," as well as that her
conviction was based on "outdated" and inaccurate information linking
the fetal death to her cocaine use.
- United
States v. Paul Ryan Douglas, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10268 (2nd
Cir 5/13/2008) There is no statutory right to two attorneys in a
federal capital case once the Government provides notification that it
will not seek death.
- United States v. Styles Taylor & Keon Thomas, 2008 U.S.
App. LEXIS 10600 (7th Cir 5/13/2008) (unpublished)"District
court's decision that government's use of peremptory challenge to
exclude African-American potential juror was not exercised in
discriminatory manner was reversed and case was remanded for
evidentiary hearing because district court in assessing credibility
failed to address disparity in government's use of challenges." [via
Lexisone.com]
- Drago
Ferguson v. Culliver, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10195 (11th
Cir 5/12/2008) Remand ordered as the district Court lacked
adequate
record on which to decide the merits of the Petitioner's claims.
(Initial
List) Week of May 19, 2008 –
In
Favor of the State or Government
- Charles
Keith Richardson v. Sup. Ct., 2008 Cal. LEXIS 6209 (Cal 5/22/2008) "Denial
of petitioner's motion under Penal Code section 1405 for DNA testing of
hair samples admitted at trial is affirmed where: 1) the standard of
review of a trial court' ruling on a section 1405 motion is abuse of
discretion; 2) a defendant is not required to show that a favorable DNA
test would conclusively establish his or her innocence because it would
be sufficient for the defendant to show that the identity of the
perpetrator or accomplice was a controverted issue as to which the
results of DNA testing would be relevant evidence; 3) to prevail on a
section 1405 motion, a defendant must demonstrate that, had the DNA
testing been available in light of all of the evidence, there is a
reasonable chance and not merely an abstract possibility that the
defendant would have obtained a more favorable result; and 4) although
the DNA test would have been relevant to the issue of identity, there
was sufficient evidence to determine guilt." [via FindLaw.com]
- People
v. Charles Keith Richardson, 2008 Cal. LEXIS 6208 (Cal
5/22/2008) "On automatic appeal for a sentence of death, the judgment
is affirmed over claims of error regarding: 1) the prosecution's use of
peremptory challenges to excuse any prospective juror who expressed
reservations about the death penalty and religious affiliation; 2) the
excusal of jurors for cause who stated that they could not impose the
death penalty; 3) a denial to excuse a potential juror who revealed she
would vote automatically for death; 4) an affidavit submitted for a
warrant; 5) suppression of a post-arrest statement arising from an
unnecessary delay in his arraignment; 6) whether the post-arrest
statement should have been excluded because it was involuntary; 7) due
process and right to counsel violations arising from relieving the
public defender based on a conflict; 8) application of Proposition 115
to defendant's case; 9) admission and exclusion of certain evidence;
10) a prosecutorial decision involving a witness; 11) prosecutorial
misconduct in presenting inconsistent theories; 12) sufficiency of
evidence regarding lewd conduct; 13) erroneous instruction on sodomy as
a basis for felony murder; 14) references to innocence in CALJIC Nos.
1.01, 2.01, 2.51 and 2.52; 15) cumulative effect of guilty phase
errors; 16) double counting of special circumstances and consideration
of sodomy special circumstance; 17) several evidentiary rulings; 18)
denial of motion for modification of death verdict; 19) intercase
proportionality; 20) instructional error; 21) challenges to the death
penalty statute; 22) international law; 23) prosecution delay; 24)
missing transcripts; 25) cumulative error; and 26) incorporation by
reference of habeas corpus petition claims. However, the case is
remanded on the issue of restitution as the issue should be considered
in light of the currently applicable statute." [via FindLaw.com]
- James
Hitchcock v. State, 2008 Fla. LEXIS 917 (FL 5/22/2008) "Denial of a
motion to vacate a first degree murder conviction and a sentence of
death is affirmed, and a petition for habeas corpus is denied, over
claims of error regarding: 1) ineffective assistance of counsel; 2)
destruction of exculpatory evidence by the state; 3) newly discovered
evidence; 4) the state's failure to disclose deficiencies of the hair
analyst and then knowingly presenting incompetent and false testimony;
5) defendant's failure to be present at a bench conference where
peremptory challenges were exercised; and 6) a failure of counsel to
properly investigate and present statutory mitigating circumstances."
[via FindLaw.com]
- Kenneth
Hartley v. State, 2008 Fla. LEXIS 918 (FL 5/22/2008) Relief
denied as: "[h]aving reviewed the briefs and heard oral argument in the
case, we hold
(1) that Hartley failed to demonstrate that trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance during the penalty phase by failing to call
certain witnesses or present a mental health expert; (2) that Hartley
did not preserve his claim that newly discovered evidence shows the
State presented false or misleading evidence at trial; and (3) that
Hartley's claim that collateral counsel provided ineffective assistance
is not a cognizable claim."
- State
v. Laderrick Campbell, 2008 La. LEXIS 1183 (LA 5/21/2008) (dissent)
Relief denied on claims including, most notably, lack of capacity of
the defendant, competency to waive counsel, mental retardation under
Atkins, and the trial court's failure to remove for cause a life
hesitant juror.
- Jeffrey Keith Havard v State, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 264
(Miss 5/22/2008) Relief denied on a large number of claims
including:
(
I) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to adopt defense
strategy during guilt phase;
( a) Failure to obtain DNA evidence;
( b) Failure to secure a pathologist;
( c) Failure to include a lesser-offense instruction;
(
II) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate,
develop and present mitigation evidence during penalty phase;
(
III) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to develop
and [*5] present compelling evidence of Havard's childhood
and family life in mitigation of punishment;
(
IV) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to develop and
introduce Havard's successful adaptation at Camp Shelby as mitigating
evidence during the penalty phase;
(
V) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to ask potential
jurors "reverse-Witherspoon" questions during voir dire;
(
VI) Ineffective assistance of counsel during closing argument at the
penalty phase;
(
VII) Prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument at the guilt
phase;
(
VIII) Victim impact testimony;
(
IX) Whether the trial court improperly responded to a question from
the jury during the sentencing phase;
(
X) Limiting instruction of especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel
aggravating circumstance;
(
XI) Failure of the indictment to charge a death-penalty-eligible
offense;
(
XII) Jury consideration of aggravating circumstances;
(
XIII) Competency of trial counsel; and
(
XIV) Cumulative error.
- Michael
A. Taylor v. State, 2008 Mo. LEXIS 43 (Mo. 5/20/2008) Relief
denied on two claims. "First, Taylor alleged that he was abandoned by
post-conviction
appellate counsel because counsel did not brief and argue ineffective
assistance of counsel during his plea and the first sentencing hearing.
Second, Taylor alleged that the doctrine of judicial estoppel warrants
re-opening his case because the State took the position in the state
court that Taylor's claims of ineffective assistance of plea counsel
were fully litigated but then argued in federal court that those claims
were barred based upon failure to fully litigate the issues in state
court."
- Comm
. v. Jerome Marshall, 2008 Pa. LEXIS 706 (Penn 5/20/2008) "In a capital case, a
trial court properly dismissed appellant's second post-conviction
petition as he waived any Batson error by failing to raise the issue on
direct appeal, as required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b), the petition
was
manifestly untimely and he failed to establish any exception to the
timeliness requirement under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545."
[via
Lexisone.com]
- State
v. Gregory B. McKnight, 2008 Ohio 2435 (Ohio 4th App
5/19/2008) "Trial
counsel's
performance was not deficient. Counsel's decision not to present
mitigating evidence in the death penalty phase regarding childhood
issues of paternal abandonment and the lack of a father figure was a
strategic decision to avoid opening the door to the inmate’s prior
juvenile murder adjudication, pursuant to Evid. R. 405(B).
" [via
Lexisone.com]
(Initial
List) Week of May 19, 2008 –
Noncapital of note
- Frederick Jess Harris v. Haberlin, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS
10880 (6th
Cir. 5/22/2008) District Court erred in not giving greater weight
to a
videotape suggesting that prosecutors used race based strikes to shape
Petitioner's jury pool.
Selected
Excerpts
from, & Commentary on, this Edition's Cases
[Note
formatting may be off below this point.]
State
v. Gavin D. Scott, 2008 Kan. LEXIS 182 (Kan 5/16/2008) Penalty
phase relief granted, and new penalty phase trial ordered, due to
errors
in the unanimity instruction that created "substantial probability
reasonable jurors could
have believed unanimity was required to find mitigating circumstances,"
multiplicitous instructions on "aggravating factor," and portions
of the
penalty phase closing by the state. Carl Folsom @ the Kansas
Defenders notes:
Rebecca E. Woodman and Steven R.
Zinn won today in State
v. Gavin Scott,
No. 83,801 (May 16, 2008). The court affirmed most of Scott's
convictions (including capital murder), but reversed his conviction for
premeditated murder, and reversed his death sentence. The court
remanded Scott’s case to the district court for a new sentencing phase.
First-Degree
Murder Conviction is Multiplicitous
The
court concluded that Scott’s conviction for first-degree murder was
multiplicitous with his conviction for capital murder under the old
version of K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(d):
The State
has acknowledged the murder of Douglas Brittain was a crime necessarily
proved under the charge of capital murder. Accordingly, under K.S.A.
21-3107(2)(d) (Furse), Scott's convictions were multiplicitous in the
absence of clear and nambiguous legislative intent authorizing multiple
prosecutions for the same conduct. We are unable to conclude from a
plain reading of K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(6) and its legislative history that
the legislature intended to override the acknowledged reach of K.S.A.
21-3107(2)(d). In other instances, the legislature has not hesitated to
state when K.S.A. 21-3107(2) is not to be applied. See K.S.A. 21-3436
(precluding application of K.S.A. 21-3107[2] to specific felony
offenses regardless of whether such felony is distinct from the alleged
homicide). Here, there has been no such declared legislative intent.
Accordingly, we conclude Scott's conviction for the first-degree
premeditated murder of Douglas Brittain must be reversed.
It
seems that a similar argument would be effective under the current
version of K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(b), that first-degree murder is a lesser
included offense of capital murder because it is “a crime where all
elements of the lesser crime are identical to some of the elements of
the crime charged.”
Equipoise under the Kansas Constitution
The
court also addressed the constitutionality of the Kansas death penalty
under the Kansas Constitution. The court declined to hold that the
weighing equation set forth in K.S.A. 21-4624(e) violates the cruel or
unusual punishment prohibition of § 9 and the due process
provision of
§ 18 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. (For background,
see Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 165 L. Ed. 2d 429, 126 S. Ct. 2516
(2006) and Kansas Supreme Court's supplemental opinion to State v.
Marsh,
282 Kan. 38, 144 P.3d 48 (2006)). However, the court did encourage
defendants to keep raising proportionality arguments under § 9 of
the
Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights:
Our decision
today should not be construed to preclude future interpretation of
§ 9
when considering the proportionality of a criminal sentence. In such a
circumstance, we are free to further consider the historical record and
decide whether § 9 should be interpreted in a manner which
deviates
from that given to the Eighth Amendment by the United States Supreme
Court.
On a side
note, the oral argument on this
issue was interesting, because it involved Kansas solicitor general,
and former KU Law dean, Stephen R. McAllister arguing against a law
review article that he had written in law school (that the Kansas
Constitution should be more expansive than the U.S. Constitution).
Death Sentence Reversal
In
reversing Scott’s death sentence, the court held that the jury
instructions used for mitigating factors could have caused reasonable
jurors to believe that unanimity was required to find mitigating
circumstances:
[W]e have considered all of the
other
instructions given by the trial court in an effort to decide whether
jurors could have reasonably been misled to believe unanimity was
required as to mitigating circumstances. Read together, the
instructions repeatedly emphasize the need for unanimity as to any
aggravating circumstances found to exist. Conversely, the trial court's
instructions do not inform the jury as to a contrary standard for
determining mitigating circumstances. The jury is left to speculate as
to the correct standard. Under these circumstances, we conclude there
is a substantial probability reasonable jurors could have believed
unanimity was required to find mitigating circumstances. We hold
failure of the trial court to provide the jury with a proper standard
for determining mitigating circumstances constitutes reversible error.
See Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 100 L. Ed. 2d 384, 108 S. Ct. 1860
(1988) (holding a death sentence should be vacated where there was a
substantial probability reasonable jurors may have thought they could
only consider those mitigating circumstances unanimously found to
exist). Accordingly, we must reverse the death sentence and remand to
the district court for a new capital sentencing hearing.
Thus, Scott
gets a new sentencing hearing.
The
court also found error in PIK Crim. 3d 56.00-C(3), or part of the
"aggravating circumstances" instruction. PIK Crim. 3d 56.00-C(3)
currently lists the aggravated circumstance: “the defendant committed
the crime
for the defendant’s self or another for the purpose of receiving money
or any other thing of monetary value.” The court held, “PIK Crim. 3d
56.00-C(3) should be revised to specifically designate the crime of
capital murder.”
Here is
coverage from the Wichita Eagle.
SMALL PRINT
SUBSCRIBING & ARCHIVES:
The summaries above are normally
published forty (40) times (or so) a year.
1997-2008
COPYRIGHT / DISCLAIMER / FAIR USE
NOTICE: In plain English, you can use these materials without
attribution (although I would appreciate the attribution) for any
noncommercial purposes you see fit, (such as
professional education, your newsletter, etc.). You can't use the
works created
by others contained in this newsletter identified above (normally
selected excerpts from the works of others) as I simply can't give away
the rights of others to
their intellectual property. Any derivative works must provide at least
as equal or
greater waiver of intellectual property rights. Nothing
in this newsletter constitutes legal advice.
The legalese,
copyright, disclaimers, notices, & terms of usage are available in
full here.
Where in conflict
with the plain English version of this disclaimer / copyright notice,
please go with the legalese
ADDITIONAL
DISCLAIMER: In plain
English, due your own due diligence. Legalese:
Use does not
constitute establishment of attorney-client relationship. On a
semi-regular basis cases in which the writer(s) have participated in
one manner
or another (including as counsel of record) may be covered here. As
always, the views expressed here represent an attempt to show what a
given Court held, not whether a particular court reached the right
decision The opinions noted above are normally "slip
opinions" that may be modified or withdrawn by the issuing court
without notice. Note the citation method we use is to permit readers to
readily find opinions either from a given court, Lexis, or the free
Lexis product Lexisone.com.
Execution
information
derived from Rick Halperin, DPIC & media accounts
|