Capital Defense Weekly
available at http://capitaldefenseweekly.com/archives/080519.htm

The news of the week is best themed "choosing life."

The Georgia Pardons and Parole Board commuted Samuel Crowe’s death sentence to life without parole briefly before his scheduled execution last week.  "After careful and exhaustive consideration of the request, the board voted to grant clemency." The Board heard testimony from several people who knew Crowe, including pastors and a former corrections officer, who said, "I felt like if they released him that morning he would never get in any more trouble and he could make a contribution to society,” and called him a “peacemaker” amongst prison inmates.  Crowe would have been "the second inmate to be put to death in Georgia in 16 days and the third in the country since a de facto moratorium on executions was lifted in April, when the U.S. Supreme Court approved lethal injection."

Continuing on the theme of choosing life, In the federal system life verdicts are noted on tough facts in United States v. Rudy Sablan (D.Co.), United States v.  Steven Sandstrom (W.D.Mo) and United States v. Jamal Shakir (MD Tn).  In Pennsylvania Herbie Baker was permitted to resolve his case with a plea of 35 -70 years in Pennsylvania; Mr. Baker had spent half of his life on death row. A Houston jury decided Tuesday that Juan Leonardo Quintero - an illegal immigrant with a record who killed Houston police officer Rodney Johnson while in custody, should spend the rest of his life in prison, rather than go to death row, for Johnson’s 2006 murder, the daily blog has more.

In case law developments, the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Gavin D. Scott, handed down the most notable opinion of this edition. As the Kansas Defenders' blog notes "The court affirmed most of Scott's convictions (including capital murder), but reversed his conviction for premeditated murder, and reversed his death sentence. The court remanded Scott’s case to the district court for a new sentencing phase."  The grounds for reversal, and potential grounds for reversal, are numerous and detailed at length below.

The unique state of the Nebraska's death penalty (retaining capital punishment and a death row but no means to carry out executions) appears likely to continue indefinitely, according to press reports. The Kansas City Star is announcing the Missouri capital rape statute has failed in the legislature. In Collin County, Texas the local  DA  after 18 months,  5,000 man-hours and more than $47,000 re-investigating the case, announced that there is no longer a good-faith basis for upholding the murder conviction of Michael Blair, more in coming days.

The Jackson v. Taylor opinion should have been cited as should have been cited as Jackson v. Danberg, No. 06-300 (D. Del 5/19/2008) and linked as http://capitaldefenseweekly.com/delawarejacksonli.pdf.

As always, thanks for reading. - k

Pending Execution Dates
May
27 Kevin Green - Va.*

June
3 Derrick Sonnier - Tex.*
6 David Hill - SC (V)*
10 Percy Walton - Va*
11 Karl Chamberlain - Tex*
17 Charles Hood -Tex.*
17 Terry Lynn Short - Okla*
25 Robert Yarbrough - Va*

July
10 Carlton Turner - Tex.*
14 Eric Hanson - Ill (L)
15 Darrell Robinson - La (L)
15 Antoinette Frank - La
22 Lester Bower - Tex.*
28 Gregory Decay - Ark.
31 Larry Davis - Tex.*

August
5 Jose Medellin - Tex.*
14 Michael Rodriguez - Texas* (volunteer)
20 Denard Manns - Tex.

Recent Executions
May
6 William Earl Lynd - Ga.
21 Earl Berry - Miss.

Notable Stays
July
24 Edward Bell - Va

Notable Commutations
22 Samuel Crowe - Ga.

* "serious" execution date /  (L) stay believed likely /  (V) Volunteer  [Sources: DPIC, Rick Halperin & AP]

 Week of May 12, 2008 – In Favor of the Defendant or the Condemned

  • State v. Gavin D. Scott, 2008 Kan. LEXIS 182 (Kan 5/16/2008) Penalty phase relief granted, and new penalty phase trial ordered, due to errors in the unanimity instruction that created "substantial probability reasonable jurors could have believed unanimity was required to find mitigating circumstances," multiplicitous instructions on  "aggravating factor," and portions of the penalty phase closing by the state.
  • Henry Skinner v. Quarterman,,  2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10444 (5th Cir 5/14/2008) Certificate of Appealability granted on two issues.   The first issue addresses trial counsel’s “failure to make use of [a] blood spatter report” which indicated a potentially radically different set of events than those put forward by the prosecution at trial.  The second issue on which the panel granted a COA addresses counsel failure to discover and present testimony of a witness who would have “offered strong circumstantial evidence to corroborate the defense theory” that another man, and not Skinner, committed the murder.
  • Ex Parte Gene Wilford Hathorn, Jr., No. AP-75,917, Wednesday ordered, after previously rejecting the issues at bar, further briefing. The Court specifically ordered briefing on:

    1. Did applicant object at trial that his jury was not given an adequate vehicle through which it could give effect to his mitigating evidence? Was any other objection specifically pertaining to mitigating evidence made when discussing the charge to be given the jury?

    2. If no objection was made, does this make a difference regarding the resolution of applicant’s allegation?

    3. Was the mitigating evidence presented at applicant’s trial the type of evidence for which applicant was entitled to a separate vehicle?

    4. Although applicant’s direct appeal began prior to the time the United States Supreme Court handed down the decision in Penry, was direct appeal counsel obligated to raise the claim post-submission considering applicant’s direct appeal remained pending in this Court for some three years after the Penry decision was handed down?

  • Michael Emerson Correll v. Ryan, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10431 (9th Cir 5/14/2008)  (Amended opinion on denial of rehearing en banc) Denial of petition for writ of habeas corpus is reversed and the case remanded for a new penalty hearing where defendant was constitutionally entitled to the presentation of a mitigation defense, but did not have an opportunity to offer mitigating evidence.
Week of  May 12, 2008  – In Favor of the State or Government

  • Robert Hendrix v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10266 (11th Cir 5/13/2008) "Denial of a habeas petition is affirmed where: 1) the mere appearance of a judge's alleged bias was insufficient to violate the Due Process Clause in light of clearly established federal law as set forth by the Supreme Court; 2) trial counsel's investigation and presentation of mitigating circumstances was reasonable and did not render ineffective assistance; and 3) the government's failure to disclose immaterial information about a witness did not amount to a Brady violation."
  • Robert L Newland v. Hall, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10433 (11th Cir 5/14/2008) At the risk of vastly over simplifying the issues, relief denied on two issues: "(1) the performance of his trial and appellate attorneys, Donald Manning and John Davis, was constitutionally ineffective concerning the admissibility of his confession, and (2) Manning was ineffective in failing adequately to search for and present to the jury certain mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of the trial."  In concurrence Judge Anderson notes that this case is a close call and seemingly asks for the Supreme Court to provide further guidance of the standards to be used in ineffective assistance of counsel claim cases where the  Petitioner at trial attempted to dissuade trial counsel from a full mitigation investigation.
  • Edward Lee Busby, Jr., v. State, 2008 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 643 (Tex. Crim. App 5/14/2008) Relief denied on numerous claims including: (A) "during closing jury arguments at the guilt phase, the State made three direct comments on appellant's failure to testify;" (B)  the "10-12" provision of Article 37.071, § 2(f)(2), is unconstitutional; (C) Article 37.071 is unconstitutional under Bush v. Gore because there "are no uniform, statewide standards to guide prosecutors in deciding" when to seek the death penalty so as to "prevent the arbitrary and disparate treatment of similarly situated people"; (D) failure to appoint counsel in a timely manner; (E) fact finding of the trial court as to the motion to suppress; (F) the trial court committed reversible error by failing to submit [appellant's] requested jury charge regarding the voluntariness of his custodial statements;" and (G) "trial court erroneously denied seven defense challenges for cause." Addi tonal claims denied relating to whether Article 37.071, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. is unconstitutional on its face because: "(1) the mitigation special issue fails to place a burden of proof on the State regarding aggravating evidence, (2) the mitigation special issue permits the type of open-ended discretion condemned in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), (3) the mitigation special issue does not permit "meaningful appellate review," (4) the mitigation special issue fails to require that mitigation be considered, (5) the definition of "mitigating evidence" in the mitigation special issue is too narrow, (6) "various terms and phrases used in the three special issues" are not defined "in ways that would permit the jury to give full mitigating significance to those terms," (7) it permitted appellant to be sentenced to death as a result of "arbitrary and unchecked discrimination amounting to a denial of equal protection under the law," and (8) it is so vague as to be fundamentally unfair. Article 37.071 is not unconstitutional on its face."

  • State v. Tyrone Lee Noling,  2008 Ohio 2394 (Ohio 11th App 5/16/2008) "When defendant said his right to a fair trial was violated when the prosecution withheld material exculpatory evidence, a review of his clam's dismissal only considered if the evidentiary material in question met the threshold requirements of R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a) and (b) because his claim was made in a successive postconviction relief petition. " [via Lexisone.com]

Week of  May 12, 2008  – Noncapital of note

  • Regina Denise McKnight v. State, 2008 S.C. LEXIS 142 (S.C. 5/12/2008) McKnight's trial counsel was "ineffective in her preparation of McKnight's defense through expert testimony and cross-examination," as well as that her conviction was based on "outdated" and inaccurate information linking the fetal death to her cocaine use.
  • United States v. Paul Ryan Douglas, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10268 (2nd Cir 5/13/2008)  There is no statutory right to two attorneys in a federal capital case once the Government provides notification that it will not seek death.
  • United States v. Styles Taylor & Keon Thomas, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10600 (7th Cir 5/13/2008) (unpublished)"District court's decision that government's use of peremptory challenge to exclude African-American potential juror was not exercised in discriminatory manner was reversed and case was remanded for evidentiary hearing because district court in assessing credibility failed to address disparity in government's use of challenges." [via Lexisone.com]
  • Drago Ferguson v. Culliver, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10195 (11th Cir 5/12/2008)  Remand ordered as the district Court lacked adequate record on which to decide the merits of the Petitioner's claims.
(Initial List) Week of  May 19, 2008  – In Favor of the State or Government
  • Charles Keith Richardson v. Sup. Ct., 2008 Cal. LEXIS 6209 (Cal 5/22/2008) "Denial of petitioner's motion under Penal Code section 1405 for DNA testing of hair samples admitted at trial is affirmed where: 1) the standard of review of a trial court' ruling on a section 1405 motion is abuse of discretion; 2) a defendant is not required to show that a favorable DNA test would conclusively establish his or her innocence because it would be sufficient for the defendant to show that the identity of the perpetrator or accomplice was a controverted issue as to which the results of DNA testing would be relevant evidence; 3) to prevail on a section 1405 motion, a defendant must demonstrate that, had the DNA testing been available in light of all of the evidence, there is a reasonable chance and not merely an abstract possibility that the defendant would have obtained a more favorable result; and 4) although the DNA test would have been relevant to the issue of identity, there was sufficient evidence to determine guilt." [via FindLaw.com]
  • People v. Charles Keith Richardson, 2008 Cal. LEXIS 6208  (Cal 5/22/2008) "On automatic appeal for a sentence of death, the judgment is affirmed over claims of error regarding: 1) the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to excuse any prospective juror who expressed reservations about the death penalty and religious affiliation; 2) the excusal of jurors for cause who stated that they could not impose the death penalty; 3) a denial to excuse a potential juror who revealed she would vote automatically for death; 4) an affidavit submitted for a warrant; 5) suppression of a post-arrest statement arising from an unnecessary delay in his arraignment; 6) whether the post-arrest statement should have been excluded because it was involuntary; 7) due process and right to counsel violations arising from relieving the public defender based on a conflict; 8) application of Proposition 115 to defendant's case; 9) admission and exclusion of certain evidence; 10) a prosecutorial decision involving a witness; 11) prosecutorial misconduct in presenting inconsistent theories; 12) sufficiency of evidence regarding lewd conduct; 13) erroneous instruction on sodomy as a basis for felony murder; 14) references to innocence in CALJIC Nos. 1.01, 2.01, 2.51 and 2.52; 15) cumulative effect of guilty phase errors; 16) double counting of special circumstances and consideration of sodomy special circumstance; 17) several evidentiary rulings; 18) denial of motion for modification of death verdict; 19) intercase proportionality; 20) instructional error; 21) challenges to the death penalty statute; 22) international law; 23) prosecution delay; 24) missing transcripts; 25) cumulative error; and 26) incorporation by reference of habeas corpus petition claims. However, the case is remanded on the issue of restitution as the issue should be considered in light of the currently applicable statute."  [via FindLaw.com]
  • James Hitchcock v. State, 2008 Fla. LEXIS 917 (FL 5/22/2008) "Denial of a motion to vacate a first degree murder conviction and a sentence of death is affirmed, and a petition for habeas corpus is denied, over claims of error regarding: 1) ineffective assistance of counsel; 2) destruction of exculpatory evidence by the state; 3) newly discovered evidence; 4) the state's failure to disclose deficiencies of the hair analyst and then knowingly presenting incompetent and false testimony; 5) defendant's failure to be present at a bench conference where peremptory challenges were exercised; and 6) a failure of counsel to properly investigate and present statutory mitigating circumstances." [via FindLaw.com]
  • Kenneth Hartley v. State, 2008 Fla. LEXIS 918 (FL 5/22/2008) Relief denied as: "[h]aving reviewed the briefs and heard oral argument in the case, we hold (1) that Hartley failed to demonstrate that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during the penalty phase by failing to call certain witnesses or present a mental health expert; (2) that Hartley did not preserve his claim that newly discovered evidence shows the State presented false or misleading evidence at trial; and (3) that Hartley's claim that collateral counsel provided ineffective assistance is not a cognizable claim."
  • State v. Laderrick Campbell, 2008 La. LEXIS 1183 (LA 5/21/2008) (dissent) Relief denied on claims including, most notably, lack of capacity of the defendant, competency to waive counsel, mental retardation under Atkins, and the trial court's failure to remove for cause a life hesitant juror.
  • Jeffrey Keith Havard v State, 2008 Miss. LEXIS 264  (Miss 5/22/2008) Relief denied on a large number of claims including:  ( I) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to adopt defense strategy during guilt phase; ( a) Failure to obtain DNA evidence; ( b) Failure to secure a pathologist; ( c) Failure to include a lesser-offense instruction; ( II) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate, develop and present mitigation evidence during penalty phase; ( III) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to develop and  [*5]  present compelling evidence of Havard's childhood and family life in mitigation of punishment; ( IV) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to develop and introduce Havard's successful adaptation at Camp Shelby as mitigating evidence during the penalty phase; ( V) Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to ask potential jurors "reverse-Witherspoon" questions during voir dire; ( VI) Ineffective assistance of counsel during closing argument at the penalty phase; ( VII) Prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument at the guilt phase; ( VIII) Victim impact testimony; ( IX) Whether the trial court improperly responded to a question from the jury during the sentencing phase; ( X) Limiting instruction of especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance; ( XI) Failure of the indictment to charge a death-penalty-eligible offense; ( XII) Jury consideration of aggravating circumstances; ( XIII) Competency of trial counsel; and ( XIV) Cumulative error.
  • Michael A. Taylor v. State, 2008 Mo. LEXIS 43 (Mo. 5/20/2008) Relief denied on two claims. "First, Taylor alleged that he was abandoned by post-conviction appellate counsel because counsel did not brief and argue ineffective assistance of counsel during his plea and the first sentencing hearing. Second, Taylor alleged that the doctrine of judicial estoppel warrants re-opening his case because the State took the position in the state court that Taylor's claims of ineffective assistance of plea counsel were fully litigated but then argued in federal court that those claims were barred based upon failure to fully litigate the issues in state court."

  • Comm . v. Jerome Marshall, 2008 Pa. LEXIS 706 (Penn 5/20/2008) "In a capital case, a trial court properly dismissed appellant's second post-conviction petition as he waived any Batson error by failing to raise the issue on direct appeal, as required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b), the petition was manifestly untimely and he failed to establish any exception to the timeliness requirement under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545."  [via Lexisone.com]
  • State v. Gregory B. McKnight,  2008 Ohio 2435  (Ohio 4th App 5/19/2008) "Trial counsel's performance was not deficient. Counsel's decision not to present mitigating evidence in the death penalty phase regarding childhood issues of paternal abandonment and the lack of a father figure was a strategic decision to avoid opening the door to the inmate’s prior juvenile murder adjudication, pursuant to Evid. R. 405(B). " [via Lexisone.com]

(Initial List) Week of  May 19, 2008  – Noncapital of note

  • Frederick Jess Harris v. Haberlin, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10880  (6th Cir. 5/22/2008)  District Court erred in not giving greater weight to a videotape suggesting that prosecutors used race based strikes to shape Petitioner's jury pool.


Selected Excerpts from, & Commentary on, this Edition's Cases
[Note formatting may be off below this point.]

State v. Gavin D. Scott, 2008 Kan. LEXIS 182 (Kan 5/16/2008) Penalty phase relief granted, and new penalty phase trial ordered, due to errors in the unanimity instruction that created "substantial probability reasonable jurors could have believed unanimity was required to find mitigating circumstances," multiplicitous instructions on  "aggravating factor," and portions of the penalty phase closing by the state.

Rebecca E. Woodman and Steven R. Zinn won today in State v. Gavin Scott, No. 83,801 (May 16, 2008). The court affirmed most of Scott's convictions (including capital murder), but reversed his conviction for premeditated murder, and reversed his death sentence. The court remanded Scott’s case to the district court for a new sentencing phase.

First-Degree Murder Conviction is Multiplicitous

The court concluded that Scott’s conviction for first-degree murder was multiplicitous with his conviction for capital murder under the old version of K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(d):
The State has acknowledged the murder of Douglas Brittain was a crime necessarily proved under the charge of capital murder. Accordingly, under K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(d) (Furse), Scott's convictions were multiplicitous in the absence of clear and nambiguous legislative intent authorizing multiple prosecutions for the same conduct. We are unable to conclude from a plain reading of K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(6) and its legislative history that the legislature intended to override the acknowledged reach of K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(d). In other instances, the legislature has not hesitated to state when K.S.A. 21-3107(2) is not to be applied. See K.S.A. 21-3436 (precluding application of K.S.A. 21-3107[2] to specific felony offenses regardless of whether such felony is distinct from the alleged homicide). Here, there has been no such declared legislative intent. Accordingly, we conclude Scott's conviction for the first-degree premeditated murder of Douglas Brittain must be reversed.
It seems that a similar argument would be effective under the current version of K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(b), that first-degree murder is a lesser included offense of capital murder because it is “a crime where all elements of the lesser crime are identical to some of the elements of the crime charged.”

Equipoise under the Kansas Constitution

The court also addressed the constitutionality of the Kansas death penalty under the Kansas Constitution. The court declined to hold that the weighing equation set forth in K.S.A. 21-4624(e) violates the cruel or unusual punishment prohibition of § 9 and the due process provision of § 18 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. (For background, see Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 165 L. Ed. 2d 429, 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006) and Kansas Supreme Court's supplemental opinion to State v. Marsh, 282 Kan. 38, 144 P.3d 48 (2006)). However, the court did encourage defendants to keep raising proportionality arguments under § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights:

Our decision today should not be construed to preclude future interpretation of § 9 when considering the proportionality of a criminal sentence. In such a circumstance, we are free to further consider the historical record and decide whether § 9 should be interpreted in a manner which deviates from that given to the Eighth Amendment by the United States Supreme Court.

On a side note, the oral argument on this issue was interesting, because it involved Kansas solicitor general, and former KU Law dean, Stephen R. McAllister arguing against a law review article that he had written in law school (that the Kansas Constitution should be more expansive than the U.S. Constitution).

Death Sentence Reversal

In reversing Scott’s death sentence, the court held that the jury instructions used for mitigating factors could have caused reasonable jurors to believe that unanimity was required to find mitigating circumstances:
[W]e have considered all of the other instructions given by the trial court in an effort to decide whether jurors could have reasonably been misled to believe unanimity was required as to mitigating circumstances. Read together, the instructions repeatedly emphasize the need for unanimity as to any aggravating circumstances found to exist. Conversely, the trial court's instructions do not inform the jury as to a contrary standard for determining mitigating circumstances. The jury is left to speculate as to the correct standard. Under these circumstances, we conclude there is a substantial probability reasonable jurors could have believed unanimity was required to find mitigating circumstances. We hold failure of the trial court to provide the jury with a proper standard for determining mitigating circumstances constitutes reversible error. See Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 100 L. Ed. 2d 384, 108 S. Ct. 1860 (1988) (holding a death sentence should be vacated where there was a substantial probability reasonable jurors may have thought they could only consider those mitigating circumstances unanimously found to exist). Accordingly, we must reverse the death sentence and remand to the district court for a new capital sentencing hearing.
Thus, Scott gets a new sentencing hearing.

The court also found error in PIK Crim. 3d 56.00-C(3), or part of the "aggravating circumstances" instruction. PIK Crim. 3d 56.00-C(3) currently lists the aggravated circumstance: “the defendant committed the crime for the defendant’s self or another for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value.” The court held, “PIK Crim. 3d 56.00-C(3) should be revised to specifically designate the crime of capital murder.”

Here is coverage from the Wichita Eagle.


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Execution information derived from Rick Halperin, DPIC & media accounts