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CAPITAL
DEFENSE
WEEKLY
Leading off this week is the
Florida Supreme Court's decision in Michael
Coleman
v.
State.
Trial counsel at a postconviction evidentiary hearing "testified that
he was convinced Coleman was
innocent and indicated he had no reason to believe he needed to pursue
mitigation for the penalty phase." Trial counsel also "admitted that he
never inquired into whether Coleman (1) was in special education
classes; (2) abused drugs; or (3) suffered a head injury," in addition
to other mitigation, rather he
focused the penalty phase defense on residual doubt. The jury
recommended life but the trial court overrode that recommendation. The
State on appeal argued that "Coleman did not provide Stokes with any
mitigation, and such mitigation may have been harmful to Coleman‘s
case." The Coleman
holds, however, if trial counsel "had properly presented the
aforementioned
mitigating
evidence, the trial judge would have had to view it in light most
favorable to the defendant and would have been precluded from
overriding the jury." As Mr. Coleman "has demonstrated that the
mitigation presented would
have provided a reasonable basis for the jury recommendation, the
defendant is entitled to a life sentence."
Leading
off the news, in New York, despite a multimillion
dollar federal
death
penalty, Vinny "Gorgeous" Basciano's defense team
quickly secured a life sentence
based on the federal government's use of witnesses who were much
more sullied than the Defendant and because more morally culpable
participants in the murder received life.
In Texas, prosecutorial misconduct has led both
parties
in
the
Chelsea Richardson appeal to seek a a new penalty
phase. A
clemency request has been filed with the Texas Board of Pardons and
Paroles for Humberto Leal Garcia by the Mexican National
Human
Rights
Commission.
In Montana, counsel have filed a high
profile
challenge to the state's death penalty
statutes under Ring.
Also in
Montana
the state legislature has granted a supplemental budget item,
approximately
$1
million
from the 2011 Montana Legislature specifically to defend
death penalty cases.
The
Nevada Senate
passed a bill authorizing a legislative audit of the cost of the
state's death
penalty.
As
always
a
heartfelt
thanks
for
reading and a special thank you to Steve Hall from which must of the
news is drawn.
-
k
Pending
Executions
June
14
Shawn Hawkins* (Ohio)
15
John Balentine* (Tex)
16
Lee Taylor* (Tex)
16
Eddie Powell III* (Ala)
16
Ricky Gray (Va)
21
Milton Mathis* (Tex)
30
Richard Bible (Az)
July
7
Humberto Leal* (Tex)
12
Marcel Williams* (Ark)
19
Kenneth Smith* (Ohio)
19
Thomas West
20
Mark Stroman* (Tex)
August
10
Martin Robles* (Tex)
16
Brett Hartman* (Ohio)
16
Gary Haugen (Ore)
23
Randall Mayes* (Tex)
30
Ivan Cantu* (Tex)
Stays
April
5
Cleve Foster* (Tex)
5
Daniel Wayne Cook* (Az)
6
Wayne Kubsch (Ind)
May
24
Robert Simon, Jr.*(Miss)
June
14
Carey Moore* (Neb)
22 Frank Williams* (Ark)
Executions
May
3
Cary Kerr* (Tex)
6
Jeffrey Motts* (SC)(V)
10
Benny Stevens* (Miss)
17
Daniel Bedford* (Ohio)
17
Rodney Gray* (Miss)
19
Jason Williams* (Ala)
25
Don Beaty* (Ariz)
June
1
Gayland Bradford* (Tex)
*"serious"
execution date / (s) stay believed likely / (V) Volunteer / note this
list may erroneously exclude some dates [via DPIC]
SCOTUS
- Brown
v.
Plata, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4012 (5/23/2011) In an unusually
blunt language Court holds the Eighth Amendment requires something more
than warehousing inmates.
Week
of
May
30,
2011:
In
Favor
of
the
Accused
or
Condemned
- Michael
Coleman
v.
State,
2011 Fla. LEXIS 1251 (Fl 6/2/2011) “For the reasons expressed below, we
reverse the circuit court‘s denial of postconviction relief as it
pertains to Coleman‘s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during
the penalty phase because we conclude that counsel rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel during the penalty phase when counsel failed to
investigate, develop, and present available mitigating evidence that
would have legally precluded an override of the jury‘s life
recommendation. Therefore, we vacate Coleman‘s death sentences and
remand for imposition of life sentences instead.”
Week
of
May 30,
2011:
In
Favor
of
the
Prosecution
or
Warden
- Eugene
Tyrone
Decastro
v.
Branker,
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11199 (4th Cir 6/3/2011) “In a petition for habeas
relief from a conviction of first degree murder, judgment of the
district court denying relief is affirmed where application on the
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and state violations of
Eighth Amendment and due process rights fail because state court’s
decisions did not constitute an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts”
[via FindLaw]
- Mark
Duke v.
Allen,
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 10574 (11th Cir 5/26/2011)(dissent) “Court
affirm[s] the denial of habeas relief to an Alabama inmate. During the
prosecution’s closing argument, defense counsel objected to an apparent
reference to the defendant’s failure to testify, and asked the trial
court to note that the prosecutor was pointing at the defendant when he
made the statement. The trial court, however, did not so note. The
Court found that defense counsel therefore failed to preserve a record
adequate to allow a reviewing court to review the claimed gesture by
the prosecutor. Moreover, the “he” whom the prosecutor may have been
commenting on might not have been the defendant, but the blood of a
victim. [In dissent, Judge Wilson argued that “he” referred to the
defendant, and the prosecution was therefore improperly commenting on
the defendant’s failure to testify.]” [via Defense Newsletter blog]
- State
v.
Roderick Nunley,
2011 Mo. LEXIS 127 (Mo. 5/31/2011) ”Because the man pleaded
guilty and
waived jury sentencing for the strategic reason of avoiding jury
sentencing, his federal and state constitutional rights were not
violated. His original plea and waiver remained valid after this Court
remanded (sent back) his case for resentencing. Because he pleaded
guilty and waived jury sentencing, the later – decided cases of Ring v.
Arizona and State v. Whitfield do not apply. In addition, this Court
did not err in its proportionality review of the man’s death sentence
because the applicable law regarding proportionality review described
in State v. Deck and State v. Dorsey is not retroactive.” ”Dissent
would
hold that “a defendant cannot waive a constitutional right that was not
yet recognized at the time of the plea and the assertion of which is
not inherently inconsistent with the plea.” [via the Missouri Supreme
Court’s Clerk’s Office’s summary]
- State,
ex re.
Michael Anthony Taylor v. Steele,
2011 Mo. LEXIS 125 (Mo. 5/31/2011) (dissent) Mr. Taylor at
trial
sought a bench trial for his guilt phase claim and which resulted in
the automatic waiver of a jury at the penalty phase under Missouri law.
On postconviction relief is denied as: “(1) Taylor is not
entitled to
jury sentencing under the Sixth Amendment;” “(2) Taylor’s waiver of
jury sentencing remains valid;” “(3) Because the record clearly shows
that Taylor strategically waived jury sentencing after weighing the
costs and benefits of facing a jury, his case is distinguishable from
Apprendi v. New
Jersey, Ring, Blakely, Whitfield and their
progeny;”
“(4) Taylor is not entitled to retroactive application of Ring or
its
progeny;”“(5) For the reasons discussed above, Taylor remains bound by
his strategic decision in 1991 to have his sentence imposed by a
judge
rather than a jury.” Dissent would hold that waiver of rights under
Ring must be made separate and apart from the waiver of a guilt phase
jury. [via the Missouri Supreme Court’s Clerk’s Office’s summary]
- State
v.
Roy
L.
Ellis,
281 Neb. 571 (Neb. 5/27/2011) Relief denied, most notably, on the
admission of other crime evidence. Specifically, “[t]he State, over
Ellis’ objection, presented testimony from Ellis’ former
stepdaughters
that Ellis had sexually assaulted them during a 3-year period
from
1993 to 1995.” “Although we find that Ellis’ argument regarding
evidence admitted pursuant to rule 404(2) has merit, we find that the
error was harmless; the physical evidence, and statements Ellis was
reported to have made before the physical evidence connected him to the
crime, established his guilt beyond any reasonable dispute. The
district court, however, correctly overruled Ellis’ objections to
alleged “jailhouse informer” testimony and DNA evidence. And we find no
merit to Ellis’ constitutional challenges to Nebraska’s capital
sentencing scheme or his claims that the evidence is insufficient to
support the findings of the jury and the sentencing panel. Finally, we
find, on our de novo review, that the death penalty is warranted and
proportional in this case.”
- Paul
Christopher
Hildwin
v.
State,
2011 Fla. LEXIS 1254 (Fl 6/2/2011) Relief denied on claims relating to
“(1) ineffective assistance of penalty-phase counsel for failing to
investigate, prepare, and present mitigating evidence, and (2)
ineffective assistance of penalty-phase counsel in failing to object to
improper remarks made by the prosecutor in closing argument.”
- People
v.
Veronica
Utilia
Gonzales, 2011 Cal. LEXIS 5437 (Cal 6/2/2011)
(dissent) "Trial
court
should have curtailed prosecutor's extended and melodramatic
oration couched as a letter to victim by sustaining defense objections
and admonishing jury, but defendant failed to show prejudice, as there
was not reasonable possibility jury would have returned different
penalty verdict absent inflammatory and irrelevant aspects of letter."
[via LexisOne]
Week
of
May
23,
2011:
In
Favor
of
the
Accused
or
Condemned
Week
of
May
23,
2011:
In
Favor
of
the
Prosecution
or
Warden
- Erick
Virgil
Hall
v.
State,
2011 Ida. LEXIS 89 (Ida 5/27/2011) Relief denied on claims
pertaining
to: “1. Whether the district court had the inherent authority to enter
an order restricting appellate counsel’s contact with jurors. 2.
Whether the district court violated Hall’s attorneys’ First Amendment
rights by entering an order forbidding contact with the jurors absent
prior court approval.3. Whether the district court abused its
discretion in denying Hall’s motion for post-verdict communications
with the jurors. 4. Whether the district court abused its discretion in
denying Hall’s motion to depose his trial counsel’s investigator.”
-
Norberto
Pietri
v.
Fl.
Dep’t
of
Corr., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 10573 (11th
Cir 5/25/2011) Affirming “the denial of habeas relief to a
Florida inmate sentenced to death for a 1988 murder. The Court rejected
the argument that counsel were ineffective for failing to put on an
“metabolic intoxication” defense. The Court noted that Pietri did not
show that he was intoxicated at the time of the murder, and that
“metabolic intoxication” was not a cognizable under Florida law at the
time of Pietri’s trial. The Court also rejected the argument that
counsel were ineffective at the penalty phase for failing to present
mitigating evidence. The Court found that trial counsel strategically
decided not to present some of the mental health experts they
consulted.”
-
Donald
Edward
Beaty v. Brewer, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 10562 (9th Cir 5/25/2011)
“State inmate was not entitled to a stay of his execution based
on the state’s intent to use a substitute drug in its lethal injection
protocol; an Eighth Amendment claim had been found unlikely to succeed
because a risk of severe pain was not shown, and the inmate did not
have a Fourteenth Amendment due process right to review protocol
changes.” [via Lexisone]
-
Ex
parte
State
of
Alabama; (In re: Thomas Robert Lane v. State of
Alabama), 2011 Ala. LEXIS 82 (Ala 5/27/2011) The trial court
removed
counsel that Lane liked. “[T]he trial court’s erroneous removal of
Lane’s court-appointed counsel was not [however] structural error, and
the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in failing to determine whether the
trial court committed plain error when it removed Lane’s
court-appointed counsel. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case to the Court of Criminal
Appeals for that court to determine whether the trial court committed
plain error when it removed Jordan as Lane’s lead counsel.”
-
Zane
Jack
Fields
v.
State, 2011 Ida. LEXIS 80 (Ida 5/25/2011) “This is
an
appeal from a judgment summarily dismissing an application for
post-conviction relief based upon DNA test results and affidavits of
trial witnesses. Because the DNA test results did not establish that
petitioner did not commit the offense and the affidavits cannot support
a claim for post-conviction relief….”
- Billy
Ray
Irick
v.
State, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 367 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 5/23/2011) “[D]enial of the inmate’s petition
for writ of error coram nobis was proper under Tenn. Code Ann. §
40-26-105(b) because his petition was time-barred and because, even if
the claims were timely, he failed to show that if the later-arising
evidence been admitted at the original trial that it might have changed
the outcome.” [via LexisOne]
- Comm.
v.
Ralph
Birdsong, 2011 Pa. LEXIS 1160 (Penn
5/26/2011) Relief denied following, what the dissent calls, a cut &
paste opinion drawn heavily from the Commonwealth’s brief, sufficiency
of colloquy waiver of jury trial, lack of evidentiary support for the
court below’s findings, and evidentiary issues before the
postconviction court. Substantively, relief denied on claims relating
to Brady violations:“(1) Commonwealth witness Andre Kinard was offered
immunity from unrelated criminal charges in exchange for his
identification testimony against appellant; (2) the Commonwealth placed
several key witnesses in a witness protection program, which provided
them with free housing, stipends for living expenses, and relocation to
another city; (3) electronic surveillance purportedly establishing
members of one of appellant's rival drug factions planned to
assassinate another drug dealer; and (4) the results of tests comparing
appellant's blood and saliva samples with those recovered from the rape
victim.” Further, “[a]n inmate failed to show ineffectiveness of trial
or appellate counsel where pursuit of a misidentification defense was
not unreasonable, the decision not to call witnesses was one of trial
strategy, and the inmate validly waived the right to a jury at
sentencing and to present mental health mitigation testimony in that
proceeding.” [via LexisOne]
Catching up from past editions
- State
v.
Clarence
Wayne
Dixon, 2011 Ariz. LEXIS 23 (Az 5/6/2011) "Murder
was
especially
cruel
under the Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-751(F)(6)
aggravator because the victim surely must have suffered mental anguish
while being raped, hit, and strangled, and defendant should have known
that the victim would suffer such anguish while being attacked."
[via
LexisOne
&
although misses some of the other issues, its
better than nothing]
- State
v.
Wayne
Benoit
Prince, 607 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 4 (Az 5/6/2011) "Ariz.
Rev.
Stat.
§
13-752(K) was not void for vagueness because the
statutes governing the second penalty phase, Ariz. Rev. Stat.
§§ 13-752(G), 13-751(G), provided sufficient guidance for the
admissibility of evidence of the aggravating factors previously found
by the aggravation-phase jury." [via LexisOne &
although misses some of the other issues, its better than nothing]
Noncapital
of
note:
- Tara
Sheneva
Williams
v.
Cavazos, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 10345 (9th Cir
5/23/2011) “A hung jury is never a desirable outcome in a criminal
trial. When a mistrial results, the interest shared by the State, the
defendant, the court, and the public in the efficient administration of
justice is diminished. The sacrifice of efficiency for the preservation
of liberty is central, however, to the safeguards the Constitution
affords criminal defendants. If “[m]en must turn square corners when
they deal with the Government,” it is even more true that the
government, including the courts, may not cut corners when dealing with
man’s freedom. Unfortunately, the trial court cut some corners here. In
view of the reasonable possibility that Juror No. 6′s discharge was
directly or indirectly the result of his position on the merits of the
case, and in view of the lack of good cause to justify his dismissal,
we hold that the removal of Juror No. 6 deprived Williams of her right
to a fair trial by jury. We therefore reverse the judgment of the
district court and remand with instructions to grant the writ.”
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In
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due
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we
aren't
a
substitute
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it
. As the author(s) don't
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cases in which the writer(s)
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OPEN
RESEARCH
DATA:
We've
been
at
this
since
1997, thanks to all those
whose time, efforts, and contributions have made it possible over the
years. Search terms for the weekly are,: " "capital habeas"
or "capital postconviction" or "death penalty" or
"capital murder" or "sentenced to death" or
"penalty phase" or "special questions" or
"sentence of death" or "death sentence" or
"capital punishment" or "witherspoon" or atkins,"
on Lexisone.com. Please note the terms dramatically "overproduce"
results. FindLaw.com & various listservs are also used to
cross-check results.
SOURCES: Execution
and other news
information derived
from DPIC, Steve Hall, Rick Halperin, & media
accounts.
**Indicates
prior
representation
or
other
involvement
in
the
case by compiler
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