Pending Executions
June
14   Shawn Hawkins* (Ohio)
15   John Balentine* (Tex)
16   Lee Taylor* (Tex)
16   Eddie Powell III* (Ala)
16   Ricky Gray (Va)
21   Milton Mathis* (Tex)
30   Richard Bible (Az)
July
7     Humberto Leal* (Tex)
12   Marcel Williams* (Ark)
19   Kenneth Smith* (Ohio)
19   Thomas West
20   Mark Stroman* (Tex)
August
10   Martin Robles* (Tex)
16   Brett Hartman* (Ohio)
16   Gary Haugen (Ore)
23   Randall Mayes* (Tex)
30   Ivan Cantu* (Tex)

Stays
April
5    Cleve Foster* (Tex)
5    Daniel Wayne Cook* (Az)
6    Wayne Kubsch (Ind)
May
24   Robert Simon, Jr.*(Miss)
June
14   Carey Moore* (Neb)
22   Frank Williams* (Ark)

Executions
May
3    Cary Kerr* (Tex)
6     Jeffrey Motts* (SC)(V)
10   Benny Stevens* (Miss)
17   Daniel Bedford* (Ohio)
17   Rodney Gray* (Miss)
19   Jason Williams* (Ala)
25   Don Beaty* (Ariz)
June
1     Gayland Bradford* (Tex)

*"serious" execution date / (s) stay believed likely / (V) Volunteer / note this list may erroneously exclude some dates [via DPIC] 

SCOTUS 

• Brown v. Plata,  2011 U.S. LEXIS 4012 (5/23/2011) In an unusually blunt language Court holds the Eighth Amendment requires something more than warehousing inmates. 

• Eugene Tyrone Decastro v. Branker, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11199 (4th Cir 6/3/2011) “In a petition for habeas relief from a conviction of first degree murder, judgment of the district court denying relief is affirmed where applicaton on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and state violations of Eighth Amendment and due process rights fail because state court’s decisions did not constitute an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts” [via FindLaw]

• Michael Coleman v. State, 2011 Fla. LEXIS 1251 (Fl 6/2/2011) “For the reasons expressed below, we reverse the circuit court‘s denial of postconviction relief as it pertains to Coleman‘s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase because we conclude that counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase when counsel failed to investigate, develop, and present available mitigating evidence that would have legally precluded an override of the jury‘s life recommendation. Therefore, we vacate Coleman‘s death sentences and remand for imposition of life sentences instead.”

• Mark Duke v. Allen, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 10574 (11th Cir 5/26/2011)(dissent) “Court affirm[s] the denial of habeas relief to an Alabama inmate. During the prosecution’s closing argument, defense counsel objected to an apparent reference to the defendant’s failure to testify, and asked the trial court to note that the prosecutor was pointing at the defendant when he made the statement. The trial court, however, did not so note. The Court found that defense counsel therefore failed to preserve a record adequate to allow a reviewing court to review the claimed gesture by the prosecutor. Moreover, the “he” whom the prosecutor may have been commenting on might not have been the defendant, but the blood of a victim. [In dissent, Judge Wilson argued that “he” referred to the defendant, and the prosecution was therefore improperly commenting on the defendant’s failure to testify.]” [via Defense Newsletter blog]

• State v. Roderick Nunley,  2011 Mo. LEXIS 127 (Mo. 5/31/2011) ”Because the man pleaded guilty and waived jury sentencing for the strategic reason of avoiding jury sentencing, his federal and state  constitutional rights were not violated. His original plea and waiver remained valid after this Court remanded (sent back) his case for resentencing. Because he pleaded guilty and waived jury sentencing, the later – decided cases of Ring v. Arizona and State v. Whitfield do not apply. In addition, this Court did not err in its proportionality review of the man’s death sentence because the applicable law regarding proportionality review described in State v. Deck and State v. Dorsey is not retroactive.””Dissent would hold that “a defendant cannot waive a constitutional right that was not yet recognized at the time of the plea and the assertion of which is not inherently inconsistent with the plea.” [via the Missouri Supreme Court’s Clerk’s Office’s summary]

• State, ex re. Michael Anthony Taylor v. Steele,  2011 Mo. LEXIS 125  (Mo. 5/31/2011) (dissent) Mr. Taylor at trial sought a bench trial for his guilt phase claim and which resulted in the automatic waiver of a jury at the penalty phase under Missouri law.  On postconviction relief is denied as: “(1) Taylor is not entitled to jury sentencing under the Sixth Amendment;” “(2) Taylor’s waiver of jury sentencing remains valid;” “(3) Because the record clearly shows that Taylor strategically waived jury sentencing after weighing the costs and benefits of facing a jury, his case is distinguishable from Apprendi v. New Jersey, Ring, Blakely, Whitfield and their progeny;”  “(4) Taylor is not entitled to retroactive application of Ring or its progeny;”“(5) For the reasons discussed above, Taylor remains bound by his strategic decision in 1991 to  have his sentence imposed by a judge rather than a jury.” Dissent would hold that waiver of rights under Ring must be made separate and apart from the waiver of a guilt phase jury. [via the Missouri Supreme Court’s Clerk’s Office’s summary]

• State v. Roy L. Ellis, 281 Neb. 571 (Neb. 5/27/2011) Relief denied, most notably, on the admission of other crime evidence. Specifically, “[t]he State, over Ellis’ objection, presented testimony from  Ellis’ former stepdaughters that Ellis had sexually assaulted  them during a 3-year period from 1993 to 1995.” “Although we find that Ellis’ argument regarding evidence admitted pursuant to rule 404(2) has merit, we find that the error was harmless; the physical evidence, and statements Ellis was reported to have made before the physical evidence connected him to the crime, established his guilt beyond any reasonable dispute. The district court, however, correctly overruled Ellis’ objections to alleged “jailhouse informer” testimony and DNA evidence. And we find no merit to Ellis’ constitutional challenges to Nebraska’s capital sentencing scheme or his claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the findingsof the jury and the sentencing panel. Finally, we find, on our de novo review, that the death penalty is warranted and proportional in this case.”

• Paul Christopher Hildwin v. State, 2011 Fla. LEXIS 1254 (Fl 6/2/2011) Relief denied on claims relating to “(1) ineffective assistance of penalty-phase counsel for failing to investigate, prepare, and present mitigating evidence, and (2) ineffective assistance of penalty-phase counsel in failing to object to improper remarks made by the prosecutor in closing argument.”

• Erick Virgil Hall v. State,  2011 Ida. LEXIS 89 (Ida 5/27/2011) Relief denied on claims pertaining to: “1. Whether the district court had the inherent authority to enter an order restricting appellate counsel’s contact with jurors. 2. Whether the district court violated Hall’s attorneys’ First Amendment rights by entering an order forbidding contact with the jurors absent prior court approval.3. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Hall’s motion for post-verdict communications with the jurors. 4. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Hall’s motion to depose his trial counsel’s investigator.”

• People v. Veronica Utilia Gonzales,  2011 Cal. LEXIS 5437 (Cal 6/2/2011) (dissent) "Trial court should have curtailed prosecutor's extended and melodramatic oration couched as a letter to victim by sustaining defense objections and admonishing jury, but defendant failed to show prejudice, as there was not reasonable possibility jury would have returned different penalty verdict absent inflammatory and irrelevant aspects of letter." [via LexisOne]
  

Week of May 23, 2011: In Favor of the Accused or Condemned

Catching up from past editions

• State v. Clarence Wayne Dixon, 2011 Ariz. LEXIS 23 (Az 5/6/2011) "Murder was especially cruel under the Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-751(F)(6) aggravator because the victim surely must have suffered mental anguish while being raped, hit, and strangled, and defendant should have known that the victim would suffer such anguish while being attacked." [via LexisOne & although misses some of the other issues, its better than nothing]
  
  

• State v. Wayne Benoit Prince,  607 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 4 (Az 5/6/2011) "Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-752(K) was not void for vagueness because the statutes governing the second penalty phase, Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-752(G), 13-751(G), provided sufficient guidance for the admissibility of evidence of the aggravating factors previously found by the aggravation-phase jury." [via LexisOne & although misses some of the other issues, its better than nothing]

Noncapital of note: SMALL PRINT

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SOURCES: Execution and other news information derived from DPIC, Steve Hall, Rick Halperin, & media accounts.
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