A small miracle in Georgia for the indigents’ defense bar
Sherri Jefferson, whose story we brought to you last fall, won near miraculously in the Georgia Supreme Court today. In the world of turmoil that has enveloped the Georgia indigents’ defense bar in recent month this is somewhere between good & great news.
As way of background Jefferson Jefferson, then an Assistant Public Defender in the Brunswick Judicial District, was sentenced to thirty (yes 30) days for her conduct in a delinquency hearing. As I noted back then “Granted, contempt happens. Granted, trial courts sometimes do wacky things. Granted, finding a public defender in contempt won’t get it noted here, or much of anywhere, as rarely are such findings upheld on appeal.” The intermediate appellate courts in Georgia upheld contempt for some rather tepid comments Jefferson made to protect, in her mind, her client’s rights.
In today’s opinion the Court notes that Georgia’s standard for contempt, “clear and present danger” to order in the court, is less than clear. Using Jefferson’s case the Court recasts the standard definition for contempt it has been using and creates a multipronged test: “(1) that the attorney’s statements and attendant conduct either actually interfered with or posed an imminent threat of interfering with the administration of justice and (2) that the attorney knew or should have known that the statements and attendant conduct exceeded the outermost bounds of permissible advocacy.” “[D]oubts should be resolved in favor of vigorous advocacy.”
The opinion appears to effectively end the Jefferson contempt proceeding, but not until after she was apparently left to fend for her own in the Georgia Supreme Court; she appeared pro se.
More after the jump, comments are open.
From the Court Clerk’s synopsis:
The Supreme Court has thrown out a contempt order against a Glynn County public defender that was upheld by the Court of Appeals. Sherri Jefferson was held in contempt and sentenced to 30 days in jail for two statements she made during a juvenile court hearing. The Court of Appeals, in a divided 4-to-3 opinion, affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
But in an opinion written by Presiding Justice Carol Hunstein, the Supreme Court has set a new standard for determining whether a lawyer’s comments during trial constitute contempt of court. In so doing, it has vacated the judgment and sent the case back to the juvenile court so it can take into account the new standard.
As an Assistant Public Defender for the Brunswick Judicial Circuit, Jefferson defended B.W., a minor, against charges of burglary, aggravated battery and possession of a pistol by a person under age 18. The child was accused of stealing a gun and giving it to a friend who then shot a victim while B.W. “egged him on.” During a 2005 hearing, Jefferson accused the judge of “gross interference with the way that I can represent my client.” Later, after she was rebuffed on the same issue, she stated, “I just find the court is biased in its view,” and, “…it seems to me like you’ve made up your mind…”
The judge found her in contempt, citing inappropriate facial expressions, disrespectful tone of voice and improper statements that attacked the impartiality of the court and undermined its authority. She argued she made her statements because she “had to zealously represent her client” in the face of what she perceived as the court’s bias.
Although the Supreme Court has held in the past that statements may be found contemptuous where they pose a “clear and present danger to orderly administration of justice,” that standard has led to inconsistent results, today’s opinion says. Under the new standard, from now on, an attorney can be held in contempt only after the court has found “(1) that the attorney’s statements and attendant conduct either actually interfered with or posed an imminent threat of interfering with the administration of justice and (2) that the attorney knew or should have known that the statements and attendant conduct exceeded the outermost bounds of permissible advocacy.” The Court advises trial courts to consider certain factors when deciding contempt cases, including whether the offending statements represented a pattern and “the extent to which the attorney was put on notice prior to the contempt citation…”
The Court underscores that in deciding a contempt case, “doubts should be resolved in favor of vigorous advocacy.” Justice Harold Melton agrees with the Court’s reversal of the Court of Appeals decision, but does not agree with all that is said in the opinion.
